

IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP, AND DEPERSONALIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF STRUGGLE 1999-2019

Hasto Kristiyanto¹
A. Hanief²

^{1,2}*Universitas Indonesia*
Pondok Cina, Beji, Depok City, West Java 16424, Indonesia

Correspondence Email: hasto.kristiyanto22@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT

Since 1999, the votes of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) have always been relatively superior, despite having to deal with various internal and external problems. By winning the elections, PDIP has given and placed the best party cadres in public positions in the legislature and executive, which directly influences the course of the Indonesian nation. Various survey results show that PDIP is still the top choice with the highest electability. Based on these data, the purpose of this study is to analyze the institutional transformation of PDI, especially in strengthening ideology and the process of party depersonalization. The method used is a literature study and the data analysis technique is carried out by analyzing the three dimensions of the concept of party institutionalization from Harmel et al. (2019), namely internal institutionalization, external institutionalization, and objective institutionalization (objective durability). From the method used, it was found that the party had carried out organizational transformation during the 1999-2019 period. PDIP also continues to consolidate to advance democracy, because political parties are the key to maintaining and developing the quality of democracy. It was also found that political institutionalization is important. An important aspect of party institutionalization is the strength of ideology as a party-political concept that underlies the ideals, struggles, and norms of the party. Finally, the party's ability to depersonalize shows significant results in party institutionalization.

Keywords: Party Institutionalization, Strategic Leadership, Ideology, Party Culture, and Organizational Transformation.

ABSTRAK

Sejak 1999 perolehan suara Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) relatif selalu unggul, walaupun dalam perjalanan harus berhadapan dengan berbagai persoalan internal dan eksternal. Dengan kemenangan dalam Pemilu, PDIP telah memberikan dan menempatkan kader-kader partai partai terbaik menduduki jabatan publik di legislatif dan eksekutif; yang secara langsung mempengaruhi perjalanan bangsa Indonesia. Berbagai hasil survei menunjukkan PDIP masih menjadi pilihan utama dengan elektabilitas tertinggi. Berdasarkan data tersebut, maka tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menganalisis transformasi pelebagaan PDI terutama dalam penguatan ideologi dan proses depersonalisasi partai. Adapun metode yang digunakan adalah studi literatur dan teknik analisis data dilakukan dengan analisis tiga dimensi konsep pelebagaan partai dari Harmel et al. (2019), yaitu pelebagaan internal, pelebagaan eksternal, dan pelebagaan objektif (daya tahan objektif). Dari metode yang digunakan ditemukan bahwa partai telah melakukan transformasi organisasi selama periode 1999-2019. PDIP juga terus berkonsolidasi untuk memajukan demokrasi, karena partai politik adalah kunci untuk mempertahankan dan mengembangkan kualitas demokrasi. Selain itu juga ditemukan bahwa pelebagaan politik adalah penting. Aspek penting pelebagaan partai adalah kekuatan ideologi sebagai konsep politis partai yang mendasari cita-cita, perjuangan dan norma partai. Akhirnya, kemampuan partai melakukan depersonalisasi menunjukkan hasil signifikan dalam pelebagaan partai.

Kata kunci: Pelembagaan Partai, Kepemimpinan Strategik, Ideologi, Kultur Partai, dan Transformasi Organisasi

BACKGROUND

After the end of the Cold War, almost all countries accepted a democratic system of government. Democracy is believed to be the best system compared to other systems of government (Desilver, 2019). The argument for acceptance and trust lies in the democratic system's guarantee of the right to freedom of expression of political preferences and the promotion of progress through peaceful competition between different interests and ideas.

A number of countries in Asia, not least Indonesia, were in the 1990s consolidating democracy as they transitioned to democratic governance. It was characterized by competitive elections for effective power (Huntington, 1991), the recognition of the right to vote for almost all citizens, and the protection of freedom of association and speech (Dahl, 1971).

Democracies reached their peak in the early 21st century. Thereafter, countries experienced a decline in aggregate global democracy scores (Aspinall *et al.*, 2020). In general, if we are following the regular assessments conducted by Freedom House, every year Indonesia's democracy shows signs of deterioration. A number of studies present similar conclusions. The decline of democracy is indicated by, among others: populist mobilization, growing intolerance and deepening sectarianism (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018; Mietzner *et al.*, 2018; Mujani, 2020; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019);

worsening civil liberties (Marta *et al.*, 2019); expansion of the executive's authoritarian tools to suppress opposition and limit criticism (Mietzner, 2020); and increasingly dysfunctional institutions and representatives (Aspinall *et al.*, 2020; Muhtadi, 2019).

