CosmoGov: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan P-ISSN 2442-5958
E-ISSN 2540-8674

Vol.11, No.2, 2025
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index

ONE MANAGEMENT PATTERN IN CORE-PLASMA PARTNERSHIPS:
A Solution For Reducing Social Conflicts and Improving the Welfare of Oil Palm Farmers

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Submitted: 16 March 2025, Reviewed: 14 October 2025, Published: 12 December 2025

ABSTRACT

The core-plasma partnership model in palm oil plantations in Indonesia has been implemented as a strategy to improve the welfare of plasma farmers and reduce the socio-economic gap between core companies and local communities. However, the implementation of this model is often marked by social conflicts due to the imbalance of negotiation power, low transparency in the financial system, and unfair profit distribution. The point of this study is to look into how well the One Management Pattern (PSM) helps reduce social conflicts in West Kalimantan core-plasma partnerships. This study uses a SWOT analysis and an actor analysis method to find the internal and external factors that affect how well PSM implementation goes. The research results show that PSM is able to improve the efficiency of plasma garden management through direct management by the core company, but still faces resistance from plasma farmers who feel they are losing control over their land. The main factors triggering farmers' dissatisfaction include high credit burdens, low transparency in the financial system, and the perceived lower quality of plasma estate revitalization compared to independent estates. To address this conflict, a strategy focusing on strengthening the role of farmer cooperatives as mediators, increasing transparency in the financial system, and regulatory support from local governments is needed. In addition, the involvement of customary institutions and community leaders in maintaining social stability is also a key factor in creating sustainable harmony. The core-plasma model used by PSM is meant to improve the well-being of farmers, make society more stable, and encourage long-term rural development in areas with palm oil plantations by taking an open and fair approach.

Keywords: core-plasma partnership; one management pattern; social conflict; farmer welfare; financial transparency.

INTRODUCTION

Economic inequality, social injustice, and competition for resources often trigger social conflicts in society. One sector that is prone to conflict is the agribusiness sector, especially in partnerships between nucleus companies and plasma farmers. The nucleus-plasma partnership model has been applied in various agricultural and plantation sectors in Indonesia, such as oil palm, poultry farming, and horticulture. However, the implementation of this model does not always run smoothly and often creates social tensions between the parties involved.

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Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
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Inti Plasma is a partnership system that establishes a connection between large companies as the core and local farmers as the plasma. This system aims to increase productivity, farmers' welfare, and economic equity in rural areas. However, in practice, the imbalance of negotiation power, low transparency, and unfair profit distribution are the main triggers of conflicts between plasma farmers and core companies. (Alexandro et al., 2023; Ardiansyah & Aulawi, 2020). In this context, the implementation of an equitable and sustainable nucleus-plasma model can be one of the effective solutions in reducing social conflicts in the community. An approach that prioritizes active participation of farmers, transparency in profit sharing, and strengthening the institutional capacity of farmers is a key factor in creating social harmony (Nasution et al., 2023).

Research conducted by Agustian and Rachman (2016) shows that an effective core-plasma partnership pattern can improve farmers' welfare and strengthen local economic resilience (Agustian & Rachman, 2016). This is reinforced by the findings of Kurniawan et al. (2021), who stated that partnerships based on trust and fair collaboration can reduce the potential for conflict and increase social stability in the community (Kurniawan et al., 2021).

However, challenges faced in the implementation of the nucleus-plasma model include farmers' lack of access to information, farmers' low managerial capacity, and the company's dominance in decision-making (Muani et al., 2018). Therefore, we need strategies that prioritize farmer empowerment, enhance transparency, and fortify conflict mediation mechanisms.

In addition, the role of government and social institutions is also crucial in creating a conducive environment for the development of a sustainable nucleus plasma model. Policies that support social justice, protection of farmers' rights, and facilitation of dialogue between stakeholders are key in reducing conflicts (Ahmad & Ongki, 2019). The application of technology and innovation in data management and financial transparency can also be a solution to improve accountability and prevent potential disputes. Digital-based information systems can help farmers monitor prices, yields, and profits in a transparent manner (Hermawan, 2017).

