GOVERNING RELIGION:
Critics of Indonesia's Government Social Cohesion and Religious Harmony Policy

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ABSTRAK

The condition of freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia is in a position that has the potential to disrupt social cohesion and religious harmony. Those threats and challenges are triggered by the structural condition of state policy and cultural condition of society. This research aims to provide an overview of the condition of religious harmony in Indonesia and analyze the structural and cultural problems that affect the condition of religious harmony in Indonesia. In analyzing this article, the author uses the concept of governing religion and security community. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative using a library research approach through collecting and analyzing materials related to the research. The results of this study indicate that there are structural and cultural problems in religious harmony in Indonesia. The government is trying to formulate policies to manage religious harmony to maintain social stability in society, but these efforts have not been maximized and tend to have a negative impact on socio-cultural relations between religious communities in Indonesia which tend to trigger conflicts between religious communities in Indonesia.

Keywords: Freedom of religion/belief; community security; religious harmony; social cohesion

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country with a very high level of diversity both from demographic, sociological, and anthropological aspects. Based on Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) data (2020), the total population of Indonesia is currently 275.60 million people (Ayurizati, n.d.-a). In the midst of this large population, Indonesia is faced with the anthropological reality that there is cultural wealth which is a potential diversity that can giving the strength of the nation. Indonesia has more than 1,340 ethnic groups spread across 17,000 islands in Indonesia (*Indonesia.Go.Id - Suku Bangsa*, n.d.). Indonesia is also awarded a diversity of religions and beliefs, of which there are six majority religions and 187 beliefs (Kemdikbud, n.d.). This condition of diversity was then faced with a problematic condition, where the majority, or as many as 237.56 million Indonesians are Muslim. A large number of Islamic believers in Indonesia, on the one hand, provide an overview of the practice of good pluralist conditions, but on the other hand it also causes various negative conditions that become challenges for national relations between citizens in Indonesia(Ayurizati, n.d.-b).

Religion is one of the essential variables in Indonesia; religion is even one of the basic principles of living in a nation and state, which is contained in the first principle of Pancasila (Indonesia Ideology), namely "Believe in God." It basically contains an explicit recognition of God's existence as the Creator. The divine value in Pancasila shows that the existence of the Indonesian state, nation, and people is related to God, who is believed to be the source of all goodness. It is a moral and religious dimension that determines the archetype for the entire life of the country. In Pancasila, the divine value is read and interpreted hierarchically. The divine value is the highest value because it concerns an absolute value. The whole value of kindness is derived from this value. An act is said to be good if it does not conflict with God's values, rules, and laws. Next, in the reading of Pancasila also, the principle of divinity is embodied in the understanding of just and civilized humanity as the disposition of Indonesian nationality (Hidayat, 2018).

Religion is not only the basis for a moral and philosophical foundation in the state but also enters the social and political dimensions in Indonesia. The interpretation of the first principle, according to Prof. Arief Hidayat, refers to political activities that must be divine, favoring morals and political ethics. In this case, bringing the religion or belief of the nation into the political struggle as a process of statehood is a legitimate act. The most important thing is it is done permanently within the corridors of Pancasila that underlie Indonesia as a godly state. In sentencing, both the formation and enforcement of laws, including the formulation of state policy, must be rooted in divine value. This is what distinguishes the main elements of the Indonesian legal state from other legal countries. The divine value becomes a measuring tool for determining whether the law is good or bad, constitutional or unconstitutional (Hidayat, 2018).