In democratic systems, political parties have long been acknowledged as a condition for strengthening and developing the quality of democratic political systems (Aldrich, 1995; Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1954; Key, 1947; Schattschneider, 1942). If political parties convey the preferences, opinions, and interests of constituents to the government, then the expression of public interest through the party system will greatly affect the quality of democracy. Political parties play an important role in the functioning of democracy and determine the success of democratic consolidation (see, among others: Lewis, 2007; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Sandbrook, 1996; Croissant & Lorenz, 2018; Diamond, 1989; Lawson *et al.*, 2010; Ufen, 2008; Weissenbach, 2010). Therefore, it cannot be dismissed that the democratic crisis that happened is also the responsibility of political parties.

At present, political parties are trapped in a number of problems. Among others, the first is the low degree of party ideologization (Labolo & Ilham, 2015); in the sense that many political parties have lost their ideological orientation. Ideology is 1. the determining factor for the existence of

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
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<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

a political party which is the identity, values, and goals of the party, which distinguishes one party from another. 2. Political stance in political, economic, and social life (Romli, 2011) and 3. Reflection of public awareness about the need for a forum that is able to mediate between the government and society. These three functions can be used to highlight the role of ideology in a democratic system. Ideology descends into manifestos and platforms that become the basic attitude of political parties in managing state policies; so that the public can clearly determine affiliation based on the suitability of their interests (Firmanzah, 2011). Therefore, it can be said that political parties are a form of political organization outside the state structure and have a position as an intermediate structure, namely between the superstructure of state government and the infrastructure of community life. In addition, political parties also guarantee the circulation of political leadership resources.

Second, political parties have problems related to not maximizing the implementation of functions, such as the functions of political education, political recruitment, political communication, articulation and aggregation of interests, and conflict resolution functions. These problems have caused most parties in Indonesia to move away from the description of a modern party. When simplified, the inability of political parties to play a role in developing the quality of democracy is due to institutionalized problems (Huntington, 1968; Randall, 2006). Sparringa (2012) further explains:

"... most political parties have turned into instruments of power for a small group of administrators, falling as political

vehicles to fight for the interests of individuals or groups of individuals who join political parties with and for motives that are not related at all to the objectives of reform which boil down to the interests of change for a more democratic, just and prosperous Indonesia. One important implication of this process has been the decline of the representational function of political parties and even parliament - occurring precisely when elections have become more democratic. Another immediate and very serious implication is the growing public distrust of political parties."

Related to Sparringa's statement, many political parties are entangled as tools of power for party elites. Some internal party conflicts in Indonesia are due to political parties experiencing the process of party personalization (Budiatri, 2018), which is a condition when individual elites have a more important position than other organizations or collective identities (Sandri et al., 2015). Party leaders or elites become very influential in all party policy-making processes - even becoming the image and/or identity of the party - and become the ruler of the party for a long period of time.

Consequently, even highly institutionalized parties can experience de-institutionalization due to the concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of party leaders. This is because party institutionalization relates to the process of a party gaining political influence independent of its leader. Party personalization is recognized by many researchers as a stumbling block to party institutionalization (Blondel & Thiebault, 2010; Pilet & Cross, 2015; Renwick & Pilet,

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

2016). This condition tends to place extraordinary decision-making authority in the hands of a leader. Party depersonalization is even more severe for "charismatic parties" which means parties created by their leaders. In early democracy, where the public is still not politically aware, the likelihood of identifying with a particular founding father tends to be stronger than party ideology or symbols. The leader exhibits a strong character that attracts constituents and internally creates the foundation and organizational functions for the newly established party (Arter, 2016; Lange & Art, 2011). However, for a party to survive in the long term, leaders must be able to consolidate these ideologies and functions, and gradually institutionalize them as a process of stabilizing the party in the form of patterns of behavior, attitudes, and organizational culture (Harmel *et al.*, 2019).

Speaking of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as one of the important parties in the reform era, Mietzner (2012) produced a comprehensive discussion of (i) legitimacy popularity, election performance, and ideological alignment of voters; (ii) organizational capacity through Megawati's leadership; (iii) factional dynamics, finance, membership structure, and party staffing arrangements; (iv) the party's ability to act as a recruitment belt for the government, articulator, and aggregator of political interests and facilitator of political participation. Mietzner's findings are quite surprising, related to PDIP's power in dealing with a number of problems - both from within and from outside - until the general elections since 1999 have relatively

always been superior. PDIP has also given and placed the best party cadres in public positions in the legislature and executive, which directly affects the course of the Indonesian nation. This is also the case with public trust, as indicated by a number of surveys by independent institutions, where PDIP is still the top choice with the highest electability.

