

Implementation of DPRD POKIR and the Shift of Legislatif Functions in Public Goods Provision: A Qualitative Study of West Sumatra Province

^a Ria Ariany; ^b Ratih; ^c Rahmat Febrianto; ^d Fandy Triawan; ^e Adi Saputra; ^f Endri Putra; ^g Yuliartati; ^h

Mitropi

^a ^b Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Andalas, Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia; ^c Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Andalas, Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia;

^d Department of Economics, Universitas Negeri Padang, Padang, West Sumatra; ^e ^f ^g ^h Research and Development Agency (BALITBANG) of West Sumatra Province, Padang, West Sumatra

ABSTRAK

Pokir secara normatif merupakan instrumen penyerapan aspirasi masyarakat, tapi pada praktiknya menunjukkan dinamika politik-administratif yang lebih kompleks. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis bagaimana implementasi Pokir DPRD mempengaruhi fungsi eksekutif dalam penyediaan barang publik pada tingkat lokal. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif pada pemerintah provinsi Sumatera Barat. Data dikumpulkan melalui wawancara mendalam dengan pejabat eksekutif dan anggota DPRD serta analisis dokumen perencanaan dan penganggaran daerah. Analisis dilakukan secara tematik berbasis teori implementasi kebijakan dari Merilee S. Grindle, yang memiliki dimensi content of policy dan context of implementation. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa masuknya Pokir ke dalam dokumen perencanaan dan penganggaran telah merekonstruksi prioritas pelayanan publik, membatasi otonomi OPD, serta menggeser locus pengambilan keputusan dari domain administratif ke arena politik legislatif. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada pengembangan studi administrasi publik dengan menawarkan konsep pergeseran fungsi eksekutif sebagai implikasi struktural dari dinamika implementasi kebijakan di tingkat lokal.

ABSTRACT

Normatively, Legislatif Main Thought serves as an instrument for channeling public aspirations, but in practice it reflects more complex political and administrative dynamics. This study aims to analyze how the implementation of Legislatif Main Thought influences the executive branch's role in providing public goods at the local level. This study employs a descriptive qualitative approach focused on the provincial government of West Sumatra. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with executive officials and DPRD members, as well as through the analysis of regional planning and budgeting documents. The analysis was conducted thematically based on Merilee S. Grindle's policy implementation theory, which encompasses the dimensions of content of policy and context of implementation. The results indicate that the inclusion of Legislatif Main Thought in planning and budgeting documents has restructured public service priorities, limited the autonomy of OPDs, and shifted the locus of decision-making from the administrative domain to the legislative political arena. This study contributes to the development of public administration studies by introducing the concept of a shift in executive functions as a structural implication of policy implementation dynamics at the local level.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Submitted: 14 04 2025

Revised: 02 02 2026

Accepted: 04 06 2026

Published: 13 10 2026

KATA KUNCI

Implementasi Kebijakan;
Pengadaan Barang Publik;
Pokok Pikiran Anggota Dewan;
Hubungan Politik-
Administratif; Pelayanan
Publik

KEYWORDS

Policy Implementation;
Legislatif Main Thought;
Political-Administrative
Relations; Public Goods
Provision; Public Serviced

INTRODUCTION

Public provision is not a function of the House of Representatives (DPR); in fact, much of public provision is carried out through the DPRD's Pokir program. "Pokir" is a common term used as an abbreviation for "Pokok Pikiran Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat" (Key Considerations of the Regional People's Representative Council), which refers to Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 86 of 2017 regarding procedures for the implementation, control, and evaluation of regional development, as well as amendments to planning documents (RPJP, RPJMD, RKPD).

In some African countries, such as Ghana, legislators also have the role of serving their constituents (Ofosu, 2024), making the provision of public goods to their constituents a necessity in carrying out their duties. In this regard, legislators have a multitasking role (Ofosu, 2024), capable of performing their party duties and serving their constituents simultaneously. However, this is not the case in Indonesia. According to the second amendment to Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, the DPR has three functions: Legislation, Oversight, and Budgeting. Therefore, based on its functions, it is clear that the DPR does not engage in the procurement of public goods in the context of providing public services to its constituents.

In West Sumatra Province during Governor Mahyeldi Ansarullah's 2022–2024 term, the budget for physical projects proposed by the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) reached 70% in the 2022 fiscal year and declined over the remaining two years of his term (Research Report by the West Sumatra Provincial Research and Development Agency, 2024). These data indicate that public procurement has become the preferred activity proposal among legislators in the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD. Consequently, public procurement through the DPRD's Pokir has led to the assumption that it forms part of a chain of corrupt agreements between the bureaucracy and the legislature, as research findings by experts reveal that public procurement is one of the sectors where corruption is most prevalent (Falcón-Cortés, Aldana, and Larralde 2022).

Field data supports this assumption; it is common for the implementation of the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD's pokir initiatives to be directly controlled by the DPRD members who proposed them, rather than by the implementing government agencies. Although administrative authority over these pokir initiatives lies with the implementing agencies, in practice many of these agencies are not involved in the implementation process and are tasked only with handling administrative matters (Interview results with the Food Agency; Education Agency; Public Works and Spatial Planning Agency; Assistant I and II of the West Sumatra Provincial Secretariat; BAPENDA and BAPPEDA of West Sumatra Province, 2024). Even more concerning is that these initiatives receive very little oversight from the local government (Interview results with the West Sumatra Provincial Inspectorate; the Regional Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK RI) West Sumatra Provincial Office; the State Financial Audit Agency (BPKP), 2024).

Interestingly, this situation reinforces the assumption that the Pokir Programs proposed by legislators following their recess are essentially government-funded personal projects; consequently, they are perceived as prioritizing their own interests, those of their groups, and their parties rather than advocating for the people's interests. This situation is considered commonplace in the realm of executive-legislative relations, including within the West Sumatra provincial government. This model of relations inevitably creates opportunities for corruption among the stakeholders.

Corruption poses the greatest challenge to the government because it not only impacts economic growth, democracy (Falcón-Cortés et al., 2022), and social justice, but more importantly, it undermines the social system that has been established (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In this context, the normalization of corrupt behavior occurs (Ashforth & Anand, 2003),

where corrupt behavior is not merely individual but is internalized into the organizational system, becoming ingrained as the norm within the organization's structure and processes—consciously accepted, permitted, and perpetuated (Brief, et. al., 2001; Zucker, 1977; in Ashforth and Anand 2003). This situation raises a critical question: Is the procurement of public goods through the DPRD's budget allocation a legislative authority?