Based on the ideality of the state concept, it should be able to provide a smooth path for the creation of social cohesion and religious harmony in Indonesia, but it is unfortunate that the opposite has not fully happened in Indonesia. The tendency for discrimination and exclusion of religious minorities/believers continues to occur. Concerns about worsening cohesion and social segregation are well-founded when looking at the results of public perception surveys, such as the national survey conducted by LIPI in 2018. Almost 60% of respondents, or six out of 10 people in Indonesia, prefer to live next door or befriend people of the same religion rather than those of different religions. This figure is in line with the finding that almost 70% of respondents, or 7 in 10 people, admit that they rarely even interact with different religions in their daily lives, such as with neighbors or at work (Brief, 2019). This figure is obviously troubling because it is an illustration of the social segregation that occurs today in Indonesia. In addition, more than 50% of respondents also objected to the construction of house of worship of other religions around their residences. Regarding political participation, 65% of respondents

also admitted that they prefer candidates for legislative members or candidates for regional heads who are same religious compared to people of different religions. (Brief, 2019). Referring to the survey results above, it can be said that inter-religious social cohesion in Indonesia is being threatened by the fundamentalism of the majority religion.

The level of discrimination and violence based on the religious issue that occurs in Indonesia has increased quite fluctuating in recent years. Based on the report on the condition of freedom/belief in Indonesia released by Setara Institute, it can be concluded that since 2018-2021 there have been fluctuations in religious-based discrimination actions in Indonesia, while the graph of fluctuations in the increase in events and acts of discrimination against freedom/belief can be seen in the chart below.

Source: Processed from Condition of Freedom of Religion/Belief Report Setara Institute

It can be seen that from 2018-2021 there has been an increase in religious freedom events from 160 events in 2018, 200 events in 2019, 180 events in 2020, and 171 events in 2021. Events in the context of the report compiled by Setara are events that occurred in the span of the past year, the events here do not include the accompanying repressive actions, so it is possible that in one event, more than one action occurred. From this data, it can be seen that there was a significant increase in 2018 - 2019 and a not-too-significant decrease from 2019 - 2021. Similarly, in the aspect of action, similar patterns of fluctuations in increase and decrease are found. Still, based on the publication release published by Setara Institute, it is stated that there are at least two

trends in the pattern of violations of freedom of religion/belief, first is interference with houses of worship which can be in the form of protests/prohibitions on the construction of houses of worship, disturbances in the practice of worship and the destruction of houses of worship. The second is acts of discrimination that include verbal, physical, and intolerant preoccupations carried out by the state and non-state actors, which in-state actors are often manifested by the implementation of policies that discriminate against the freedom of certain religious people.

In this writing, the author also refers to several previous research findings that have discussed the issues related to the policy of religious harmony among different religious communities in Indonesia. One of the referenced studies is conducted by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD) at Paramadina University, titled "Revisiting the 2006 Joint Ministerial Decree and the Role of the Interfaith Harmony Forum (FKUB): Findings from the Database" in 2020. Within this research, several key issues about the problem of religious relation Indonesia were identified: First, the role of local governments in maintaining religious harmony is still not optimal and evenly distributed, and often inter-religious conflicts are considered to occur because they are driven by mistakes in policy making by the Government. Secondly, the Interfaith Harmony Forum (FKUB), which should serve as a key tool for regional governments in fostering religious harmony within specific areas, has not fully maximized its role. Some contributing factors include the lack of competence among FKUB members in preventing conflicts among religious communities, issues related to the insufficient representation of religions within FKUB memberships, as well as challenges concerning empowerment and funding. Furthermore, the neutrality of FKUB and the potential for biased roles in providing recommendations for the establishment of places of worship are also issues identified within the study. (Ichsan, 2020).

Literature Review

In Indonesia, religion is not only present in the private sphere but has also entered the public domain, requiring the presence of the state for regulation. Despite the existence of many policies and regulations, they do not immediately solve the issues concerning religion. This is due to the increasing presence of religion in the public space, making the management of religious-related policies more complex. Furthermore, this also demands a solid understanding so that productive, accommodating, and high-quality policies can be formulated (Fauzi et al., 2017). The phenomenon of freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia which is briefly conveyed above describes a condition of threat to public *security (community security)*. The condition of the plurality of the Indonesian nation is faced with the strengthening of the majoritarianism of religious groups in Indonesia, which affects the existence of the right to religious freedom and social cohesion in Indonesia.