Mietzner's findings are the basis of this paper, which is to examine party institutionalization that focuses on the aspect of ideology as a party-political concept that underlies the ideals, struggles, and norms of the party. Another aspect that is also important to study is to look at the party's ability to depersonalize the party which will be shown through Megawati Sukarnoputri's leadership steps as the party's General Chairperson. In discussing the transformation of the PDIP party during 1999-2019, this study uses the three dimensions of the concept of party institutionalization from Harmel *et al.* (2019), which are internal institutionalization, external institutionalization, and objective institutionalization (objective durability).

Political Party

Schattschneider (1942) argued, "Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties," in other words, an affirmation of the centrality of the role of political parties in a modern democracy. Political parties encourage the development of new democracies and improve the quality of democracy in established democracies. Political parties are part of political society whose role is to control state power and its political apparatus (Linz & Stepan, 1996), as

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

a representation of ideas that represent the public interest by legitimizing the succession of political leadership, as stated (Sartori, 2005), “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office.”

Other figures understand political parties as an effort to articulate the interests of a group to encourage government responsiveness to its citizens, resolve conflicts by building representative channels, exert influence on the political process in the legislature, and recruit political elites (Dalton *et al.*, 2011; Scarrow *et al.*, 2017; Stokes, 1999). In other words, political parties are actually a “bridge” between the public and the government (Agustino, 2021). Neumann (1956) states the party as, “...the articulate organization of society’s active political agent; those who are concerned with the control of government policy power, and who complete for popular support with other group or groups holding the divergent view.” Neumann (1956) understands parties based on their functions, which are: (i) parties of individual representation that articulate the demands of a particular social group; (ii) parties of social integration which are well-developed organizations, providing a wide range of services to their members, encapsulating them in a partisan community, relying on members' financial contributions and voluntary services during election campaigns; and (iii) parties of total integration which have the more ambitious goal of seizing power and radically transforming society, demanding full

commitment and unquestioning obedience from members.

Political Leadership

In the study of politics, the leadership of political parties is, to some extent, determined by their followers. It would be difficult to understand the nature of leadership in parties without trying to understand the importance of voters (Lobo, 2014). According to Weber (1947), the relationship between leaders and followers is important, viz:

“... how the quality in question would be ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or another such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone important is how the individual is regarded by those subjects to charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or disciples;”

In some cases, political leadership is seen as a form of coercive and generative power that can be applied depending on the situation (Hendriks, 2017); as a core property of democratic functioning (Beerbohm, 2015); about the legitimacy of political activity (Butcher & Clarke, 2006); as the mobilization of resources to satisfy certain motives (Burns, 1978).

Leadership in organizations in general is familiar with the concept of strategic leadership. Strategic leadership in the sense of Hitt *et al.* (2009) is the ability to anticipate, look ahead, be flexible, and empower others in order to shape the necessary strategic changes. Norzailan *et al.* (2016) elaborate that strategic leadership relates to high-level leadership activities in a company. Strategic leaders are required to have high-level thinking skills, especially

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

creative thinking to choose options and ways to compete. In addition, strategic leadership also implies the ability to negotiate and manage internal politics. Meanwhile, Davies & Davies (2004) state that mastery or recognition of organizational and individual characteristics can be linked to strategic leadership. Furthermore, Davies & Davies present indicators to measure the ability to manage the organization: (i) showing strategic orientation in actions and decisions, (ii) being able to translate strategy into real action, (iii) being able to direct people and organizational goals, (iv) being able to determine effective decisions, and (v) being able to develop useful strategic capabilities.

Political Party Institutionalization

Many scholars agree with Huntington (1968), that party institutionalization is, "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability," measured "through the properties of adaptability, compatibility, autonomy, and coherence"; or Panebianco (1988) understanding that: "the process by which followers develop an interest in the survival of the party independent of its current leadership." As for this study, Harmel & Svåsand (2019), define institutionalization as "*the process of acquiring the properties of a durable organization which is valued in its own right and gaining the perceptions of others that it is such.*"