Thus, a holistic approach involving various parties, including the government, companies, farmers, and civil society, is key in building social harmony through the plasma nucleus model. The point of this study is to look into how using a fair nucleus-plasma model can help lower social conflicts in the community and figure out what components make this model work. There is hope that, by learning about how core plasma partnerships work, effective ways can be found to improve the lives of farmers, make communities more stable, and make rural areas more peaceful and long-lasting.

METHOD

In the context of implementing the One Management Pattern (PSM) to reduce conflicts in core-plasma partnerships in West Kalimantan, social and policy analysis is an appropriate method for understanding the dynamics of conflict and designing sustainable solutions. This approach allows researchers to examine how regulations such as Minister of

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Finance Regulation No. 117/PMK.06/2006 on Bioenergy Development Credit and Plantation Revitalization and Minister of Agriculture Regulation No. 33/Permentan/OT.140/7/2006 on the Plantation Revitalization Program impact the welfare of plasma farmers and the social stability of local communities. Through SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis (Halla, 2007), researchers can identify the strengths and weaknesses of the PSM pattern, as well as the opportunities and threats that arise from the social, economic, and cultural aspects of the indigenous communities of West Kalimantan. In addition, stakeholder analysis (Brugha, 2000) is also important for mapping the power relations between plasma farmers, core companies, cooperatives, and local governments in order to understand the inequality of access to information and the lack of transparency in the management of revitalization funds. With this approach, researchers can provide more inclusive policy recommendations, such as strengthening the role of local institutions and transparency in the PSM credit system, thereby reducing the potential for conflict and improving the welfare of plasma farmers sustainably.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Farmer Vs. Core Perceptions on PSM and Potential Conflicts

The issuance of the two regulations above is based on two problem maps faced by oil palm farmers. The two issues are: first, the problem of the quality and productivity level of the plantations caused by the farmers' limited knowledge of palm oil cultivation techniques, which is considered to be still minimal/superficial and second, related to the cohesion of farmers or farmer groups in maintaining performance-supporting facilities, especially roads and bridges, which are considered still very low/weak. Given these two problem maps, PSM is viewed as a potential solution to address these pressing issues at the plasma farmer level.

Based on the author's research, it was found that plasma farmers did not fully accept the PSM pattern and did not yet see it as a profitable solution. So, this PSM pattern still needs solid proof to make sure that putting it into practice does not make a big difference between the people involved in the palm oil trade using a core-plasma mechanism. Many plasma gardens that have entered the rejuvenation age have not been able to revitalize themselves because the decision is not yet final. There are several issues that are considered unresolved in the eyes of the farmers and remain unanswered questions regarding the choice of this PSM pattern. First, the revitalization program is considered not empowering farmers because, currently, growers feel they have mastered the technical aspects of oil palm cultivation, so there is no need to use the core company in technical cultivation and garden management. Second, the high credit burden and the practice of non-transparency in afforestation became the basis for farmers' discontent with the revitalization program. Third, the credit ceiling for replanting the core plantation and revitalizing the plasma plantation is the same, but farmers think the PSM pattern results in lower quality than their own plantation and the core plantation. Fourth, the practice of revitalizing gardens, according to farmers, is not as large as

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the credit ceiling set by the bank, so the credit amount of hundreds of millions of rupiah per plot is considered unreasonable.

Based on what the author has seen, the people of West Kalimantan, especially plasma farmers in Sanggau Regency (Meliau, Parindu, and Kembayan) and Landak Regency (Ngabang), who were early adopters of palm oil, have learned how to grow palm oil plantations through the concept of ATM (Observe, Imitate, and Implement). This ATM model not only enables them to establish their own high-quality palm oil plantations but also demonstrates their financial capability, allowing them to own palm oil plantations not just the size of the plasma allocation (2 ha) but also to develop plantations spanning dozens to hundreds of hectares. The plantation was opened on their own land, as acknowledged by Mr. Kenedy, Tumenggung Panca Benua, Tumenggung Kunt, and Pastor Arif, as well as Mr. Slamet, the palm oil farmers in the Parindu, Kembayan, and Ngabang Units, who have plantations spanning more than 10 hectares.

Under these conditions, the chosen PSM model aims to reduce the workload associated with managing independent gardens. However, when the quality of the revitalized gardens built does not meet the farmers' expectations, it invites rejection of the implementation of this PSM. Therefore, when PSM has not yet been able to prove the quality equivalence between replanting and independent farms with revitalized farms, the PSM model will still leave unease in the hearts of plasma farmers. If their unrest remains unresolved, I fear it could disrupt both the company's performance and socio-economic stability. In my role as a researcher, I am committed to finding a quick solution to resolve the conflicting views regarding PSM.

