

## SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS, MULTI-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL, AND COATTAIL EFFECTS IN INDONESIA

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### ABSTRACT

The 2019 simultaneous elections are the first experience for the Indonesian people. Simultaneity between the legislative and presidential elections is intended, for one, to produce a coattail effect. Based on this, this study seeks to answer whether, in the 2019 election, there was a coattail effect and what factors caused the coattail effect to occur. This study uses a qualitative and descriptive method, using secondary data from various sources. The results of this study indicate that for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi candidate pairs, the coattail effect does not always affect the vote acquisition of the supporting parties. The coattail effect is only evident in the political parties that carry the main candidate pairs, namely the PDIP and the Gerindra Party. However, there was an unusual incident where the PKS mass base gave Prabowo-Sandi a coattail effect, not the other way around.

**Keywords:** 2019 Election; Coattail Effect di Indonesia; Jokowi-Ma'ruf; Prabowo-Sandi

### BACKGROUND

In a presidential system, deadlocks or government failures often occur because the government led by a president needs to receive significant or majority support from the legislature (Cheibub, 2002; Tsai, 2008). In countries with presidential systems, especially in Latin America, presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously on the same day (Carreras, 2017; Shugart, 1995; Valdini & Lewis-Beck, 2018). The hope is that voters will choose a legislative candidate or a political party, which is a political party that carries the chosen presidential candidate (Carey & Polga-Hecimovich, 2006; Kemahlioglu et al., 2009; Rudolph & Leininger, 2021). Thus, the elected presidential candidates are

supported by political parties that support the elected president with significant seats because political parties get many votes due to presidential candidates (Borges & Lloyd, 2016). As a systemic impact, the policies of the elected president will not falter in parliament so that the government can run effectively and efficiently (Huang & Wang, 2014).

The 2019 elections are the first experience for the Indonesian people (Habibi, 2022; Khalyubi & Perdana, 2021; Prasetyo et al., 2020). Unlike the four previous elections during the reform era, where the presidential election was preceded by a legislative election, in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections, the presidential election was held on the same

day as the legislative election (Rajagukguk et al., 2021). The simultaneity between the legislative and presidential elections is intended to produce a coattail effect (Prasetio & Sianipar, 2021). As the name suggests, when the coat's tail is waved, it sweeps away everything around it. Likewise, the 2019 Simultaneous Elections implementation is also expected to give birth to the coattail effect.

The coattail effect is usually influenced by the popularity level of an election, where the more popular election affects the less popular election (J. E. Campbell & Sumners, 2009; Rogers, 2019). In the Indonesian context, if the coattail effect works, the more popular presidential election will affect the outcome of the legislative election. In other words, the selected pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates will affect the victory of the political parties carrying the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The assumption is that the simultaneous election makes voters who cast their votes for specific pairs of Presidential Candidates and Vice Presidential Candidates automatically choose the political party that carries the pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Samuels, 2000).

Based on the experience of simultaneous elections in Brazil and Chile with the same situation, the performance of the coattail effect was found to be diffuse (Borges & Turgeon, 2019). Conventionally, the coattail effect is only enjoyed by political parties carrying the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates (conventional coattail effect) (Hogan, 2005). However, the experiences of Brazil and Chile show that in

a coalition of political parties carrying pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the coattail effect is not only enjoyed by the main bearing party (or the party where the presidential and vice-presidential candidates come from) but also provides electoral benefits to the party (Ames, 1994; West & Spoon, 2017)—political coalition members or what is known as the diffused coattail effect. However, the distribution of the coattail effect across the coalition needs to be more balanced. Only political parties that have succeeded in building solid associations with the pairs of Presidential Candidates and Vice Presidential Candidates have the effect of the scattered coattails (Samuels, 2000).

In the 2019 simultaneous elections, there were two pairs of Presidential Candidates and Vice Presidential Candidates, namely the incumbent presidential candidate –Joko Widodo– with KH Ma'ruf Amin (Jokowi-Ma'ruf), who occupies serial number 01. This pair faces off against Prabowo Subijanto. and Sandiaga Uno (Prabowo-Sandi) with serial number 02. The Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair is carried by a coalition of nine political parties calling themselves the Working Indonesia Coalition (Arifianto, 2019).