There is currently limited literature examining this issue. Studies on Pokir in Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD) in Indonesia generally focus on legal aspects, budgetary politics, and the representation of public aspirations, while few studies analyze it as a policy implementation phenomenon that impacts the structure of administrative authority in public service delivery. Therefore, this study aims to examine the gap that has emerged in the implementation of Pokir within the context of governance, which has caused a shift in the locus of decision-making regarding the provision of public goods, from the executive domain to the legislative political arena. This research is particularly important given that the DPRD's Pokir serves as a political instrument integrated into the formal regional development planning system, which is subsequently incorporated into the Regional Government Work Plan (RKPD) and the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD).

Literature Review

Public Service

Public services are a government function involving the implementation of policies to meet the needs of the community (Katelo, 2024). Public services, defined as services provided by the government to serve the public interest, can be categorized into two main groups: (1) infrastructure services; and (2) social welfare services (Bordás, 2009). The provision of public services by the government is carried out with various important considerations, particularly regarding the method of delivery (Kang, 2024). Political factors, government finances, administrative levels, and the environment influence the government's decisions in determining how to provide public services. Local governments, as the primary providers of public services, play a central role in fulfilling the public's expectations for quality services.

Under the regulations, the procurement of public goods is part of public services, which fall under the government's responsibility (Ginting et al., 2023) . Law No. 25 of 2009 on Public Services stipulates that the procurement of public goods funded by the regional or national budget falls under the authority of the government. The procurement of public goods is tailored to regional needs and financial conditions.

An empirical study conducted by researchers from 2023 to 2025 through public satisfaction surveys in three cities in West Sumatra Province (Payakumbuh, Bukittinggi, and Padang Panjang) found that several neighborhood roads in residential areas in these three cities were funded through the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative Council's (DPRD) discretionary budget allocation (Public Satisfaction Survey Report, 2025). This study indicates that the provision of public goods is not solely the domain of the government as part of its functional duties but is also carried out through political processes, specifically the DPRD's budget allocation initiatives. Although these initiatives often address only the public's short-term needs and may not necessarily align with the direction of regional development.

Meanwhile, public services provided by the government are the result of a lengthy planning process and have a very broad scope, touching every sector of society. The public

expects an improvement in the quality of government services, which have long been “labeled” as poor due to the uneven and unequal distribution of services, particularly for the poor (Gethin, 2026). This situation creates an opening exploited by legislators, particularly in the context of public goods provision—an area highly susceptible to corruption, especially when these two actors are connected (Darabad and Dadgar 2017). The relationship between service providers and government officials shifts the purpose of public goods procurement from one focused on public welfare to one centered on the distribution of profits (Bold et al., 2018).

This study reinforces the analysis of clientelism between providers and government actors, revealing a transactional model within the public goods procurement system in impoverished regions. The findings indicate that following legislative elections, there is an increase in the availability of public goods in impoverished regions that serve as the legislators’ electoral strongholds. This study demonstrates that transactional politics serves as one of the methods employed in the provision of public goods by legislators in impoverished regions, with the provision of public goods functioning as compensation for the political support received. A key finding of this research is that clientelism is considered a legitimate aspect within the political system. The long-standing tolerance of clientelistic practices has led to their integration into the ongoing political systems and processes (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Furthermore, the focus on the relationship between public actors and providers is of great importance because it is closely linked to decision-making regarding resource allocation, and rent-seeking (Bazie et al., 2024) remains a critical issue in government economic activities. The findings of this study underscore the importance of conducting a more in-depth examination of how the procurement of public goods through political processes has been carried out to date.

George K. Ofosu also conducted a study focused on the legislative function and identified constituents’ desires and expectations regarding the legislators they support, finding that constituents prefer legislators to allocate their resources toward meeting constituents’ needs rather than focusing on parliamentary work (Ofosu 2024). The provision of public goods in their constituencies is a necessary step in fulfilling the service function of legislators in Ghana. This is possible because one of the functions of legislators is to serve their constituents.

The previous studies cited above have primarily examined the weaknesses in local government governance when confronted with practical political realities; however, they have not specifically examined the shift in the legislative branch’s role as a provider of public goods, which has obscured some of the government’s core functions in public service delivery.

Policy Implementation

The failure of a policy is often not solely due to poor policy design; rather, the success or failure of policy implementation is frequently determined by political and administrative factors in the context where the policy is implemented. views policy implementation as a political process, not merely a technical administrative matter. Every policy to be implemented is the product of political negotiation, involving bargaining, resistance, and compromise.

Policy implementation is influenced by the content and context of the policy (Grindle, 2017). Policy content in this study refers to the nature of the initiative, with a focus on identifying the pokir's objectives and who stands to benefit most from it; the extent to which the initiative will alter the OPD's work program; who determines the details of the pokir's program; and who implements the pokir's program. Analysis of data within the scope of policy content will illustrate where distortions originate. Meanwhile, policy context in this study focuses on the relationship between the DPRD and the executive branch, with an in-depth examination of: the presence of pressure or coercion at the OPD level to accept and implement the pokir; the existence of budget negotiations; dominance in program determination; the level of compliance by implementing actors with existing regulations; and the tendencies of regional heads. Analysis of data within the policy context will illustrate the degree of imbalance in the established relationships. Analysis of the data within the policy context will illustrate the degree of imbalance in the relationships that have been established.

In the context of policy implementation, policy impact is a crucial component of the analytical framework because impact is the result of the implementation process; thus, the success of implementation can be measured by the level of compliance; changes in the behavior of the target group; and the achievement of program objectives.

In contrast to Paul A. Sabatier's perspective (Sabatier, Jenkins, 1993), the impact of a policy is not merely measured by the implementation of programs (outputs), but by the extent to which the policy is able to produce tangible changes (outcomes) and sustainable long-term effects (impact). Sabatier emphasizes that the effectiveness of a policy is largely determined by the clarity of its objectives, the consistency of its design, and the presence of mechanisms for policy evaluation and learning (policy learning).

Therefore, when policy implementation is focused solely on fulfilling administrative requirements without being accompanied by substantive changes among the target groups, the policy tends to fail to produce significant impacts. Furthermore, weak evaluation processes and the absence of policy learning lead to recurring implementation errors, causing policies to remain at the output level without being able to achieve development goals optimally and sustainably.

In this study, the impact resulting from the implemented policies will focus on examining whether the local government agencies responsible for implementing community-driven initiatives have lost their autonomy; whether public services have shifted into the political realm; and assessing the extent to which program fragmentation has occurred. In line with this, Grindle (2017) also identifies the key actors in policy implementation as (1) Political Elites; (2) Implementing Bureaucrats; (3) Interest Groups; and (4) Beneficiaries

Meanwhile, in the context of executive-legislative relations, the two branches have distinct authorities, duties, and functions that complement one another in fulfilling their respective roles within the regional government. However, in practice, the structure of interaction between the legislative and executive branches has led to distortions that have, among other things, resulted in a shift in the legislative branch's role in public service, particularly in the area of public goods provision.