Therefore, when examining interactions between different religions, it is important to understand the notion of religion itself. The author attempts to explain the essence of religion based on Elizabeth Hurd's perspective, in which she classifies religion into three categories: (1) Governed religion: This category includes religions that are established by individuals who hold positions of political and religious authority. These individuals have the power to define what can be categorized as religion, and they set the parameters. (2) Expert religion: In this category, religion is shaped by those with political and religious authority, as well as expertise. It involves individuals who are recognized for their knowledge of religion within various contextual frameworks, (3) Lived religion: The third classification pertains to religion as practiced daily by its adherents. These individuals, who are considered to have comprehensive knowledge of religion in various contextual dimensions, engage in religious practices individually and collectively. This category includes a wide variety as it encompasses what is defined as religious or non-religious, according to legal and governmental standards (Rohman, 2018) .

Threats to public security in the context of inter-religious relations can be influenced by the way the state constructs its interests in the management of religious policies or what

Elizabeth S. Hurd calls governed religion, namely religion that has been adapted to the influence or wishes of the parties in power in the political realm (Bagir, n.d.). The scope of this arrangement can apply on a regional or national scale. In the context of Islam in Indonesia, which has great influence in the political landscape, it can undoubtedly be considered as a role model for various forms of regulation, particularly with regard to religious matters.

Threats to religious minorities fall into the category of community security, where some forms of action include: discrimination, exclusion, violence from other groups, and threats from the state. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also defines community security as a threat associated with tensions based on inter-ethnic, religious, and other identities. The idea of community security provides a flexible framework for responding to multiple contexts and cultures while bridging state-centered and individual-centered conceptions of security. The aim is to develop an 'effective state that is accountable to citizens for the effective delivery of services and focuses on developing an inclusive political process (Caballero-Anthony, 2015). Some academics equate community security with the protection of one's identity. Social security arises in situations where important groups in society feel threatened, feel their identities are threatened by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves. This suggests that people maintain the boundaries of their group because they have an innate need for their group.

In the concept of human security, particularly community security, the shift towards the subject of security is also relevant to look at the vulnerability of religious minority groups. One of the practical consequences of this shift is to view vulnerable individuals and groups not only as victims in need of protection, but also as active agents who can be empowered to engage with the threats they face (Petri, 2021).

This paper will try to dig deeper into the factual conditions of religious harmony in Indonesia and provide a critical picture of how the Government as a facilitator of religious harmony, still cannot play an ideal role in facilitating religious harmony. This paper will also try to explore options that can be an ideal solution in responding to the condition of religious harmony in Indonesia. The novelty in this research compared to the referenced previous studies lies in the inclusion of the concept of human security, particularly community security, in interfaith relations in Indonesia. The portrayal of the concept of human security becomes crucial to provide readers with an alternative perspective that religious harmony should no longer be viewed solely as a socio-cultural issue, but also as a matter of national security. Additionally, this article places a critical emphasis on analyzing government policies in managing religious harmony, which is seen as triggering conflicts among religious communities, as well as proposing alternative solutions for policy improvement and development.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this study is qualitative. This is intended to understand and seek the meaning of the phenomenon of religious discrimination in Indonesia as one of the threats to public security. This qualitative research also aims to explore alternative solutions to minimize the occurrence of discrimination against minority religious groups from the perspective of community security.

The data collection technique used in this research is a *library research* study through the collection and analysis of materials related to research, such as laws and regulations, scientific journals, literature, news in the mass media, and related books. The data analysis technique used in the study is qualitative data analysis where in this study in the form of opinions expressed by experts, these data are used as a basis to strengthen the author's arguments in analyzing this article.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overview of Religious Harmony in Indonesia (2017-2021)

In looking at the condition of religious harmony in Indonesia, the author tries to describe it from various findings and data that have been found by previous studies on the condition of freedom of religion/belief.