In my research, the hindrance of the plasma revitalization program is also caused by the transfer of ownership of the plantations from the first owner 20 years ago to the new owner due to the sale and purchase of plots. Information about the transfer of plasma plot ownership is indeed difficult to document because it is specific and closed in nature. Data on the transfer of ownership only emerged after the group of farmers decided on the PSM rejuvenation pattern. For instance, Sawit Jaya Village in Paser Regency, East Kalimantan, has experienced this phenomenon. On the 270 ha of land (135 heads of families) that has partnered with PTPN XIII for more than 20 years, as many as 58 families have transferred (bought and sold plots) to other parties, causing banking funding for the revitalization program with the PSM pattern in that group to be hindered. Even worse, outside parties mediate the plot sales, involving both buyers and sellers. When PSM was only implemented on an area of 154 ha (77 households) and not on 116 ha (58 households), internal group disputes emerged, adding to the complexity of the issues in this PSM pattern revitalization garden.

SWOT analysis as mapping Intiplasma's ability to reduce conflicts

SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) has become an important tool in measuring the strength of government policy models because it allows policymakers to identify internal and external factors that influence the success of policy

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implementation. By understanding internal strengths and weaknesses as well as external opportunities and threats, the government can design more effective and adaptive strategies. According to Gurel and Tat (2017), "SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool that helps organizations to identify their internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as external opportunities and threats" (p. 995). This approach helps improve efficiency, reduce risks, and strengthen policy resilience against dynamic environmental changes. So, in this part, the author shows the outcomes of a SWOT analysis on how plasma core could be used to reduce community conflict.

Table 1. SWOT Analysis Results

Aspects	Internal Factors	External Factors
Strengths	Plasma farm management efficiency through the nucleus company. Access to capital and technology from revitalization schemes. Farmer income stability through a transparent profit-sharing system.	Government regulatory support through Permenkeu No.117/PMK.06/2006 and Permentan No.33/Permentan/OT.140/7/2006. - Global market potential through the ISPO standard.
Weaknesses	Lack of transparency in the financial system and high credit burden. Lack of farmer involvement in land management. Lower quality of revitalized farms compared to independent farms.	Illegal transfer of ownership of plasma land, which hinders revitalization. Farmers' dependence on the core company.
Opportunities	Penguatan kelembagaan lokal (lembaga adat, koperasi, sekolah, dan organisasi desa) melalui hasil kebun plasma. Peningkatan kesejahteraan petani dan stabilitas sosial-ekonomi.	Local government supports maintaining the nucleus-plasma partnership. Opportunity to expand the global market through ISPO.
Threats	Potential social conflicts due to farmers' dissatisfaction with PSM. The practice of buying and selling plasma plots complicates beneficiary data.	Farmers' dependence on the nucleus company can eliminate farmers' independence.

The implementation of the One Management Pattern (PSM) in the core-plasma partnership in West Kalimantan has enormous potential to mitigate social conflicts between core companies and plasma farmers. PSM is considered a solution to increase productivity and the welfare of farmers through the management of plasma gardens, fully carried out by the core company, from planting and maintenance to harvesting. With a more transparent profit-sharing system, farmers can earn a stable income without having to face the risks of technical garden management. However, on the other hand, this model also generates resistance among farmers who feel they are losing control over the farmland they possess.

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One of the main weaknesses of PSM is the lack of transparency in the financial system and the credit burden, which is considered too high by plasma farmers. In addition, the quality of plantations managed through the PSM revitalization pattern is considered lower compared to independent plantations managed directly by farmers. This is in line with Narayan's (2002) findings, which state that the imbalance of power and access to information between farmers and core companies can be a major trigger for social conflicts in rural communities (Narayan-Parker, 2002). Therefore, it is important for companies to build transparency in their management systems and involve plasma farmers in the decision-making process.