Previous research focusing on the implementation of DPRD Pokir in several regions of Indonesia has been conducted from various perspectives. For example, Ellyzan, Andi Miftahul Farid n.d., (2024) a study examining the implementation of the DPRD's Pokir drafting process in Natuna Regency found that the drafting process was based on

customary practices within the DPRD, with no regulatory references other than Article 178(6) of Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 86 of 2017.

Meanwhile, Federioco Timotius Tan (2022) examines the budgetary rights inherent in the functions of the DPRD from a legal perspective; his research findings indicate that the DPRD's right to propose initiatives represents a paradox in the development of representative theory and applicable legislation.

Another study evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of Pokir funds in Mimika Regency has also been conducted (Nasrum, Iek, and Ngutra, 2024). In this study, the researchers focused on the impact of Pokir utilization on the welfare of the community in Mimika Regency. The results of the study indicate that Pokir does not have a significant impact on improving the welfare of the Mimika community.

Several studies focusing on the implementation of DPRD policy initiatives generally discuss such initiatives from a normative perspective and treat them as phenomena of administrative implementation. However, these previous studies do not address how legislative interventions influence the structure of administrative decision-making. Therefore, this study offers a theoretical contribution by explaining how the interaction between the content of policy and the context of implementation within Grindle's policy implementation framework is used to analyze changes in the structure of administrative authority at the local level in the public service sector.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach using a case study design. This approach was chosen in accordance with the study's objective to gain an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the implementation of the DPRD's Pokir in West Sumatra Province, as well as its impact on changes in the structure of administrative authority in the delivery of public services resulting from legislative intervention through the DPRD's Pokir scheme. The case study method is employed to examine the processes, actor interactions, and institutional dynamics of local government in a factual manner. The research analytical framework draws upon the policy implementation theory proposed by Merilee S. Grindle, focusing on the key concepts of content of policy and context of implementation, which will serve as the analytical tools.

This research was conducted in the West Sumatra provincial government, with the unit of analysis focused on the implementation process of the DPRD's pokir, specifically how pokir is integrated into the RKPD (Regional Government Work Plan); the APBD; and the OPD Work Plan. Consequently, the research focus is directed toward changes in the decision-making structure for the provision of public goods and their implications for executive administrative autonomy in public service delivery.

Informants were selected purposively based on their formal authority and direct involvement in POKIR planning, budgeting, and supervision. Data collection continued until thematic saturation was reached. Data were analyzed through coding, categorization, thematic interpretation, and triangulation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

It cannot be denied that a system of government with a separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches causes these two state institutions to compete with one another, each possessing independent political authority and control over the government (Metzger, 2020).

As the authority responsible for carrying out public service functions, local governments have the power to set program priorities, allocate resources, and direct policy implementation in accordance with applicable planning documents and regulatory frameworks. These authorities are normatively inherent to the executive function as a technocratic actor responsible for ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of services to the public. Within the framework of public management, this authority is realized through the formulation of the Regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), the Organizational Unit Strategic Plans (Renstra OPD), and the establishment of performance indicators that serve as the basis for determining program priorities.


Normatively, the structure of the APBD should ideally accommodate the various interests of local stakeholders (Sitepu et al., 2024), particularly the political interests of the bureaucracy in the administration of local government. Meanwhile, the DPRD, as the government's partner in governing, has a budgeting function and is formally authorized to deliberate on and approve the regional budget. This role is part of the system of checks and balances in local government governance (Nasrum et al., 2024).

In carrying out its budgeting function, the DPRD also plays a role through the submission and integration of Pokir into regional planning and budgeting documents. This mechanism allows public aspirations gathered through recess activities and other forms of political communication to be incorporated into the structure of local government programs, in accordance with the mandate of Article 78, Paragraph 1, Point i of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 86 of 2017.

The integration of DPRD Pokir proposals into regional planning and budgeting documents should ideally align with the established regional development plan (Naharuddin, 2022). However, field data indicates that this process is often not entirely free from the dynamics of political interests inherent in the legislative function. This finding reinforces previous research that preferences conveyed through Pokir proposals may reflect the needs of specific constituents, electoral district priorities, short-term political agendas, or the individual political interests of the proposal's sponsor (Hidayaturrehman et al., 2021).

From the perspective of policy implementation as outlined by Marile S. Grindle (Grindle, 2017), the phenomenon of the integration of the DPRD's Pokir demonstrates an interaction between policy content and the context of implementation through a series of activities not regulated by law. Five (5) series of interactive activities were identified in the integration process, which ultimately restructured the authority of OPDs in the realm of public services, including public procurement. The forms of interaction between policy content and context of implementation in the process of integrating DPRD Pokir into the RKPD document, when synthesized into an analytical framework, are as follows:

Figure 1.
Integrating the Pokir DPRD into the Provincial Budget of West Sumatra



Source: data processed by the researcher

Figure 1 illustrates the process of integrating the DPRD's Pokir into the West Sumatra Provincial RKPD, where the power dynamics between the legislative and executive branches significantly influence the integration of the DPRD into the RKPD during the implementation process. The interaction between the content of policy—dominated by political interests—and the context of implementation, under conditions of weak oversight, coordination among actors, and institutional capacity, as well as limitations in human resource capabilities, results in the implementation process being fragmented into several distinct activities, as follows:

1) Coordination in the Implementation of Pokir

Coordination between local governments and DPRD members proposing Pokir is a crucial aspect in ensuring that Pokir proposals can be effectively integrated into the RKPD. Institutionally, this coordination is typically facilitated by BAPPEDA as the local government agency responsible for aligning program proposals with planning documents. Through this mechanism, Pokir proposals submitted by DPRD members are first reviewed by the local government to ensure their alignment with the development policy direction and performance indicators established in the RPJMD and RKPD. This coordination process also involves relevant OPDs as technical implementing partners for the proposed programs.

Institutionally, BAPPEDA of West Sumatra Province has also developed the SAKATO PLAN application as an internal communication tool within the local government. Meanwhile, to ensure that DPRD proposals remain within the framework of the regional development plan, BAPPEDA of West Sumatra Province has created a "Proposal Glossary" that can be used as a guide for proposing DPRD Pokir activities.

However, field findings indicate that there remains a lack of awareness among DPRD members proposing Pokir, as well as among faction staff tasked with entering DPRD's Pokir proposals into the SIPD application. Even the secretariat of the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD, which is responsible for verifying the DPRD's Pokir proposals, does not use the "Proposal Dictionary" as a guideline for verifying council members' Pokir proposals. This situation indicates a problem in the coordination system between the executive and legislative branches.