The concept of political party institutionalization by Harmel *et al.* (2019) involves three dimensions based on the dominant functions of institutionalization, namely internal institutionalization, external

institutionalization, and objective durability. Internal institutionalization focuses on the internal behaviors and attitudes of the organization. Internal institutionalization has subdimensions of routinization and internal value infusion. Routinization is understood as "stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior" (Huntington, 1968) or "recurring patterns of behavior that are valued by those who identify with them" (Janda, 1980). Harmel & Svåsand (1993) characterize routines as involving the extent to which "the party has become part of the 'routines' of other relevant actors." Levitsky (1998) defines routinization as the process by which the "rules of the game," or patterns of behavior that shape individual interactions, become entrenched or established. The concept of routinization from Harmel *et al.* (2019) is identical to the system defined by Randall & Svåsand (2002) i.e., regularity as a level of routine, and the development of prevalent conventions guiding behavior. Routine in more popular terms is an attempt to shape culture as in Aristoteles' classical understanding of the state of mind that can inspire political change or stability or Machiavelli's emphasis on the role of values and feelings of identity and commitment. The internal institutionalization subdimension is the valuation of the party itself, beyond goals and leaders. Value infusion occurs when the party is embodied in the public mind when the organization is valued. This valuation can come from party members as well as from the public. Valuation from party members occurs through the development of a stable membership base and when the party experiences minimal defections.

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

External institutionalization involves "the perception by others that the party is indeed an 'organization,' and should be regarded and treated as such" (Harmel *et al.*, 2019). According to Randall & Svåsand (2002), a form of external institutionalization takes the form of party reification, which is "a party's ability to establish itself in an imaginary popular image; that depends in part on the particular historicity and symbolic values it can claim to successfully represent [and] it also depends on the party's organizational strength and especially its access to effective means of communication." For this reason, the party must pay special attention to the historical context and claim symbolic values for itself.

The external dimension can, among other things, be measured through the number of votes obtained in - or rather, a stable core electorate. Party affiliation also affects this dimension by establishing objective criteria that measure the support and popular base of other parties or groups. The perceived popularity of the other party marks the strength of the relationship, also referred to as 'roots in society. This is manifested when parties develop a stable core electorate and are based on the attitudes of other parties or societal groups; either directly (through direct statements and quotes in the media, for example) or indirectly (when other parties change their programs or in other ways indicate potential coalitions).

The last dimension is objective durability, which is "an objective estimate of the likelihood of a party's survival" (Harmel *et al.*, 2019). Objective durability can be measured according to two aspects:

persistence and ability. This implies "the ability to withstand shocks" and adaptability. In this latter aspect, the party managed to adapt to the environment, not only because it achieved electoral success, but also because of changes in the form of political programs.

METHOD

This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach which has the characteristics of "... natural setting, researcher as a key instrument, multiple sources of data, inductive data analysis, participants' meaning, emergent design, theoretical lens, interpretative, dan holistic account." (Creswell, 2009, p. 175). By using the literature review method (library research), this study aims to understand the transformation of PDIP party institutionalization, especially in strengthening the ideology carried by the party and the process of party depersonalization. Data analysis techniques are carried out by reducing data, presenting data, and drawing conclusions (Creswell, 2009).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

PDI Perjuangan Ideology in Historical Perspective

Historically, the Indonesian Democratic Party was declared in 1973, when the "Declaration of the Establishment of the Indonesian Democratic Party" or "Declaration of January 10, 1973" was signed. However, the history of PDIP has always been a flashback of the existence of the Indonesian National Association founded by Sukarno in 1927; then changed to the Indonesian National Party in 1928, the

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

Indonesian Party (Partindo) in 1931, back again to the Indonesian National Party in 1946, the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1973, until in 1998 it became PDI Perjuangan. Thus, PDI Perjuangan declared PNI as its ideological mother's breast milk (Latif, 2015), PDI Perjuangan is the political successor of PNI (Lay, 2019). Symbolically, PDI Perjuangan personifies its continuity with the PNI through the presence of the figure of Sukarno in various media publications.

The birth of the PDI in 1973 was heralded by the signing of a declaration by the "nationalist group" which was the end point of the New Order regime's process of party simplification (fusion), as well as the starting point of the political weakening of the fused party. Each fused party was "forced" to end its existence and merge based on ideological similarities. The original identity of the party was slowly eroded, leaving only two major ideologies, namely the nationalist parties, namely the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the People's Consultative Party (Murba), the Indonesian Independence Support Association (IPKI), the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), and the Catholic Party which joined the PDI. As for the Islamic parties that joined the United Development Party (PPP), the NU Party, the Indonesian Muslimin Party (Parmusi), the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), and the Perti Islamic Party were merged into the United Development Party (PPP).