The Pew Research Center's latest report on Global Religious Restrictions, which covers most of the world's countries through 2017, finds significant religious restrictions in Indonesia. According to Pew's index, the country's level of government restrictions is considered "very high" (at 7.9 of 10), and its level of social hostilities involving religion is considered "high" (5.9 of 10). In addition, the 2020 Annual Report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended that the U.S. Department of State place Indonesia on a Special Watch List of countries "where the government engages in or tolerates 'severe' violations of religious freedom" (a category lower in severity than the "Country of Particular Concern" category). However, Indonesia's government restrictions score for 2017 is better than the previous year (8.5 in 2016), and its social hostilities score has witnessed a significant improvement of nearly three points since 2011 (when it reached a 10-year high of 8.7. (Syah, 2020).

The Pew Research Center's findings are confirmed by research conducted by the Setara Institute over the past few years, particularly regarding actors who have led to religious violence. As an illustration, in 2021, it was stated in the report that there had been violations of Religious Freedom/Belief by state actors, most committed by the police (16 actions) and local governments (15 actions). Violations of Religious Freedom/Belief by non-state actors were most committed by citizen groups (57 actions), individuals (44 actions), and community organizations/mass organizations (22 actions). The mass organizations that committed the most violations of Religious Freedom/Belief were MUI, with eight violations. Three of them are misdirection, namely declaring a sect as heretical and misleading, which has

implications for the loss of the right to adhere to beliefs according to conscience because it is given guidance and the loss of the right to spread a teaching that has been considered heretical by the MUI (SETARA Institute, 2022).

In terms of victims, in 2021, Protestant Christians were the most victims of violations of religious freedom, with 26 cases. Twenty of the cases include disturbances of houses of worship which include denial of the establishment of houses of worship, disturbances during worship, destruction of houses of worship, and attacks on people that occur in places of worship/houses of worship carried out by either non-state and/or state actors. With regard to the house of worship disruptions, the church has consistently occupied the first position as the most disturbing house of worship each year since 2007, with exceptions in 2008 and 2016. In 2021, there were 24 churches (Protestant and Catholic) that experienced disruptions. The mosque occupies the second position as the house of worship that experienced the most disturbances, with seven disturbances in 2021(SETARA Institute, 2022)

The picture of freedom of religion/belief from another perspective is presented in a study released by the religious freedom institute in 2020 (Syah, 2020); it is described in the study that there are two challenges to freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia. First, the stigmatization of the branches as a cult/religion is still strongly organized at the grassroots, although the Constitutional Court, through its decision, has encouraged the Government to accommodate the civil affairs of believers (ID card column, birth certificate registration, etc.) this does not necessarily succeed in changing the public's mindset about the existence of believers as part of citizens who have the right to adhere to their beliefs, This has resulted in the emergence of social discrimination by the community and the Government. Second, the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism, which in recent years these groups have increasingly targeted religious minorities. They have focused their attacks primarily on Christians as well as on "deviant" groups they consider unorthodox, particularly the Ahmadiyya and Shia communities. Through their intimidation and violent tactics, Islamic vigilante groups have sought to establish themselves as key players in shaping Muslim public sentiment on

the issue of religion.

Islamist groups pose a threat to religious freedom in Indonesia, manifested in political landscape in 2017 elections and the blasphemy conviction of Jakarta's Christian governor, Ahok. While Islamist hatred of a man who serves as Governor of the country's largest metropolis is certainly expected, what surprised many, locally and internationally, was the sheer scale of opposition mobilized in the movement against Gubernur Ahok. Ostensibly led by the FPI but actually supported and controlled by the political and economic elites. Although the FPI and HTI are very prominent, they are not the only radical groups operating in Indonesia. Others are the Muslim Forum and the Indonesian Mujahideen Council. The anti-Ahok mobilization illustrates the potential ability of Islamist groups—when supported by highly influential elites—to shape the political stance of Indonesian Muslims at the expense of long-established inclusive Muslim groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU. Although extremist groups are much smaller than mainstream Muslim organizations in Indonesia, it shows that hardline organizations are sometimes adept at "whipping community antipathy" against religious minorities, and many of these groups often increase support by helping local Muslim communities. (Syah, 2020).