In fact, the existence of the "Proposal Dictionary" as a guideline for drafting Pokir has not been adequately disseminated to all stakeholders involved in the proposal process. Furthermore, the limited space for dialogue and discussion forums between the local government and the DPRD

in determining the priorities of Pokir proposals further weakens the alignment process between legislative aspirations and the direction of local development policies. Consequently, many Pokir proposals from DPRD members are not fully aligned with the local government's development policy priorities and flagship programs (Progul). From a policy implementation perspective, this situation indicates the existence of obstacles in the policy communication process among the actors involved.

As explained by Grindle, the success of policy implementation is greatly influenced by the interaction between the content of policy and the context of implementation, including the capacity of actors and the quality of inter-institutional communication. When policy coordination and communication do not function effectively, the integration of policy into implementation practices becomes suboptimal, as reflected in the emergence of Pokir proposals that are not fully aligned with the direction of regional development.

2) Reconstructing Priorities in Public Service

The complexity of public service delivery in Indonesia is not limited to the delivery process itself, which tends to deviate (Supriyanto et al., 2023), but also extends to the procurement process. In terms of public goods procurement, the government must ensure that the procurement process is carried out effectively (M. Haikal Aditya et al., 2024) and in accordance with established procedures. Although priority reconstruction is not inherently negative in a normative sense, the findings of this study indicate that the adjustments made are often additive and partial, rather than integrative. The research findings reveal that efforts at priority reconstruction in public services serve as an approach used to align various program proposals within OPDs so that legislative proposals can still be accommodated without entirely disregarding the direction of regional development. In an interview with the Governor of West Sumatra for the 2021–2024 term, it was stated that many DPRD community-based initiative proposals were budgeted at amounts below Rp200 million, with a very large number of proposed activities. It is suspected that this is done to avoid the bidding process for the work, so that administratively, the relevant government agencies can use the Direct Appointment (PL) system in the procurement of public goods.

Based on an analysis of available documents, the proposed package of DPRD Pokir activities, with a budget of approximately 200 million rupiah, is primarily directed toward meeting the immediate needs of the community, such as providing sewing machines, rice field plows, and various other forms of production assistance, which do not always align with the regional development objectives outlined in the RPJMD or the regional flagship programs (PROGUL). The direct and sectoral nature of these proposals indicates that some Pokir activities tend to focus on meeting the short-term needs of the community in the council members' electoral districts.

Although this approach can provide direct benefits to aid recipients, in some cases these activities have not been fully integrated into the strategic, medium-term regional development planning framework. As a result, the contribution of Pokir activities to the achievement of regional development targets remains relatively limited, particularly when the proposed programs lack a clear link to the development priorities established in regional planning documents.

Table 1.
Proposed Budget of the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD in the West Sumatra Provincial

Type of Activity	2022	2023	2024
Physical	324.886.090.000	157.310.627.800	174.041.919.200
Non Physical	95.574.518.200	178.181.622.350	248.843.376.700
Total	420.460.608.200	335.492.250.150	422.885.295.900

Source: Research report from the Regional Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) of West Sumatra Province (2024), compiled by researchers.

The data in Table 1 show that in the first year of the elected governor's administration, approximately 70% of the budget allocated for the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD's community-based initiatives (pokir) was directed toward physical projects, specifically the procurement of goods such as road construction, agricultural equipment, buildings, and other physical infrastructure (BAPPEDA Prov. Sumbar, 2024). However, in practice, not all budgeted initiatives could be implemented due to various obstacles, including technical, administrative, or legal issues.

The magnitude of the DPRD's proposed public works projects, as shown in Table 1, indicates the high level of immediate community need in the electoral districts (dapil) of the proposing DPRD members; these projects are considered easier to implement compared to other non-physical initiatives. Nevertheless, based on previous research, it is agreed that the public procurement process is the most scrutinized aspect of government operations, as it is prone to corruption (Darabad & Dadgar, 2017; M. Haikal Aditya et al., 2024) bribery, and other activities that harm local finances.

Interview data also indicates that the process of integrating DPRD Pokir into budget deliberations begins with an adjustment process between technocratic planning—based on strategic documents such as the RPJMD and OPD Strategic Plans—and political aspirations conveyed through the DPRD Pokir scheme. Under certain conditions, this adjustment is not always integrative but tends to be additive—that is, incorporating programs without fully considering consistency with the medium-term development framework. Consequently, the priority structure formulated through formal planning mechanisms undergoes reconfiguration. This situation poses a unique challenge for BAPPEDA and its OPD partners, who are often “forced” to synchronize with the DPRD's Pokir proposals that do not align with the proposal framework previously designed by the West Sumatra Provincial BAPPEDA.

This restructuring occurs when programs that were not previously included in the OPD's technocratic priorities become part of the strategic agenda because they have been accommodated in budget discussions. This means that Pokir programs are added to the service structure without being fully integrated into a comprehensive strategic planning framework. Consequently, program fragmentation and the dispersal of resources occur, which impact the effectiveness of achieving the OPD's strategic objectives. Therefore, the integration of DPRD Pokir into regional planning and budgeting documents does not merely add to the list of programs, but substantively reconstructs the structure of public service priorities.

This situation has contributed to the assumption that the DPRD's budget requests are viewed as a bargaining chip or a reward for political support of the ruling government (Deacon, 2009). If a government is established and operated based on strong political support, it is common for the budget for public procurement to be directed toward its supporting political groups (Deacon, 2009); the implication is that oversight of public procurement through the DPRD's budget recommendations will be weakened. Because, as the government's partner, the DPRD views itself as equal in authority and in the performance of its duties and functions, it often behaves

as an extra-powerful and dominant body at the local level (Wicaksono & Febrina, 2016).

Thus, the reconfiguration of priorities in public service can be understood as a structural consequence of the interaction between policy content and the power dynamics of implementation. This process demonstrates that public service at the local level is determined not only by administrative capacity but also by the political configurations that influence strategic decision-making. From the perspective of policy content, the nature of Pokir—which represents the interests of constituents—influences the structure of service priorities.

3) Negotiations in the Context of Implementation

In the process of drafting the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD), local wisdom and regional political dynamics are among the influential factors. Research data indicates that the elected governor of West Sumatra Province hails from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and is supported by five (5) supporting parties (PKS, Democrat, Perindo, PBB, and Gerindra). This political configuration indirectly influences the direction of local government policy, as the support of these political parties helps shape the policy preferences adopted by the local government.