In the Old Order regime, although parties were ideology-based, the character of political leaders had a patronage culture, where party leaders became patrons for party members and sympathizers. Party

leaders were not only the founders of the party but also the developers of ideology and the determinants of party policy. The party is in the identification stage and the organizing stage with the start of establishing routine procedures and mechanisms for control and coordination, characterized by a one-person representation (Harmel & Svåsand, 1993). When the New Order came to power, political parties were forced to no longer be oriented towards ideology, but towards development programs. The fusion policy and hegemonic system caused the ideology and leadership of political parties to have no significant meaning.

It was only after the reform era that legal-formal regulations on the regulation of political parties were regulated through Law (UU) Number 2 of 2011, and amendments to Law Number 2 of 2008 concerning Political Parties. The General Elucidation of the Law on Political Parties states that: Political parties as pillars of democracy need to be organized and improved to realize a democratic political system to support an effective presidential system. The regulation of political parties is important, because during the New Order political parties could not carry out their functions optimally. The law also implicitly states: The arrangement and improvement of political parties are directed at two main things, namely, first, shaping the attitudes and behavior of political parties that are patterned or systemic so that a political culture that supports the basic principles of a democratic system is formed. This is indicated by the attitudes and behavior of political parties that have an adequate membership selection and recruitment

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

system and develop a strong cadre and political leadership system. Second, maximizing the functions of political parties, both functions towards the state and functions towards society through political education and cadre, as well as effective political recruitment to produce cadres of prospective leaders who have political abilities.

The reform era is also an open door for parties to formulate and reaffirm their ideology. In simple terms, ideology is defined by Denzau & North (2000, p. 24) as "... ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured." Ideology is the thought product par excellence of the political world and is political in nature. Party ideology is a concept or a set of complex meaningful decisions to allocate and through which to interact with the world (Freedon, 2013). In short, ideology is a collective production of imaginative maps that, because of its collective nature, belongs to the public. However, the concept is different from political action, party ideology needs to be formulated and translated into concrete forms in the form of party platforms, manifestos, or programs. The platform is a concretization of party ideology that contains values, norms, and becomes the party's normative benchmark, which is a reference for political attitudes and actions for its members (Romli, 2011).

Harmel *et al.* (2019) did not specifically discuss the existence of manifestos and party platforms. However, with the manifesto and platform, a party can

concretize its ideology, policy goals, and underlying normative benchmarks; so that the attitude and behavior patterns of the leadership and party members can be assessed for suitability. This is what can release the party from personalization because the platform may be different from the original goals of the party founders. Without clear policy goals and norms, party organizations become parties of people, not principles. Thus, if the leader is the only reason for keeping the organization together, leadership changes can lead to defections and resignations (Harmel *et al.*, 2018).

PDI Perjuangan is considered a political party that has a clear ideological line (Gerald, 2019; Romli, 2011). PDI Perjuangan firmly chooses the ideology of Pancasila according to Soekarno's speech on June 1, 1945, namely Pancasila which is based on socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and divinity with culture. Based on the ideology of nationalism-marhaenism, PDI Perjuangan then takes the identity of nationalism, populism, and social justice. The 2015-2020 Articles of Association of PDI Perjuangan stipulate: (a) A means of struggle to shape and build the character of the nation based on the Pancasila of June 1, 1945; (b) A means of struggle to create a life of the nation and state that is Godly, has the spirit of socio-nationalism, and socio-democracy (*tri sila*); (c) A means of struggle to oppose all forms of individualism and to revive the soul and spirit of mutual cooperation in the life of society, nation and state (*eka sila*).

In 1999, under the leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri, PDI Perjuangan obtained fantastic election results, namely

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

33.12% of the vote. Although Megawati did not automatically become president, the PDI Perjuangan's achievement was the largest in the history of Indonesian elections. PDI Perjuangan and Megawati emerged as a symbol of resistance. Until 2001, the MPR Special Session appointed Megawati as president to replace Abdurrahman Wahid. This condition was an opportunity for PDI Perjuangan to manage the country

based on party ideology, and not a few of its government programs were derivatives of party ideology, including: the seriousness of the Megawati government in eradicating corruption in the discussion of the KPK Bill and inaugurating the institution in 2003, ending relations with the IMF, stabilizing the national economy. However, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, PDI Perjuangan's votes fell considerably (Table 1.1)