In terms of the problem of houses of worship, SETARA Institute highlighted two main problems, namely the permit of houses of worship (IMB) and the disruption of worship. In the case of IMB houses of worship, SETARA Institute observed that the Government still applies the same settlement pattern. If a house of worship belonging to a minority group receives a lot of resistance and does not meet the minimum requirement of 60 support from the local community as stipulated in Joint Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Religious Affairs Number 8 and 9 of 2006 about Guidelines for the Implementation of the Duties of Regional Heads/ Deputy Regional Heads in Maintaining Religious Harmony, Empowerment of Religious Harmony Forums, and Establishment of Synagogues (PBM 8/9), then the Government proposes to move the location so that the house of worship can still be built. This happened in the case of the GKI Yasmin land grant in Bogor City, whose groundbreaking was carried out on December 5, 2021, as well as the Royal Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, Bekasi City, and Bogor City, both of which were inaugurated in 2021. The process of administering IMB for minority groups of houses of worship does not fully reflect the guarantee of religious freedom, considering that minority groups are still not free to establish houses of worship wherever they want. SETARA Institute understands the move as an attempt by the state to be present amid the complexity of conflict resolution relating to houses of worship and places of worship. However, SETARA Institute stresses that such solutions should not be a pattern of resolution in cases of rejection and disruption of houses of worship. As for the long-term solution, the Government and all elements of civil society need to intensify interfaith dialogue so that it can make the community truly uphold pluralism and provide support for the construction of houses of worship for minority groups. Thus, minority groups are expected to be able to establish houses of worship anywhere without worrying about rejection from the majority group (SETARA Institute, 2022).

Looking at the facts and conditions of religious harmony described above, the tendency of the dominance of government attention to governed religion is very strong, the state tries to construct its own "religions" in order to emphasize its goals on the stability of security and public order. The situation of Freedom of Religion and Belief in Indonesia is characterized by ambiguity, as evidenced by the increasing cases of blasphemy, the fulfillment of civil rights for certain religious groups, and the construction of places of worship. The recurring cases above are strong evidence that the regulation of freedom of religion in Indonesia does not consistently provide a proportional portion for all religious communities living in Indonesia, in accordance with the principles of Human Rights (Ramadhan, n.d.).

Government Policies and Conflict Resolution

in Religious Harmony in Indonesia

The Constitution of 1945 has affirmed that freedom of religion/belief is a basic right guaranteed by the Constitution and the State. The guarantee is contained in article 28 E of the 1945 Constitution, which reads :

"Everyone is free to embrace religion and worship according to his religion, choose education and teaching, choose employment, choose citizenship, choose a residence in the territory of the country and leave it, and have the right to return."

The constitution in article 28 I also guarantees religion as a *non-dirigible human right* under any circumstances, and article 29, paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution also guarantees the role of the state in protecting the independence of each population to be able to embrace and worship in accordance with their respective religions/beliefs. In the construction of the state constitution, it can be concluded that the state has the mandate to ensure that there can be no discrimination against people of any religion in Indonesia. However, it is unfortunate that the constitutional mandate has not been implemented properly by the Government and some Indonesian people until now.