However, on the other hand, PSM also opens up great opportunities to strengthen local institutions such as farmer cooperatives, customary institutions, and village organizations. By making sure that the profits from plasma gardens are used to fund social and economic activities in the community, PSM can improve community cohesion and stop farmer groups from fighting with each other. (Hanna, 2008). This is in line with Hidayat & Sulastri's (2019) view, which emphasizes that strengthening social capital and local institutions is key to building social stability in agrarian communities (Hidayat & Sulastri, 2019).

Considering the threats arising from the potential social conflicts due to farmers' dissatisfaction, a more inclusive and equitable strategy is needed in the implementation of PSM. In line with the rules in Permenkeu No.117/PMK.06/2006 and Permentan No.33/Permentan/OT.140/7/2006 on Plantation Revitalization, local governments need to be more involved in making sure this policy is followed. To ensure equality between core companies and plasma farmers, we must strengthen farmers' cooperatives as supervisors of PSM implementation (Neumayer, 2003). Thus, PSM can become a solution that not only increases productivity but also creates social stability and sustainable welfare for plasma farmers.

The Inti-Plasma Partnership model has been applied in the oil palm plantation sector as a strategy to improve the welfare of plasma farmers and reduce socio-economic inequality between nucleus companies and local communities. One of the approaches applied is the One Management Pattern (PSM), which allows the nucleus company to take over the full management of the plasma plantation, from planting and maintenance to harvesting. This pattern is considered capable of increasing the productivity of palm plantations and the stability of farmers' income. However, the implementation of PSM in West Kalimantan still faces social challenges that lead to tensions and conflicts between plasma farmers and nucleus companies.

One of the main factors causing conflict is the imbalance of power and access to information between plasma farmers and the nucleus company. Farmers feel that they have lost control over their land and face high credit burdens due to a PSM system that is considered non-transparent. This is in line with the views of Narayan (2002), who emphasizes that inequities in access to economic resources and information can exacerbate social conflicts in agrarian societies (Narayan-Parker, 2002). Therefore, transparency in

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financial management and farmer involvement in the decision-making process are key to reducing these tensions.

On the other hand, PSM also provides opportunities to strengthen local institutions such as farmer cooperatives, customary institutions, and village organizations as mediators in overcoming conflicts. By managing the plasma plantation products that are meant to help with social and economic growth in the community, PSM can make the community's social bonds stronger. This is reinforced by Hanna's (2008) findings that strengthening the capacity of local institutions can improve social stability and empower communities to participate in local resource management actively (Hanna, 2008).

The efficacy of PSM in mitigating conflicts is significantly contingent upon the function of farmer cooperatives as a communicative intermediary between nucleus companies and plasma farmers. Hidayat & Sulastri (2019) posit that robust cooperatives can serve as an efficacious instrument for social and economic empowerment in mitigating power disparities. (Hidayat & Sulastri, 2019). In West Kalimantan, farmer cooperatives can serve as overseers in the execution of PSM, guarantee financial system transparency, and safeguard farmers' rights to plasma land.

Moreover, local government support is a crucial element in sustaining the equilibrium of power between nucleus companies and plasma farmers. Equitable regulations and stringent oversight of the implementation of the Minister of Finance Regulation No. 117/PMK.06/2006 concerning Vegetable Energy Development Credit and Minister of Agriculture Regulation No. 33/Permentan/OT.140/7/2006 regarding Plantation Revitalization are mechanisms through which the government can ensure that PSM adheres to the principles of social justice and economic sustainability. Neumayer (2003) asserts that a robust and transparent government can avert the exploitation of farmers by large corporations (Neumayer, 2003).More importantly, the engagement of traditional institutions and community leaders can significantly contribute to alleviating social conflicts that emerge from the implementation of PSM. Customary institutions serve as protectors of social and cultural equilibrium, thereby reinforcing the cohesion of smallholder communities. Posits that the engagement of customary institutions in the conflict mediation process has the potential to enhance the perception of justice and expedite the resolution of conflicts within rural communities (Simanjuntak & Lestarini, 2022).

The main challenge in performing PSM is the insufficient education and awareness among plasma farmers regarding their rights within the nucleus-plasma partnership. Consequently, educational and training programs are essential for farmers to enhance their negotiation skills and comprehension of the management system established by the core company. Denhardt & Denhardt (2015) assert that education and community empowerment are essential for establishing an equitable and sustainable partnership (Denhardt, 2015). The core-plasma partnership model via the One Management Pattern (PSM) can effectively mitigate social conflicts in West Kalimantan if implemented with an inclusive and equitable methodology. Transparency in the financial system, enhancement of local institutions, active

P-ISSN 2442-5958
E-ISSN 2540-8674

Vol.11, No.2, 2025
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index

engagement of farmers, and support from local government are essential components for establishing social stability and sustainable welfare for plasma farmers.