Table 1.1. PDIP Achievement

Year	Votes	Seats	Rank
1999	35.689.073 (33,74%)	153 (33,12%)	1
2004	21.026.629 (18,53%)	109 (19,82%)	2
2009	14.600.091 (14,03%)	95 (16,96%)	3
2014	23.681.471 (18,95%)	109 (19,46%)	1
2019	27.053.961 (19,33%)	128 (22,26%)	1

Source: analyzed from various sources

PDI Perjuangan's defeat was caused by several important factors, namely internal conflict, and the weakening of party ideology. PDI Perjuangan's defeat in areas considered to be the party's base - for example, in Blitar where Sukarno's tomb is located as an ideological symbol - required PDI Perjuangan to re-examine its ideological profile. PDI Perjuangan's loyal supporters come from Sukarnoists, Marhaenists, Nationalists, who are indirectly linked to PDI's populist ideology. In the 2004 elections, this rooted mass was obscured (Romli *et al.*, 2008) by a party format known as a catch-all party. According to Faisol *et al.* (2015), PDI Perjuangan's rhetoric for ideological distribution is outdated, making it difficult to attract young voters. For this case, Mietzner (2012) compared the distribution of ideology by the Prosperous Justice Party

(PKS). At every event, PKS treats party cadres and visitors with various books and journals on the development of party ideology, while PDI Perjuangan sells more memorabilia (t-shirts, scarves, etc.).

Learning from the defeat of two elections, Megawati took a strategic step. PDI Perjuangan decided to become the government's opposition. The move was effective as a reaffirmation of PDI Perjuangan's role as Indonesia's main opposition party, just as PDI Perjuangan in 1999 symbolized the principle of non-violent opposition to the New Order regime (Mietzner, 2012). The opposition stance became a policy as well as an affirmation of party ideology as stated in one of the recommendations of the Second Congress, "the opposition practiced by PDI Perjuangan is an effective opposition, criticizing government policies that do not

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

favor the people, and providing alternatives that favor the people."

The opposition position provides space for PDI Perjuangan to strengthen the party organization with a regeneration system to prepare regeneration of the nation's leaders and successors to the party ideology. The PDI Perjuangan regeneration system is in the form of political recruitment with an active stelsel method carried out by activating cadres through a process of recruitment, selection, political education, and development. Thus, PDI Perjuangan repositions and redefines the function of the party to be more effective in political dynamics. At the Third-Party Congress in Bali in 2010, PDI Perjuangan included an agenda on regeneration. The realization was the birth of a Party School called National Cadre Education. On February 23, 2012, in Yogyakarta, the first batch of the Party School was attended by 520 cadres from all over Indonesia.

The strategic move paid off. Most PDI-P MPs (64 out of 94, or 68%) are party cadres with long track records in party organizations. Potential party cadres - among others: Maruarar Sirait, Rieke Diah Pitaloka, Eva Kusuma Sundari, Pramono Anung, Ganjar Pranowo, and of course Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - have gained public attention. In addition, since 2005, PDI Perjuangan has succeeded in placing its cadres in local government and several party cadres in local government have become "ambassadors" of the party's ideology. For example, Jokowi, when he was Mayor of Solo, was known for his frequent *blusukan*, which was easily characterized as populist. Another figure is Ganjar Pranowo who

brought the regional Trisakti concept and became Governor of Central Java.

The role of these party cadres brought PDI Perjuangan back to victory in the 2014 elections. It even succeeded in placing the Jokowi - Jusuf Kalla (JK) pair as president and vice president by carrying the Nawacita concept which is a squeeze of June 1 Ideology. Jokowi-JK's vision and mission are contained in 41 pages entitled "The Path of Change for a Sovereign, Independent, and Personalized Indonesia," namely an Indonesia that is politically sovereign, as well as independent in the economic field, and has a personality in culture; is a manifestation of PDIP implementing party ideology in government.

Party Depersonalization and Transformation

In a consolidating democracy, where new parties are born and the emergence of a prominent leader is normal, some people are still stuttering in different conditions. They identify political positions through strong figures rather than party ideology. Many cases show this and many party leaders function as, "*little more than the personal mobilization instruments for ambitious politicians*" (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Gunther & Diamond (2003) explain, that under the label "personalistic parties," the sole reason for such parties is to provide a vehicle for their leaders to win elections and exercise power. While it may initially contribute to party cohesion and survival, in the long run, and without routinization, party personalization effectively "seriously inhibits institutional development" (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

Empirical identification of depersonalization, in the form of decision-making power, as an internal party institutionalization process is demonstrated by the routinization subdimension. Routinization can be demonstrated by two pieces of evidence: first, the existence of written rules that are considered legitimate by party leaders and members. The existence of legal rules, to some extent,

contributes to the process of institutionalizing both the party system and a party (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Second, actual behavior, regardless of the written rules. For this reason, the frequency and scope of change can be seen from the composition of party leadership, namely: the party chairperson and the central committee.