One of the structural problems in the management of religious harmony in Indonesia is the gap in the implementation of religious harmony policies between the Central Government and Regional Governments. When referring to Law Number 23 of 2014 about Regional Government state that the religious policy is one of the six responsibilities of the Central Government, while the Regional Government has a duty to maintain the security and order of society. Within the framework of the relationship between the central Government and local governments, it then gives rise to logical consequences in the process of making policies for religious harmony. The central Government, in this case, is positioned as a facilitator who provides policy guidelines for local governments. However, this resulted in one unbalanced implementation problem,

where at the end of the day, the authority regarding religion is strongly in the hands of the central Government in contrast to the narrow authority of the Local Government, which has to face many cases of religious conflicts in the regions. Local governments are then faced with political problems due to weak authority in the field of managing religious harmony policies. Often local leaders are more concerned with security measures than holistic problem-solving, and sometimes regional leaders do not even have the power to deal with perpetrators of discrimination against religious minorities because of fears of losing their legitimacy and political electability.

In managing religious harmony, local governments are only given "guidance" by the Central Government, a Joint Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Religious Affairs Number 8 and 9 of 2006 about Guidelines for the Implementation of the Duties of Regional Heads/ Deputy Regional Heads in Maintaining Religious Harmony, Empowerment of Religious Harmony Forums, and Establishment of Synagogues (PBM 8/9). In this regulation, at least several things are regulated, firstly stipulating the duties and obligations of the Governor, mayor, regent, and sub-district to the sub-district to maintain peace and foster harmony of religious harmony together with the vertical agencies of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Second, establishing a Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB) at the provincial to district/city levels while the FKUB has the task of organizing the religious dialogue, accommodating the aspirations of religious organizations and communities, channeling aspirations to regional leaders, socializing laws and regulations in the field of religion and community empowerment, and for FKUB districts/cities have the special task of providing written recommendations on requests for the construction of houses of worship. The third is the requirements for the construction of houses of worship, along with the mechanism for disputes/settlements of houses of worship.

The regulation at first glance giving complements the shortcomings of the lack of local government agent authority in the management of religious harmony, but almost two decades later the regulation has become one of the sources of

structural and cultural problems in the policy of managing religious harmony, some of these problems are identified as follows.

First, the PBM requires 90 congregations and 60 supporters of the establishment of houses of worship in one area. This provision often complicates access to establishing houses of worship because in practice many congregations of houses of worship do not reside in the area where the house of worship is established. According to Melissa Crouch, the 90/60 provision discriminates against minority religious groups or small religious groups with fewer than 90 members. This is evident from the comparison of the number of mosques which is significantly massive in number compared to the number of churches throughout Indonesia at present, namely as many as 296,797 mosques and as many as 70,394 Catholic and Protestant churches. Therefore, PBMs that still use the minority and majority paradigms and the quantity of the number of worshippers cannot be enforced (Sigit & Hasani, 2021).

Second, PBM can be the basis for legitimacy for intolerant or majority groups to discriminate against minority religious groups, not to build houses of worship, and to close houses of worship. Third, in the juridical aspect and the preparation of laws and regulations in Indonesia, it is found that PBM is not included in the hierarchy of laws and regulations, besides that PBM also does not have binding force either by attribution or delegation from the higher law above it. This then becomes one of the reasons why it is often not run effectively.

The PBM is not only structurally problematic but also has an impact on cultural efforts in managing religious harmony. First, FKUB membership is based on a representation of the number of religious believers. FKUB decision-making based on PBM is carried out by deliberation and consensus, but in fact, it is often based on voting. This is detrimental to the representatives of minority religions because it does not make room for the diversity of denominations in some religions. Besides that, there is no provision for the representation of

believers in FKUB membership resulting in ineffective harmony between religious people and believers. Second, the task of providing recommendations for the establishment of houses of worship by the FKUB has an impact on the involvement of FKUB in conflicts over the establishment of houses of worship, and then this will be contradictory to the task of FKUB as a catalyst for religious harmony. Third, the lack of budget and effective activity programs from FKUB. This happens because often local governments and FKUB are not well synergized. The FKUB approach is often only religious and arises when conflict events have occurred (Ichsan, 2020) .

The need for the importance of the state's presence (governing) through state policies in creating religious harmony is very important in order to maintain the security of religious communities in Indonesia, but policies regarding religion should not only give privileges to governed religion and expert religion, but also pay attention to the interests of diverse lived religions. The goal is that every citizen can practice their religion and beliefs properly, in accordance with democratic principles and existing laws, without fear of being alienated.