The nine political parties consist of six parliamentary political parties, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Working Group (Golkar), National Democrats (Nasdem), United Development Party (PPP), People's Conscience (Hanura), and the rest are non-parliamentary parties –the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)– and the

new parties –the Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo)– and the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI). PDIP is the political party from which Jokowi comes from the nine political parties. Thus, PDIP is the main supporting party for Jokowi-Ma'ruf in the Indonesian Working Coalition (Widayat et al., 2022).

On the other hand, the Prabowo-Sandi pair is supported by four parliamentary parties, namely the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Democratic Party, plus a new party –the Berkarya Party–, which joined in the Indonesian Fair Prosperous Coalition. The first-mentioned party, the Gerindra Party, is the main supporting party for pair 02, where Prabowo and Sandi belong.<sup>4</sup> Conventionally, PDIP and Gerindra should have an enormous coattail effect (conventional) and be followed by political parties and coalition members who have successfully built solid associations. with Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi (spread) (Fauzi et al., 2019).

Studies on the effect of coattails in simultaneous elections still need to be made. However, Samuels, Borgess, and Turgeon have conducted studies of simultaneous elections in countries with multi-party systems, namely Brazil and Chile. As a result, they found that the coattail effect was enjoyed by the main political parties carrying the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates and provided electoral benefits to the political parties that are coalition members. Provided that the political parties succeed in building solid associations with the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates and the main

supporting political parties (Borges & Lloyd, 2016; Borges & Turgeon, 2019; Ferejohn & Calvert, 1984; Garmendia Madariaga & Ozen, 2015; Samuels, 2000).

The Borges & Turgeon (2019) hypothesis, built based on the experience of seven consecutive simultaneous elections in Brazil and Chile, can be used to analyze a coattail effect in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections in Indonesia. According to the conventional and spreading coattail effect concept, this paper answers whether the coattail effect occurred in the 2019 simultaneous elections. Furthermore, what factors influence it?

## **METHOD**

This study aims to examine whether there was a coattail effect in the 2019 election and what factors caused the coattail effect to occur. This study uses a qualitative approach with a qualitative descriptive approach. However, the researcher limits the discussion to the vote acquisition at the national and provincial levels, and the political parties counted in this paper are the only political parties with seats in parliament to see the dynamics. This study was conducted by collecting data by studying library materials in the form of books, literature, documents, reports, and official archives that can support the completeness of primary data, such as previous research data, journal articles, publications of the General Elections Supervisory Board and General Election Commission, and mass media. Data and other documents collected are then selected and classified based on research needs. The data is then analyzed using an interactive

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model: reducing, presenting, and drawing conclusions (Miles et al., 2014).


## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Coattail Effect of the Candidate Pair Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin on the Supporting Parties

Joko Widodo, or Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amien, won in 44 of the 80 Indonesian House of Representatives electoral districts. 61.36 percent of Jokowi-Ma'ruf's victories were in areas with a large PDIP mass base. The following is a graph of Jokowi-Ma'ruf's victory based on the results of political parties in the electoral districts of the

Indonesian Parliament. From Graph 1, it can be seen that Jokowi-Ma'ruf's most victories were in the constituencies of the DPR RI with the most votes for PDIP. In other words, the electability of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair gave the most good coattail effect on PDIP. Jokowi-Ma'ruf's electability made PDIP get a large, massive number of votes in the 40 electoral districts of the DPR RI. Only four electoral districts in which Jokowi-Ma'ruf won did not provide a significant vote for PDIP, but other supporting parties, such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), NasDem Party, and the Golkar Party (Golkar).


**Graph 1.** Number of Election Districts for Jokowi-Ma'ruf Win



Sources: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden, Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, D, (2019)

On the other hand, Jokowi-Ma'ruf's electability could have made this pair of candidates win the most votes in several electoral districts with a reasonably large PDIP vote. Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost to the candidate pair Prabowo-Sandi in 13 electoral districts with a large or large PDIP vote. The 13 electoral districts are North

Sumatra I, Riau I, Bengkulu, DKI Jakarta I, DKI Jakarta II, West Java I, West Java VI, West Java IX, West Java X, Banten III, South Kalimantan II, Southeast Sulawesi, North Sumatra. However, for the most part, in 23 regions, Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost in the electoral districts of the DPR RI with a small PDIP vote.