Table 1.2 National Board of PDI Perjuangan

Chairman	General Secretary	First of term	End of term	Period
Megawati Sukarnoputri	Soetjipto Soedjono	24 March 1999	31 March 2005	1
Megawati Sukarnoputri	Pramono Anung	31 March 2005	6 April 2010	2
Megawati Sukarnoputri	Tjahjo Kumolo	6 April 2010	9 April 2015	3
Megawati Sukarnoputri	Hasto Kristiyanto	9 April 2015	8 August 2019	4
Megawati Sukarnoputri	Hasto Kristiyanto	8 August 2019	Incumbent (2024)	5

Source: PDI Perjuangan (2022)

PDI Perjuangan has rules regarding the election of the general chairperson, namely in the Party Congress activities held every 5 years with certain mechanisms (consensus, acclamation, voting with the provision of a quorum of 2/3 participants). The process of electing the General Chairperson of PDI Perjuangan is often an internal conflict, although in the end Megawati is always the sole candidate. According to Budiatri (2018), despite the fact that the chairman election mechanism is legal and regulated in the party's bylaws, the system that allows the election of the chairman by acclamation and a single candidate jeopardizes the party's internal democracy. A single candidate eliminates

democratic competition in leadership circulation, leading to party personalization.

The tendency of personalization is further strengthened by the direct election system, which encourages parties to nominate figures with more popularity value. Therefore, when PDI Perjuangan won the 2014 elections, Megawati released the attachment of her figure in PDI Perjuangan by handing over the presidential nomination to Jokowi. Jokowi's success in the presidency led to his re-election in the 2019 election. Megawati's move was a political breakthrough that slowly eroded the PDI-P party's personalization label. With this step Megawati contributed to positive public perceptions for PDI Perjuangan (see Table 1.3).

Table 1.3 PDI Perjuangan Electability Trend

PARTAI POLITIK	PILEG 2019	INDO	LITSANG	INDEK	Indikator	Charta	Indikator	Indikator	INDOMETER	SMRC	Litbang	LSI	NEW	SMRC	INDIKATOR	PARAMETER	SMRC	CHARTA	INDIKATOR
		BAROMETER	PDIP	Research	Indonesia	Politika	Indonesia	Indonesia			Kompas	INDONESIA							POLITIKA
		JAN 2020	FEB 2020	APR 2020	MEI 2020	JULI 2020	JULI 2020	SEPT 2020	OKT 2020	DES 2020	JAN 2021	JAN 2021	FEB 2021	MARET	APRIL 2021	MEI 2021	JUNI	JULI 2021	AUG 2021
PDI Perjuangan	19,33	24,8	22,7	33,1	22,2	20,5	26,3	25,2	31,6	31,3	19,7	24,5	23,1	24,9	25,3	22,1	25,9	22,8	24,4
GERINDRA	12,57	14,8	14	14,7	15,2	14,2	17,7	21,1	14,4	13,4	9,6	12,6	12,2	11,6	13,1	11,9	10,9	17,5	12,8
GOLKAR	12,31	8,1	10,2	8,7	6,4	10,3	8,5	6,7	8	5,6	3,4	10	9,1	11,6	9,2	10,8	10,7	6,6	9
DEMOKRAT	7,77	5,5	7,2	3,3	3,6	6,0	5,7	5,9	3,2	4,5	4,6	5,4	8,2	7,7	8	8,4	6,6	6,6	9
PKB	9,69	5,6	7,4	5,5	5,7	8,7	5	4,1	5,1	3	5,5	9,7	6,4	7,5	7,2	8,2	9,7	9,4	8,2
PKS	8,21	7,8	5,8	6,5	4	8,1	4,4	5,9	5,7	5,2	5,4	7,6	7,7	5,2	7,2	7,5	4,6	6,8	7
PPP	4,52	2,3	2,5	2,9	1,7	2,2	1,7	0,6	1,3	1,2	0,5	2,4	2	2,7	2,4	5,5	2,6	2,3	5,9
NASDEM	9,05	2,5	4,3	3,9	3,3	8,0	4,5	3,1	3,6	3,1	1,7	3,4	3,5	4,1	2,3	5	3,7	4,8	3,5
PAN	6,84	2,4	1,9	1,5	2,1	2,3	2	1,1	1,1	1,1	0,8	3	1	2,5	1,5	4,3	1,8	1,7	2,2
PERINDO	2,67	2	0,7	0,8	0,3	1,7	0,3	1	0,5	0,5	0,5	1,4	0,4	1,2	1,2	1,5	1	0,7	1
HANURA	1,54	0,4	0,9	0,8	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,9	0,3	0,3	0,7
PSI	1,89	0,8	0,7	4,1	0,7	1,6	0,1	0,3	4,8	0,5	0,2	1,5	4,8	0,3	0,4	1,6	0,3	1,2	0,4
Umat												0	1,1	0,2	0,3	0	0,2	0,4	0,4
PBB	0,79	0,2	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,1	0	0,1	0		0	0,1	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,4	0,1	0,2	0,2
BERKARYA	2,09	0,1	0,1	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,1	0,8	0,3		0,4	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,1	0,5	0,6	0,1	0,1
GELORA												0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,4	0	0,3
GARUDA	0,5		0,1	0,3		0,5	0	0	0		0,1	0	0	0	0,2		0,6		0
PKPI	0,22		0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1	0	0		0	0	0	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1	0	0
TIDAK JAWAB		22,7	20,9	13,4	33,9	14,8	23,2	23,6	23,2	30	47,3	17,5	19,6	19,2	21,1	12,9	20,2	16,5	17