Stakeholder Map in the Inti-Plasma Model

Stakeholder mapping is essential for the effective execution of the Inti-Plasma model, especially in resolving conflicts between the core company (Inti) and plasma farmers. Stakeholder mapping facilitates a comprehensive understanding of power dynamics, interests, and potential conflict areas within the partnership by identifying and analyzing key stakeholders, including plasma farmers, company management, cooperatives (KUD), local government, traditional leaders, and financial institutions. This mapping facilitates the equilibrium of power dynamics, guarantees transparent communication, and fosters inclusive decision-making processes that represent the interests of both the corporation and the farmers. Jones et al (1917) posit that proficient stakeholder management can avert conflict and promote collaboration in business partnerships, particularly pertinent to the Inti-Plasma model, where land ownership, financial management, and production outcomes frequently generate tension (Jones et al., 2017). Integrating stakeholder mapping into the PSM approach enables companies to cultivate trust, enhance collaboration, and mitigate social tensions, thereby fostering sustainable palm oil production and improving the welfare of plasma farmers.

Table 2. Stakeholder Map in the Inti-Plasma Model

Stakeholder	Level of Influence	Interests	Position in the conflict	Role in PSM
Plasma Farmers	Higher	Higher	Pros and Cons	Plasma landowner, beneficiary of farm products
Core Company (PTPN XIII)	Higher	Higher	Dominant	Plasma farm manager, technology provider, and market access
Farmer Cooperative (KUD/Kopbun)	Moderate	Higher	Neutral	Mediator between farmers and core companies
Local Government (Plantation & Agriculture Agency)	Higher	Moderate	Support PSM	Supervisor of PSM implementation in accordance with Regulation No. 117/2006
Customary Institutions and Community Leaders	Moderate	Higher	Support Farmer	Maintain social and cultural stability of local communities
Banks and Financial Institutions	Higher	Moderate	Neutral	Credit provider for plasma plantation revitalization
NGOs and Environmental Activists	Moderate	Higher	Pro-Farmer Tendency	Advocate for farmers' rights and environmental sustainability

P-ISSN 2442-5958
E-ISSN 2540-8674

Vol.11, No.2, 2025
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
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The stakeholder map analysis results regarding the implementation of the One Management Pattern (PSM) in the core-plasma partnership model reveal a substantial disparity in power and interests between plasma farmers and the core company. The nucleus company (PTPN XIII) wields significant influence as it entirely governs the management of plasma plantations, encompassing access to capital, technology, and markets. Simultaneously, plasma farmers, as landowners, possess significant interests; however, their influence in decision-making is considerably restricted. This disparity is a primary catalyst for discontent and potential social unrest within the community.

Conversely, farmer cooperatives (KUD) exert a moderate influence yet serve a pivotal function as a communicative intermediary between plasma farmers and the principal company. Cooperatives facilitate the distribution of produce, ensure financial system transparency, and safeguard the rights of plasma farmers. Nonetheless, the deficiencies in management and negotiation skills of cooperatives frequently hinder their ability to equilibrate the power dynamics between farmers and the principal company. (Hanna, 2008). Consequently, enhancing farmer cooperatives is essential for establishing a more equitable and harmonious relationship in PSM implementation.

Moreover, local governments and traditional institutions wield significant power in preserving social stability and ensuring that policy implementation adheres to regulations. Local governments are tasked with supervising the partnership system to ensure its transparency and equity, as mandated by regulations such as Permenkeu No.117/PMK.06/2006 and Permentan No.33/Permentan/OT.140/7/2006. Simultaneously, customary institutions serve as custodians of social and cultural values, mitigating potential conflicts among smallholders and enhancing community cohesion.

The effective execution of PSM is significantly reliant on the backing of banks and financial institutions that finance smallholder revitalization initiatives. Although financial institutions significantly influence credit allocation, they frequently lack an understanding of the social and economic circumstances of plasma farmers, resulting in credit burdens deemed excessive and onerous for these farmers (Narayan-Parker, 2002). A robust synergy among the nucleus company, smallholders, cooperatives, local government, and financial institutions is essential for establishing an equitable and sustainable partnership.