**Graph 2.** Number of Election Districts for Jokowi-Ma'ruf Lose

Source: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden, Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, D, (2019)

Graph 2 shows that the coattail effect of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair on PDIP is quite significant. Voters who did not choose the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair did not vote for the PDI-P in the DPR RI election. However, there are 13 other regions where many voters voted for PDIP, so the PDIP's vote acquisition was quite large. However, more voters chose the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair as the presidential-vice presidential candidate pair.

For example, in the electoral district of North Sumatra I, PDIP's vote gain was the largest compared to other political parties, at 20.89 percent. Likewise, the total votes for the parties supporting Jokowi-Ma'ruf were 6 percent higher than those supporting Prabowo-Sandi. However, more voters chose the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair. Thus, in these 13 regions, voters did split-ticket voting; for example, voters chose a candidate from party A in one election but chose party C in another election held simultaneously (Burden & Helmke, 2009).

Split ticket voting can occur in two directions, namely vertical and horizontal

(A. Campbell & Miller, 1957). Split ticket vertical voting is done when elections are held for positions at different levels of government simultaneously, and voters decide not to vote for a candidate or political party consistently. For example, voters choose candidates from different political parties for president and members of parliament or regional heads and legislative candidates.

Meanwhile, horizontal split-ticket voting can occur when elections are made for equal positions, for example, in the two-vote voting system used in Germany, New Zealand, Lithuania, and Hungary (Stumpf, 2020). Split ticket voting can also occur in elections that are not held simultaneously. In Indonesia in 2014, for example, which was held before the presidential election, voters were allowed to do split-ticket voting by choosing pairs of presidential-vice candidates who came from different political parties from the voting parties chosen in the legislative elections.


If the map out whether or not the results of the presidential-vice presidential

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candidate pair's vote are linear with the total votes acquired by the supporting parties in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections, three patterns are created. First, the percentage of votes for the presidential-vice presidential candidate pair is linear with the percentage of the votes cast by the political parties. In this case, linear means the difference between the percentage of votes for the candidate pair and the supporting parties is not more than 5 percent. In the Jokowi-Ma'ruf case, there are linear cases in 27 Indonesian House of Representatives

electoral districts. Second, the percentage of votes for candidate pairs is greater than the total percentage of votes for the supporting parties. There are 20 electoral districts, with this case in Jokowi-Ma'ruf. Third, the percentage of votes for candidate pairs is smaller than the total percentage of votes for the supporting parties. The percentage of votes for Jokowi-Ma'ruf is smaller than the total percentage of votes for the supporting parties in the 33 electoral districts of the DPR RI. Here is graph 3.

**Graph 3.** Jokowi-Ma'ruf Vote Gain Pattern and Supporting Parties



Source: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden, Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, D, (2019)

Graph 3. shows that in areas with linear votes, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair won more, likewise with regions where Jokowi-Ma'ruf's votes were more than the total votes of the supporting parties. Jokowi-Ma'ruf won more. Jokowi-Ma'ruf only lost in 1 electoral district in the second pattern, namely in DKI Jakarta I, with a significant vote for the PDIP, which was 20.79 percent.

On the other hand, this pair of candidates lost more in areas where the total votes for the supporting parties were more significant than the votes for Jokowi-Ma'ruf.

Compare the data on the vote acquisition of Prabowo-Sandi and his supporting parties in the electoral districts of the DPR RI. In that case, the large number of DPR RI parliamentary parties that carry

Jokowi-Ma'ruf impacts the number of cases of Jokowi-Ma'ruf, getting fewer votes of the total votes acquired by the supporting parties. In Prabowo-Sandi's data, this case only occurred in six electoral districts. The ratio is 1:5. Jokowi-Ma'ruf is promoted by six political parties in the national parliament, while Prabowo-Sandi is promoted by four political parties.