In the context of local government, the political affiliations of local leaders often play a role in determining the orientation of development programs and the policy priorities implemented during their terms in office (Dye, 2013; Peters, 2010; Nugroho, 2014). Thus, the political dynamics formed through the coalition of supporting parties are not only a factor in the regional head election process but also have the potential to influence the direction of regional development policy implementation, including in the budgeting process and the determination of development program priorities. Consequently, the interaction between legislative and executive actors in budget deliberations is not only based on technocratic considerations derived from development planning documents and social and cultural values but is also influenced by the power configurations that emerge within the local political context. This situation makes the APBD formulation process an arena for compromise between various administrative and representative political interests.

Based on the data collected, the local political landscape within the West Sumatra provincial government significantly influences the prioritization of regional budget allocations, including the consideration of legislative proposals submitted by the DPRD that reflect the aspirations of constituents in their respective electoral districts. In this regard, the Governor, as the head of the region, will not disregard the interests of the party that nominated him, nor will he disregard the political interests of the legislature, which is a partner in the administration of government. As the head of government, the governor will always prioritize the political interests of the government in the administration of government to ensure that regional development proceeds in accordance with the established direction (Results of an interview with the governor of West Sumatra Province, 2024).

As a result, the local budgeting process does not always proceed in a linear fashion in accordance with established planning documents, but is instead influenced by negotiations and the balancing of interests among the actors involved. This situation also contributes to the length of the budget deliberation process, indicating weaknesses in local development budgeting planning (Sitepu et al. 2024). It cannot be denied that a political system based on electoral democracy is inseparable from the practice of clientelism, which is a hallmark of democratic systems. In such systems, the process of political competition drives political actors to build support through various networks of interest characterized by clientelistic practices. Clientelism within the bureaucracy—as the administrator of government—seems to have become a legal

matter because tolerance of such practices has persisted for a long time, much like corruption that has been normalized and become part of the culture. Consequently, the oversight function inherent to the legislature becomes blurred, particularly when access to resources—the management of which falls under the government’s authority—is opened up, allowing political actors to exploit them to boost their personal electability (Hidayaturrehman et al., 2021).

This practice is observed in political negotiations over the government budget between the executive and legislative branches in West Sumatra Province, where the budget tends to be used as a tool for political bargaining. According to data from interviews with a senior council member of the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD, it was stated that it is quite common for council members proposing Pokir to act as the executors in the implementation of their Pokir. In addition to ensuring that Pokir activities meet the established targets, they also ensure they gain material benefits, since council members incur political costs to secure their legislative seats; thus, this situation is considered a common occurrence (Results of interviews with members of the West Sumatra Provincial DPRD, 2024). The data from these interviews reinforces the established assumption that DPRD community development initiatives are frequently used as a tool to secure personal gains.

The continued tolerance of these conditions has fostered a culture that has been tacitly accepted by all, as the government views political factors as playing a crucial and even dominant role, particularly in policy formulation (Vandusky-Allen & Utych, 2021).

However, based on the data obtained, not all of the DPRD’s proposed initiatives that have been included in the OPD’s Annual Work Plan can be implemented. Some of the reasons why these initiatives have not been implemented include issues with land acquisition, changes in the location of the activities, or even the inability to carry out the activities due to other technical reasons; these circumstances have implications for the absorption of the Regional Budget.

However, it is highly ironic that the West Sumatra provincial government continues to allocate nearly 5% of the total APBD for the 2022–2024 period to fund Pokir initiatives for the 65 members of the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative Council (Research Report of the West Sumatra Provincial Research and Development Agency, 2024). This data supports the assumption that the budget serves as a tool for political bargaining among those in power. In reality, suboptimal budget absorption indicates weak planning in development budgeting, which consequently impacts regional development and public services.

These findings indicate the existence of negotiation dynamics between the legislative and executive branches in the budgeting process. From a policy implementation perspective, this phenomenon suggests that the implementation process is influenced not only by the formal design of the policy but also by the configuration of power and the interests of the actors involved, as explained by Grindle through the interaction between the content of policy and the context of implementation.

4) Reduction of Technical Autonomy of OPDs

The budgeting function inherent to the DPRD is part of the system of checks and balances in local government governance, and normatively, OPDs have the authority to formulate and implement development programs based on needs analysis, performance indicators, and policy directions outlined in strategic planning documents. However, in practice, field data indicate that the DPRD involvement through its budgeting function is not merely evaluative or limited to formal approval; it is accompanied by pressure to accommodate legislative priorities (Pokir) that have entered the budget deliberation process, thereby limiting the OPD’s discretion.

In fact, according to previous research, aggregate fiscal discipline is a critical component of public expenditure management; the two key principles underpinning this discipline are allocative efficiency and operational efficiency. To date, these two principles do not appear to apply in the local financial budgeting process of the West Sumatra provincial government, particularly regarding budgeting that intersects with the DPRD's Pokir.

This situation has prompted OPDs to reevaluate the priorities of their existing programs, including by postponing or shifting activities that were previously considered more relevant from a technical standpoint. Consequently, the role of OPDs as planners and implementers of policies based on rational analysis has shifted; program decisions are no longer determined solely by technical considerations, but also by the dynamics of power relations within the budgeting process.

The power dynamics at play in determining the success of negotiations between the executive and legislative branches often make the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) appear to be a "superpower" institution. Consequently, many of the DPRD's Pokir initiatives within certain government agencies are viewed as a burden—especially when these initiatives are not a priority but must be implemented due to pressure or because they were specifically requested by certain legislative members. Thus, it can be said that the integration of Pokir initiatives leads to program fragmentation and adjustments to work plans.

Based on the presentation of these findings, it can be concluded that the decision-making process in regional budgeting does not take place entirely through administrative and planning-based channels, but is also influenced by the political dynamics that emerge in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. From a policy implementation perspective, this phenomenon indicates that the capacity and autonomy of policy implementers are significantly influenced by the surrounding political and institutional context, meaning that policy implementation does not fully operate within a neutral administrative framework.

5) The Shift in Executive Functions

In the context of the shifting role of the legislature in decision-making within the public service sector, it is evident that the Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) budgeting function serves as a gateway for practical politics into the policy implementation phase. This role expands the arena of public service decision-making from the administrative domain into the realm of political negotiation, thereby fostering more intense interaction between legislative representatives' preferences and executive rationality, which leads to a reduction in the technical autonomy of OPDs in formulating and implementing development programs. This reduction in autonomy is reflected in the increasingly limited discretion of OPDs in determining program priorities based on needs analysis and regional development performance indicators.

This situation ultimately leads to a shift in the executive branch's role in the delivery of public services, including the provision of public goods. As the discretion of government agencies in formulating and setting program priorities becomes increasingly limited, the executive's role as a planner guided by rational analysis tends to shift toward that of a policy implementer who must accommodate the political preferences that emerge during the budgeting process. This situation not only affects the quality of program planning but also drives a reconfiguration of public service priorities, where program decisions are not entirely based on objective regional development needs but are also influenced by the dynamics of power relations between the legislative and executive branches.