Table 3. Map of Power Relationships in the Core-Plasma Model

Stakeholder	Level of Influence	Interests	Function in PSM	Power Relationships
Core Company (PTPN XIII)	Higher	Higher	Manage smallholdings, control finances, technology, and distribution of produce.	Dominant to smallholders and cooperatives
Plasma Farmers	Moderate	Higher	Landowners, laborers, and recipients of production	Influenced by core companies and cooperatives

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E-ISSN 2540-8674

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Stakeholder	Level of Influence	Interests	Function in PSM	Power Relationships
Farmer Cooperative (KUD/Kopbun)	Moderate	Higher	Mediator between farmers and companies, managing the distribution of products and credit	Serves as a power broker
Local Government	Higher	Moderate	Policy regulator, supervisor of PSM implementation according to regulations	Policy controller and supervisor
Customary Institutions and Community Leaders	Moderate	Higher	Maintain social and cultural stability of local communities	Strengthening social solidarity and maintaining harmony
Banks and Financial Institutions	Higher	Moderate	Credit provider for plasma plantation revitalization	Determine access to capital and credit burden

The power relations map indicates that Nucleus Company (PTPN XIII) wields the greatest influence over the management of plasma plantations. In contrast, plasma farmers, despite being landowners with significant interests, possess limited power, rendering them particularly susceptible to conflict. Farmer cooperatives (KUD/Kopbun) serve as intermediaries connecting farmers' interests with the primary company; however, the capabilities of these cooperatives require enhancement to bolster farmers' bargaining power. Local governments serve as policy overseers to guarantee that PSM implementation adheres to regulations, while customary institutions uphold the social and cultural stability of local communities. Conversely, banks and financial institutions exert significant influence over access to capital and credit rates, frequently creating tension for farmers. Consequently, collaboration among the core company, cooperatives, government, and traditional institutions is crucial for establishing a fair and sustainable partnership, thereby mitigating the risk of social conflict in plasma communities.

Table 4. Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

Level of Importance	Level of Influence
Plasma Farmers - High	Core Company – High
Farmer Cooperatives - Medium	Local Government – High
Customary Institutions - Medium	Banks & Financial Institutions – High
NGOs and Activists - High	Farmer Cooperatives - Medium

The Stakeholder Analysis Matrix is essential to assess the strengths and interests of each stakeholder in implementing the One Management Pattern (PSM) in the Intel and Plasma partnership, as shown in Table 4. This matrix can identify the nucleus company, plasma farmers, farmer cooperatives, local government, customary institutions, and banks

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and other financial institutions based on their level of concern and influence over PSM. By establishing a clear framework, companies can analyze power dynamics, comprehend the status of plasma farmers who possess significant interests yet wield minimal power, and enhance the function of cooperatives as intermediaries in mitigating power disparities that frequently incite social conflicts.

It additionally functions to avert potential social conflicts, establish more transparent communication strategies, and fortify alliances with essential stakeholders, including farmer cooperatives and customary institutions that contribute to social stability. By comprehending intricate power dynamics, corporations can formulate more equitable policies, including alleviating the credit burden for smallholders, ensuring transparency in financial systems, and reinforcing local institutions. This matrix can serve as a strategic instrument to facilitate enduring and equitable partnerships, while also assisting smallholder communities in circumventing conflicts.

Conflict Resolution Strategy Based on Stakeholder Analysis

To ease the social tensions caused by the One Management Pattern (PSM) in the Core-Plasma partnership in West Kalimantan, it is important to use conflict resolution strategies based on stakeholder analysis. This study makes it possible to see how core companies, plasma farmers, farmers' cooperatives, local governments, customary institutions, and banks and other financial institutions all have different levels of power and interests. According to Freeman (2010), stakeholder analysis allows companies to understand the interests and power of each actor involved, thereby avoiding potential conflicts arising from power imbalances and a lack of transparency. (Freeman, 2010). In the case of Core-Plasma, this analysis helps the core company figure out the main issues that cause problems, like how opaque the financial system is and how hard it is to get credit, which are the main reasons why plasma farmers are unhappy.