Thus, the electability of Jokowi-Ma'ruf does not always affect the vote acquisition of the supporting parties. In other words, the coattail effect only significantly works for some parties carrying the candidate pairs. The coattail effect is only evident in the political party with the central pair of candidates, PDIP. There is also one other party that gets the coattail effect, namely PKB. Jokowi's vice presidential candidate, Ma'ruf Amin, is a figure from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the mass base of PKB, especially in East Java.

These data also show that the supporting political parties' vote acquisition (other than PDIP) in the electoral district is determined by the mass base of the party in the electoral district rather than the coattail effect of candidate pairs, for instance, the Golkar Party, one of the supporters of Jokowi-Ma'ruf in the constituency of Aceh I. Although Jokowi-Ma'ruf was defeated by only getting 14.33 percent of the vote, the Golkar Party's vote acquisition was still quite large, namely 16.83 percent. This is much higher than the PDIP's 1.84 percent of

the votes, likewise with the People's Conscience Party (Hanura). Jokowi-Ma'ruf's popularity did not get this party a big vote. In the Bali constituency, where Jokowi-Ma'ruf won a landslide victory with 91.68 percent and PDIP got 54.36 percent of the vote, Hanura had to be satisfied with 3.63 percent.

### **The Coattail Effect of the Prabowo-Sandi Candidate Pair on the Supporting Parties**

Prabowo-Sandi won in 36 constituencies (election areas) and lost in 44 constituencies for the DPR RI 41.7 percent of Prabowo-Sandi's victories were in areas with a large and quite large mass base of the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) (without significant gains from other supporting political parties). This means that the Gerindra Party is closely related to the Prabowo-Sandi figure. However, there are three regions with significant Gerindra Party votes, but Prabowo-Sandi lost in the electoral districts of DKI Jakarta III, Central Java IX, and East Java IV. DKI Jakarta III is a reasonably large mass base of PDIP. Central Java IX has a large mass base of PDIP and PKB. East Java IV's mass base is quite large for PKB and PDIP. Prabowo-Sandi's victory based on the results of the political parties carrying in the electoral districts of the DPR RI can be seen in Graph 4.


**Graph 4.** Number of Electoral Districts for Prabowo-Sandi Wins

Source: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden, Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, D, (2019)

Prabowo-Sandi won in 8 regions, and the mass base of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was quite large, or 22.2 percent. This means that the Prabowo-Sandi figure is quite attached to PKS. PKS's large mass base contributed votes for this pair of candidates. In all electoral districts with a sizeable PKS vote share (for example, between 14 and 19.9 percent), Prabowo won the Presidential Election. However, not all electoral districts won by Prabowo-Sandi gave PKS a big vote.

Unlike the Prabowo-Sandi and PKS coattail effects, which are quite influential, the Prabowo-Sandi electability coattail effect is minimal for other

supporting parties, namely the Democratic Party and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Prabowo-Sandi won in 2 constituencies with a reasonably large Democrat Party mass base (Gerindra's vote in these two electoral districts was also quite large) and one constituency wedged between the Democrat and PAN mass bases (Gerindra's vote in these constituencies was relatively small), and one constituency based on PAN mass base (Gerindra's vote is also quite large). Prabowo-Sandi also lost in 1 electoral district with a sizeable Democratic vote, namely the East Java VII constituency.

**Graph 5.** Number of Prabowo-Sandi Electoral Districts Lost

Source: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden,




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Not only were the majority of Prabowo-Sandi's victories in electoral districts with significant Gerindra votes, but the majority of Prabowo-Sandi's defeats were also in electoral districts with small Gerindra votes. Of the total defeats in 44 constituencies, 41 occurred in constituencies, with Gerindra's total number of votes not exceeding 14 percent. This data further confirms that the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair is attached to Gerindra, so voters who choose Gerindra also choose Prabowo-Sandi.

The relationship between Prabowo-Sandi's vote acquisition and its supporting

parties can also be seen in linear patterns (the percentage of votes acquired by the candidate pair is the same as the percentage of the total number of votes for the supporting parties). The percentage of the candidate pair's vote is greater than the total percentage of the party's total number of votes. -the supporting party and the percentage of votes for the pair of candidates is smaller than the total percentage of votes for the supporting parties. The following graph shows the relationship between Prabowo-Sandi's votes and the supporting parties.