In this context, policy implementation at the local level reveals a transformation in decision-making structures, where the line between technical considerations and political preferences is becoming increasingly blurred. This phenomenon indicates that public service is no longer entirely oriented toward achieving strategic regional development goals, but has also become part of a process of adapting to political pressures within the local government system.

The accumulation of these dynamics indicates a shift in the executive's function from that of a technical planner to an implementer of political preferences in public service. This shift is a structural consequence of the interaction between policy content and the context of implementation.

From the perspective of Grindle's policy implementation theory, these dynamics indicate that policy content—which incorporates the representative preferences reflected in the DPRD's Pokir—will interact with the power context during the budgeting process. This interaction creates space for a shift in the orientation of public service, from one originally based on measurable strategic planning toward an orientation that is more responsive to representative political pressures. Thus, the integration of Pokir is not merely an administrative mechanism but also a venue for the negotiation of interests that influence the direction of local policy implementation.

The issues surrounding the DPRD's Pokir do not stop at the reconfiguration of development priorities alone, but also extend to the quality of the proposed Pokir. Data indicates that, generally, the proposed DPRD Pokir initiatives are not accompanied by data or in-depth studies regarding the issues they aim to address. Consequently, there is often an overlap in the activities carried out, as well as a mismatch between the proposed programs and the actual needs of the community, or regional development performance indicators. This situation aligns with previous researchers' findings that the DPRD's Pokir programs brought by legislators to their constituencies are more the result of agreements with the executive branch, rather than programs genuinely needed by the community (Mujani et al., 2020; in Hidayaturrehman et al., 2021), but rather routine and ritualistic programs that drain the state budget (Kariem and Ismatuddin 2020; Rahman and Munaf 2019; Syafrudin, Putra 2019; in Hidayaturrehman et al., 2021)

These findings confirm that the DPRD's pokir recommendations not only influence the configuration of development priorities but also create distortions in the quality of public policy. From Grindle's (2017) perspective, this situation reflects the weakness of the content of policy due to a lack of data and analysis, as well as the problematic context of implementation characterized by the dominance of political interests within the technocratic sphere. Consequently, policy implementation becomes suboptimal, inconsistent, and tends to result in inefficiencies in achieving regional development targets.

Similarly, regarding the oversight system, the data indicates that there is no specific oversight system for public procurement activities carried out through the DPRD's pokir mechanism; oversight is limited to the administrative completeness of budget utilization, rather than the outputs or outcomes of pokir activities. The lack of oversight over the implementation of these activities means that program evaluations tend to focus solely on procedural compliance, without assessing the extent to which the implemented activities actually contribute to improving the quality of public services.

From Grindle's (2017) perspective, the challenges in implementing the DPRD's Pokir reflect a weak implementation context, particularly regarding oversight, coordination among actors, and institutional capacity. The suboptimal monitoring by both OPDs and the DPRD, as well as the

delegation of implementation to third parties without adequate oversight, indicate a fragmentation of actors that has the potential to cause distortions in policy implementation. This situation results in a gap between policy objectives and implementation outcomes, characterized by low-quality development outputs. Thus, implementation failures are not only caused by weak policy substance but also by ineffective oversight and accountability mechanisms in the policy implementation process.

This phenomenon has not yet been addressed by the West Sumatra provincial government in determining the amount of funding allocated for DPRD-initiated projects. The legislature's strong bargaining position in the approval of APBD serves as one of the reasons the government has not been overly stringent in evaluating the performance of these DPRD-initiated projects.

Limitations in Human Resource Capacity

Human resource issues among the proposers of the DPRD's Pokir are also a fundamental problem that affects the quality of the proposed programs. In many cases, the drafting of DPRD Pokir proposals has not been fully supported by adequate analytical capacity, whether in identifying public issues, formulating alternative solutions, or aligning proposals with the regional development planning framework. Consequently, Pokir proposals are often more descriptive and pragmatic in nature, lacking a basis in comprehensive needs assessments or clear policy impact analyses.

These capacity limitations are also linked to a lack of technical support and data processing systems that could assist council members in formulating more evidence-based policy proposals. Without such support, the process of formulating Pokir tends to rely on information obtained informally from constituents or aspirations expressed during recess forums, which may not necessarily represent broader development needs. This situation ultimately makes it difficult to integrate Pokir into regional strategic planning documents, as local government agencies must make technical adjustments to ensure that these proposals can still be accommodated within the framework of previously designed programs.

These limitations in human resources capacity have a direct impact on the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) members' understanding of the regulations that serve as a reference in drafting the Pokir. Conceptually, the Pokir document proposed by the DPRD is part of the political process in local government aimed at helping the government identify the real needs of the community that have not yet been accommodated in the Regional Government Work Plan (RKPD). However, in practice, there is a tendency to interpret the provisions of Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 86 of 2017 regarding the submission of the DPRD's Pokir more broadly. Pokir is not only understood as a document of aspirations submitted to the local government for consideration in the development planning process, but is also often perceived as a program tied to specific funding allocations.

In some cases, this situation has led members of the DPRD to act as if they were performing executive functions in the implementation of development programs. There is even a tendency for some DPRD members to view Pokir funds as a right that must be realized in the form of development activities. Consequently, when proposed Pokir activities are not carried out in the current fiscal year, there is an assumption that the local government still has an obligation to carry out those activities in the following fiscal year.

This phenomenon indicates limitations in the human resource capacity of DPRD's members to understand the regulatory framework governing the functions, authorities, and mechanisms for proposing Pokir. From a policy implementation perspective, this situation relates to the "content

of policy” dimension, particularly regarding the capacity of actors involved in the policy formulation and implementation process. When policy actors have a limited understanding of the substance of regulations, their interpretation of the policy risks broadening in a way that is not fully aligned with the policy’s original objectives.

This limited understanding ultimately affects not only the interpretation of the DPRD’s core duties and functions but also impacts the process of proposing and managing Pokir, including the use of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Local Government Information System (SIPD), which serves as a platform for submitting Pokir proposals as well as a tool for the central government to coordinate and monitor regional development. This situation indicates that the success of policy implementation is determined not only by the design of regulations but also by the capacity of the actors implementing them to understand and translate these policies into local government practice.

In addition to having a direct impact on understanding, limitations in human resource capacity also affect the process of proposing DPRD Pokir, particularly in the form of delays in submitting proposals, resulting in not all activities being accommodated within the regional planning and budgeting cycle. Nevertheless, power dynamics remain the key factor dominating the process of integrating DPRD Pokir into the DPA-OPD.