Furthermore, stakeholder analysis facilitates the development of more inclusive and equitable collaborative strategies; as noted by Hanna (2008), the active involvement of all stakeholders is essential for establishing sustainable partnerships. (Hanna, 2008). By enhancing the role of farmer cooperatives as intermediaries, ensuring transparency within the financial system, and engaging customary institutions to uphold social stability, partnership relations can operate more harmoniously and mitigate the risk of prolonged conflicts. (Herrmann, 2005). Consequently, conflict resolution strategies grounded in stakeholder analysis can alleviate social tensions while enhancing the welfare of plasma farmers and fostering sustainable, equitable partnerships.

Table 5. Conflict Resolution Strategy Based on Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder	Recommended Strategy
Plasma Farmers	Improving negotiation capacity through strengthening cooperatives and supporting traditional institutions

P-ISSN 2442-5958
E-ISSN 2540-8674

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Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index

Core Company	Improving the transparency of the financial system and the quality of plasma plantations
Farmers' Cooperative	Strengthening the position of cooperatives as mediators and supervisors of PSM implementation
Local Government	Encouraging fair regulations and overseeing the implementation of the PSM model
Customary Institution	Using social power to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers
Bank & Financial Institutions	Providing more flexible and transparent credit for plasma farmers

The conflict resolution strategy table 5, derived from stakeholder analysis within the core-plasma model, indicates that the core company (PTPN XIII) wields predominant authority over the management of plasma gardens, yet frequently neglects to engage plasma farmers in the decision-making process. This creates a power disparity that serves as the primary catalyst for social conflicts within the plasma community. Consequently, the optimal strategy is to enhance the transparency of the financial system and fortify the role of farmer cooperatives (KUD) as intermediaries to reconcile the interests of farmers with the primary company. (Freeman, 2010).

Furthermore, local governments, as regulatory overseers, and customary institutions, as custodians of social stability, significantly contribute to conflict mitigation. This strategy can alleviate social tensions arising from ambiguity regarding credit obligations and production outcomes (Hanna, 2008) by engaging plasma farmers more actively, enhancing the cooperatives' efficacy in managing result distribution, and ensuring equitable profit sharing among all stakeholders. The participation of customary institutions is crucial for safeguarding the social and cultural values that constitute the identity of the local community. Consequently, banks and financial institutions must adopt a more flexible and transparent approach in establishing the credit limits for plasma farmers within the plasma garden revitalization program. Rigorous oversight by local governments and farmers' cooperatives can prevent the economic exploitation of plasma farmers, facilitating the establishment of sustainable partnerships. (Neumayer, 2003). Consequently, conflict resolution strategies grounded in stakeholder analysis can establish a power equilibrium, bolster the trust of plasma farmers, and reinforce social stability within the local community.

CONCLUSION

The core-plasma partnership model in palm oil governance has demonstrated the capacity to enhance the welfare of plasma farmers and alleviate social conflicts frequently stemming from disparities in negotiation power and insufficient transparency in the financial system. The One Management Pattern (PSM) enables the core company to exert comprehensive control over the management of plasma plantations, encompassing all stages from planting to harvesting, to enhance productivity and stabilize farmers' income. This

P-ISSN 2442-5958
E-ISSN 2540-8674

Vol.11, No.2, 2025
Doi: 10.24198/cosmogov.v11i2.62301
http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/cosmogov/index

research identified that plasma farmers' dissatisfaction stems from substantial credit burdens, the perceived inferior quality of plantations relative to independent management, and the limited participation of farmers in decision-making processes.

This research highlights the application of SWOT analysis and stakeholder analysis to discern the internal and external factors affecting the success of PSM. The analysis indicates that enhancing the role of farmer cooperatives as intermediaries, ensuring transparency in the financial system, and obtaining regulatory support from local government are essential for rectifying the power disparity between core companies and plasma farmers. The participation of customary institutions and local communities is deemed crucial for preserving social stability and enhancing the sense of justice among farmers.

The implementation of PSM can be optimized through a holistic and sustainable approach by integrating digital technology to improve the transparency of harvest data and profit distribution. This action not only mitigates potential conflicts but also enhances the negotiating power of plasma farmers within the partnership. Consequently, an equitable and sustainable nucleus-plasma model is anticipated to foster social harmony, enhance economic welfare, and encourage social stability in palm oil plantation regions.

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