Source: analyzed from various sources

PDIP has experienced internal conflict several times. At the First Congress in Semarang in 2000, when Dimiyati Hartono and Eros Djarot planned to compete for the position of Secretary General, which caused both to be eliminated from PDI Perjuangan. In 2002, Dimiyati Hartono formed the Indonesian Party Tanah Airku (PITA) and Eros Djarot formed the National Banteng Independence Party (PNBK); the emergence of both parties caused internal party tensions (Tan, 2015). At the Second Congress in Bali in 2005, the PDI Perjuangan Renewal Movement offered a number of candidates for chairman - Arifin Panigoro, Roy BB Janis, Laksamana Sukardi, Sophan Sopian, and Guruh Soekarnoputra - which showed that PDI Perjuangan's internal political consciousness was growing, although, in the end, they all dropped out.

CONCLUSION

Political parties are key in the process of democratic transition and consolidation. A party with a stable

These conflicts were successfully navigated by PDI Perjuangan, with some consequences, proving Megawati's strong leadership. This opinion was reinforced by Andreas Hugo Pereira (quoted from Ekawati & Sweinstani (2020)) who stated that Megawati's role in leading PDI Perjuangan through the New Order regime until now is difficult to replace. This thinking became the basis for as many as 514 PDIP administrators from the lowest level in the province to support Megawati's return as Chairperson at the V Congress in 2019. Megawati's leadership affects the party's objective institutionalization (durability), which is the party's ability to survive, and "ability to withstand shocks, whether due to intentional adaptation or some other factor(s)" (Harmel et al., 2019).

connection with the public is a strong party, or in other words an institutionalized party, which is one of the main requirements for the process of democratic consolidation.

Vol.8 No.1, 2022
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447
<http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index>

The study of PDI Perjuangan, through the three dimensions of party institutionalization Harmel *et al.* (2019), shows the transformation of the PDI Perjuangan party. These dimensions demonstrate the party's ability (i) to adjust to changing goals and routinize the political decision-making process of its leaders' goals, (ii) the party is embodied in the public mind, and (iii) has the resilience and persistence to survive shocks.

In Indonesia, PDI Perjuangan is a party that is deeply rooted in society and has a clear party ideology, which is based on the June 1 Pancasila and nationalism. The ideology is related to the concept of nationalism, as a sense of belonging to the nation and state that must be maintained. The strengthening and distribution of ideology as the basis for party management has been systematically carried out by PDI

Perjuangan through political education to its cadres. The party's ideology then surfaced and became the basis for state management when Joko Widodo promoted it in his presidential candidacy through the concept of Nawacita.

Party institutionalization for post-New Order democracy is primarily concerned with the process of a party relinquishing the political influence of its leader. It is undeniable that PDIP's party personalization problem stems from the strong figure of Megawati Sukarnoputri as the successor of Sukarno, the founder of PNI, and the founding father of the nation. However, during her leadership, Megawati showed a number of strategic steps that ultimately strengthened the institutionalization of the party and slowly eroded its personalization of the party.

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Vol.8 No.1, 2022
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