CONCLUSIONS

This study shows that the implementation of Pokir by the DPRD in the regional planning and budgeting process is not merely an administrative mechanism for incorporating public aspirations, but also forms part of the political–administrative dynamics in the administration of regional government. The integration of Pokir into regional planning and budgeting documents indicates that the policy implementation process does not fully occur within a technocratic framework but is influenced by power dynamics between the legislative and executive branches in the regional budgeting process. Consequently, the DPRD’s Pokir is often used as a bargaining tool between the local government and the DPRD to advance the interests of both institutions.

Research findings indicate that several factors influence the implementation of Pokir, including (1) the capacity of DPRD members to understand regulations and regional development planning; (2) the quality of Pokir proposals, which are not yet fully based on data and assessments of community needs; limited coordination between the legislative and executive branches, as well as the dynamics of power relations in the regional budgeting process; (3) the minimal use of SAKATOPPLAN as a communication medium for activities; (4) weak oversight of the implementation process and outputs of the DPRD’s Pokir. These factors influence how Pokir is integrated into regional development programs and implemented by regional government agencies (OPDs).

The implication of this situation is a reduction in the technocratic autonomy of OPDs in formulating and implementing regional development programs, as OPDs must adjust their planned programs and activities to accommodate the legislative initiatives proposed by DPRD members. This situation ultimately leads to a restructuring of priorities in public services, including the procurement of public goods, where program decisions are not solely based on technocratic regional development needs but are also influenced by the political preferences of elected representatives that emerge during the regional budgeting process. Thus, the implementation of DPRD Pokir implies a shift in the executive’s function from policy planner to policy implementer who must adapt to political dynamics in the regional policy implementation process.

From Grindle's perspective on policy implementation, the findings of this study indicate that the success of policy implementation is significantly influenced by the interaction between the content of the policy and the context of implementation, including the capacity of actors, the quality of inter-agency coordination, and the configuration of power within the decision-making process. Therefore, based on the research findings, several key recommendations for improvement include: (1) enhancing human resource capacity; (2) involving the DPRD in the development of the POKIR Dictionary; (3) engaging council members in the use of the SAKATO PLAN electronic communication system; (4) Entering the DPRD's POKIR proposals on the Development Dashboard page by including the proposer's identity so that it can serve as a mechanism for public oversight.

Another key point of this study is that it still has limitations, which simultaneously open the door for further research on policy implementation and political-administrative relations at the local level. The qualitative and contextual focus of the research on a single region does not yet allow for generalization, and it still emphasizes the dynamics of the process without systematically measuring the impact of Pokir implementation on public service performance. Furthermore, the dominance of the perspectives of government and legislative actors indicates that the beneficiary dimension has not been fully accommodated in the analysis; therefore, these limitations of the study can serve as a starting point for future research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like acknowledge The Research and Development Agency (BALITBANG) of West Sumatra Province for supporting the original research based on the Decree of the Governor of West Sumatra Province No. 070-393-2024 regarding the Formation of a Quality Control Team and a Research and Development Team to Analyze the Effectiveness of Regional Development Budget Planning in West Sumatra Province, from which the data used in this study were obtained. The authors also acknowledge the members of the original research team for their contributions to the data collection and research process.

REFERENCES

- Aditya, M Haikal, Bella Vinia Ginting, Iklilah Dini Fajriyah, Yenni J Rammanda, Neng Sri Wardhani, 2024, Optimalisasi Pencegahan Korupsi dalam Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa Pemerintah, Jurnal Internasional Penelitian Ekonomi dan Akuntansi Keuangan (IJERFA) Volume 2, Nomor 4, Juli 2024, Halaman 367–373 E-ISSN: 2964-1977
- Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003). THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS. In *Research in Organizational Behavior* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–52). JAI Press. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085\(03\)25001-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085(03)25001-2)
- Bazie, P., Thiombiano, N., & Maiga, Eugénie. W. H. (2024). Allocating budget in developing countries, the need to fight corruption: evidence from Sub-Saharan African countries. *Future Business Journal*, 10(1). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s43093-023-00289-y>
- Bold, T., Molina, E., & Safir, A. (2018). Clientelism in the public sector : why public service reforms fail and what to do about it. World Bank, Washington, DC. <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8439>
- Bordás, Mária, Public Services at Local Government Level (October 12, 2009). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2465374> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2465374>
- Bronsoler V, Salman L. Hybrid Regimes for Local Public Goods Provision: A Framework for Analysis. *Perspectives on Politics*. 2017;15(4):952-966. doi:10.1017/S1537592717002109
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Desain penelitian: Pendekatan kualitatif, kuantitatif, dan metode campuran* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Cristian, Angga, et al. 2025, Teori Keadilan Menurut John Rawls, *QUANTUM JURIS: JURNAL HUKUM MODERN* Volume 07, No. 1, Januari 2025
<https://journalversa.com/s/index.php/jhm>
- Darabad, B. G., & Dadgar, B. (2017). Public Procurement: A Major Potential for Corruption. 4(2), 93–96. <http://iaiest.com/abstract.php?id=5&archiveid=642>
- Deacon, R.T. Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy. *Public Choice* 139, 241–262 (2009). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9391-x>
- Falcón-Cortés, A., Aldana, A. & Larralde, H., 2022, Practices of public procurement and the risk of corrupt behavior before and after the government transition in México. *EPJ Data Sci.* 11, 19 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-022-00329-7>
- Gethin, A. (2026). Who benefits from public services? Novel evidence and implications for inequality measurement. *Journal of Development Economics*, 179. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103627>
- Ginting, Nova M, Herijanto Bekti, Sawitri Budi Utami, 2023, Electronic Goods/Services Procurement Policy Implementation at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, *Jurnal Manajemen Pelayanan Publik*, Vol. 07 No. 01, <http://dx.doi.org/10.24198/jmpp.v7i1.46332>
- Hayat, H., 2024, Inovasi Kebijakan Publik dalam Mewujudkan Pelayanan Prima, *Jurnal Manajemen Pelayanan Publik*, <https://doi.org/10.24198/jmpp.v8i1.51241>
- Hidayaturrehman, Mohammad, dkk., 2021, Clientalism Politics of Muslim Politician Who Became People's Representatives, *International Journal Ihya 'Ulum Al-Din*, Vol. 23, No.2, DOI: 10.21580/ihya.23.2.7445 , 224-242
- Idrus, Ahmad, dkk., 2015, Peran Kepemimpinan Birokrasi, Budaya Organisasi, dan Komitmen Organisasi terhadap Kinerja Organisasi (Studi pada Pejabat Penatausahaan Keuangan Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah/SKPD di Lingkungan Pemerintah Kota Jayapura), *European Journal of Business and Management*, ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) Vol. 7, No. 19, 2015, www.iiste.org
- Isril, Rury Febrina, 2017, ANALISIS PROSES POLITIK PEMBAHASAN DAN PENETAPAN ANGGARAN PENDAPATAN DAN BELANJA DAERAH (APBD) PROVINSI RIAU TAHUN ANGGARAN 2016, Dosen Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan, FISIP Universitas Riau.
- Katelo, I. (2024). Public administration and public services analysis and development trends: a review. *Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues*, 12(1), 195–208. [https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2024.12.1\(14\)](https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2024.12.1(14))
- Khmelko, Irina, dan Ishiyama, John, 2025, Dinamika dalam Hubungan Legislatif- Eksekutif: Garis Besar Global untuk 2019-2024, *Sorotan Politik*.
- Koeswara, Hendri, dkk., 2014, Analisis Kebijakan Belanja Pelayanan Publik dalam Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, *Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi & Organisasi, Bisnis & Birokrasi*, Volume 21, Nomor 1.
- Koeswara, Hendri, 2016, The Optimization of Budget Outcome to Create Trust in Public Expenditure Allocation on Local Budget, *Jurnal Bina Praja*, DOI: 10.21787/jbp.08.2016.277-291
- Magaloni, B., Diaz-Cayeros, A., & Estévez, F. (2007). Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico (pp. 182–205). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511585869.008>
- Magaloni, B., D'iaz-Cayeros, A., & Ruiz Eule, A., 2018, Public Good Provision and Traditional Governance in Indigenous Communities in Oaxaca, Mexico; *Comparative Political Studies*
- Metzger, Gillian. E., 2020, Legislatif, Eksekutif dan Kontrol Politik atas Pemerintahan, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Administrative Law*, Peter Cane, Herwig C. H. Hofmann, Eric C. IP & Peter L. Lindseth (EDS), Cambridge University Press. <https://scholarship>