**Graph 6.** Prabowo-Sandi Vote Gain Pattern and Supporting Parties



Source: Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 987/PL.01.8-Kpt/06/KPU/V/2019 Tentang Penetapan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden Dan Wakil Presiden, Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi, D, (2019)

Graph 6 above shows that when Prabowo-Sandi's vote acquisition was linear or equivalent to the total percentage of votes acquired by the supporting parties, Prabowo-Sandi more often lost, namely in 22 out of 23 linear electoral districts. This is different from the linear pattern in the

Jokowi-Ma'ruf case. In a linear pattern, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won more.

Second, in the Prabowo-Sandi vote pattern, which is greater than the total votes for the supporting parties, Prabowo-Sandi wins more. This is the same as the Jokowi-Ma'ruf case. However, the number of electoral districts won by Prabowo-Sandi in

this pattern is more than Jokowi-Ma'ruf. Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in 19 constituencies in this pattern, while Prabowo-Sandi in 35 constituencies. Third, in the pattern of vote acquisition for candidate pairs that are smaller than the total votes for the supporting parties, Prabowo-Sandi never won. In contrast, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won in 28 regions in this pattern and lost in 5 electoral districts.

This fact means three things. One, Prabowo-Sandi is supported by fewer parties compared to Jokowi-Ma'ruf, which is supported by six political parties in the DPR RI which already have a mass base from the previous elections, so when the supporting parties get a higher vote than the percentage of votes obtained by Prabowo-Sandi, the percentage of votes for Prabowo-Sandi is too small. Two, the political parties that support Prabowo-Sandi do not have a large mass base like the parties carrying Jokowi-Ma'ruf, so their mass base needs to be more substantive to vote for Prabowo-Sandi. Third, more than the electability of Prabowo-Sandi is needed to boost the vote acquisition of the political parties that carry it so that the vote acquisition (other than Gerindra) is more determined by the party's mass base.

The phenomenon of split-ticket voting is also not as evident as in Jokowi-Ma'ruf. Prabowo-Sandi did lose in the electoral district with Gerindra and the supporting parties that were smaller or smaller than the votes of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf parties. Gerindra's vote acquisition was quite significant in the East Java VII constituency, 14.99 percent, but PDIP was more significant, with 29.17 percent. Likewise, Gerindra received 14.47 percent of the vote

in the Central Java IX constituency, but PDIP got 30.92 percent of the vote and PKB 15.43 percent.

From these data, it can be concluded that in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections, the coattail effect of the candidate pair to the supporting political parties was only significant enough to occur in the political party from which the candidate originated, namely the Gerindra Party for the Prabowo-Sandi candidate pair. As for PKS, the party's mass base gave Prabowo-Sandi a coattail effect, not the other way around.

## CONCLUSION

Jokowi-Ma'ruf's most victories were in the constituencies of the DPR RI with the most votes for PDIP. In other words, the electability of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair gave the most good coattail effect on PDIP. Jokowi-Ma'ruf's electability made PDIP get a large, massive number of votes in the 40 electoral districts of the DPR RI. Only four electoral districts in which Jokowi-Ma'ruf won did not provide a significant vote for PDIP, but other supporting parties, such as the National Awakening Party (PKB), NasDem Party, and the Golkar Party (Golkar).

Prabowo-Sandi won in 36 constituencies (election areas) and lost in 44 constituencies for the DPR RI. 41.7 percent of Prabowo-Sandi's victories were in areas with a large mass base of the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) (without significant gains from other supporting political parties). This means that the Gerindra Party is closely related to the Prabowo-Sandi figure. However, there was an unusual incident where the PKS mass

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base gave Prabowo-Sandi a coattail effect, not the other way around.

In the upcoming elections, to benefit all political parties participating in the general election for the coattail effect of the simultaneous elections, each political

party participating in the election should be allowed to nominate its pair of presidential-vice-presidential candidates. The coattail effect only significantly affects the party from which the presidential and vice-presidential candidates come.

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