Author's Solutions

In order to improve and strengthen the policy of managing better religious harmony in the future of Indonesia, the author tries to provide structural and cultural solutions with the following descriptions.

First, it is necessary to revise and upgrade the status of PBM into a higher regulation which is a regulation that is within the hierarchical scope of laws and regulations in Indonesia. The author suggests that PBM can be upgraded to a Presidential Regulation (Perpres). The content of the PBM must follow universal human rights principles and be structured with a good dialogical process with all religious people. Second, removing the authority to provide recommendations for the construction of houses of worship in district/city FKUBs to avoid the involvement of FKUBs in the vortex of conflicts over the establishment house of worship. Third, develop a more representative FKUB membership mechanism by including believers in

the composition of FKUB members. Fourth, strengthening the religious approach with the social welfare approach by compiling an FKUB work program that prioritizes poverty alleviation as a form of mutual cooperation between religious people. Fifth, build a more comprehensive cooperation between FKUB and the Government, especially in the aspect of funding and empowering.

The author considers that FKUB has a very central role in the management of religious harmony in Indonesia. Technically, the author tries to convey suggestions so that in the future FKUB can be better empowered. FKUB needs to be equipped with the ability and obligation to map potential socio-religious conflicts in its territory; this is important so that FKUB can more sensitively read the current situation of religious harmony in its territory. In addition, FKUBs in each region are deemed necessary to build social cohesion simultaneously and pour it into a peace charter as a common consensus that must be adhered to by all religious people in the region. Finally, the author also argues that the religious approach that has been built by FKUB can be developed by including a social welfare approach so that the implementation of each of the values adopted by religious believers can be channelled in a universal form to poverty alleviation for common progress.

Looking at the phenomenon and the picture of religious harmony in Indonesia described above, it can be seen that the security of society, especially religious communities in Indonesia, has the potential to approach a clash that can eliminate each other at its highest point. For this reason, the need to protect and ensure the security of potentially alienated religious groups is important. The approach to protecting the security of alienated religious groups can refer to the conception of human security.

In the context of community security, maintaining harmonious relations between religious communities is a task that must be carried out by the Government and related stakeholders, by providing democratic legal rules and upholding the principle of human rights, then the government's efforts in maintaining harmonious relations between religious communities are on the right track. In addition, the government should also not necessarily monopolize the management program of religious harmony with its coercive approach, but must provide non-state actors to participate in creating a peaceful atmosphere with a persuasive and democratic approach. The author's proposal by strengthening the juridical aspects of the legal basis for managing religious harmony policies and strengthening the capacity and institutional empowerment of FKUBs is relevant and essential to the conditions of religious harmony described earlier.

CONCLUSION

Based on the research results written by the researcher, it can be concluded that the condition of freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia still holds potential threats to public security. In this article, the researcher tries to portray the weaknesses of structural aspects such as regulation and implementation of government policies and cultural aspects by exploring the weak points of religious harmony management carried out by religious leaders in the FKUB forum so far. Furthermore, in this study, the author tries to convey some suggestions that can be used in the management of better religious harmony, among others, by revising and improving the status of PBM into higher regulations and regulations that are within the scope of the hierarchy of laws and regulations in Indonesia, moving the authority to provide recommendations for the establishment of houses of worship to FKUBs in districts / cities to avoid FKUB involvement in the vortex of conflict over the establishment of houses of worship, compiling a more representative FKUB membership mechanism, and strengthening the synergy of FKUBs with local governments. FKUBs need to be equipped with the ability and obligation to map the potential for socio-religious conflict in their regions, this is important so that FKUBs can be more sensitive to the situation of religious harmony in their regions. The synergy between FKUBs and local governments will have a positive impact on the creation of religious harmony, which in turn will create a more harmonious society.

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