- Miles, Matthew B. & A Michael Huberman, 1992, Analisis Data Kualitatif Model Miles dan Huberman, terjemahan, Tjetjep Rohindi Rohadi, UI-Press.
- Muno, W. 2010. Mengonseptualisasi dan mengukur klientelisme. Dipresentasikan dalam lokakarya Neopatrimonialisme di Berbagai Kawasan Dunia, GIGA, Hamburg.
- Murana, A. O. (2021). Dampak konflik legislatif-eksekutif terhadap anggaran dan tata kelola pemerintahan di Republik Keempat Nigeria. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 29(4), 560-578. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2021.2015886>
- Ofosu, George Kwaku, 2024, What do voters want from their legislators? evidence from ghana, *African Affairs*, Volume 123, Issue 491, April 2024, Pages 165-192, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adae013>
- Puspita, Dian Permata, Heru Nurasa, Ramadhan Pancasilawan, 2023, Organizational Transformation at the Government Procurement Bureau of Goods and Services in Banten Province, *Jurnal Manajemen Pelayanan Publik*, Vol. 07 <http://dx.doi.org/10.24198/jmpp.v7i1.47876>, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
- Ramadhan, M. N., & Oley, J. D. B., 2019, Klientalisme Sebagai Perilaku Koruptif dan Demokrasi Banal, *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi*, 5 (1), 169-180., <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v5i1.379>
- Robert Agwot, K. (2024). Exploring Systemic and Behavioral Factors Influencing Corruption in Public Procurement: A Global Comparative Study. *Journal of Business and Management Studies*, 6(6), 141-149. <https://doi.org/10.32996/jbms.2024.6.6.7>
- Robert D. Lee Jr, dkk., 2013, *Public Budgeting Systems*, Jones & Bartlett Publisher, ISBN; 9781449627904.
- Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C., 1993, *Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach*. Westview Press.
- Sari, Meri Ernita Puspita, 2018, Peran Pemerintah Dalam Penyediaan Akses Pelayanan Publik, *Jurnal Trias Politika*, Vol. 2, No. 1: 1-2, e-ISSN: 2597-7423, p-ISSN: 2597-7431
- Seong C Kang, Volunteers in Public Service Production: Modeling the Contributions of Volunteers to Organizational Performance, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Volume 34, Issue 2, April 2024, Pages 165–179, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muad016>
- Sitepu, Devina Rosa, Tri Priyatmo, Rusdi Akbar, 2024, DETERMINAN PENGHAMBAT PENYERAPAN ANGGARAN: STUDI EMPIRIS PADA PROVINSI RIAU: *Jurnal Manajemen Perbendaharaan: Direktorat Jenderal Perbendaharaan, Kementerian Keuangan, Pekanbaru*– Volume 5, Nomor 1, 2024, 1-19
- Shen, J. (2023). State capacity, political competition and public goods provision: a cross-national comparative study. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 8(2), 620-636. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231161248>
- Supriyatno, Budi; Rani Karno Kinasih, Azis Hakim, Salim Bugis, 2024, Public Service Ethics of Government Apparatus Indonesia, *IJRISS*, DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.8120036>
- Trijono, Rachmat, 2018, Apakah Republik Indonesia Sebagai Negara Demokrasi? (Studi Kasus Model Demokrasi Perwakilan Republik Indonesia Dalam perspektif Proses Pembuatan Undang-Undang) *PEOPLE: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial* 4(3).
- VanDusky-Allen, J. A., & Kettler, J. J. (2021). Dampak hubungan partai-konstituen terhadap pengaruh eksekutif dan legislatif dalam pembuatan kebijakan. *Party Politics*, 29(1), 89-99. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211051659>
- Xu, K., Wang, H., Wang, Z., & Mei, K. (2024). Distribution justice and regional equity of urban public transport Services: Evidence from China. *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment*, 126. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2023.104033>

- BALITBANG Provinsi Sumatera Barat, 2024, Laporan Penelitian: Analisis Efektifitas Pereencanaan Penganggaran Pembangunan Daerah di Provinsi Sumatera Barat,
- BAPPEDA Provinsi Sumatera Barat, 2024, Lampiran surat BAPPEDA Provinsi Sumatera Barat No. 000.7/220/V/P2EPD/Bappeda-2024, Hal: Penyampaian Data Penelitian
- Daftar kegiatan POKIR di Dinas Pendidikan Provinsi Sumatera Barat tahun 2024, Bappeda Provinsi Sumatera Barat, 2024.
- Hasil Evaluasi Perencanaan dan Penganggaran Pemerintah Provinsi Sumatera Barat tahun 2023 Data Hasil penelitian BAPPEDA, tentang POKIR SKPD Provinsi Sumatera Barat tahun 2022-2023 Dashboard pembangunan <https://dashboard.sumbarprov.go.id/tahun/2025>
- LPPM universitas Andalas, 2024, Laporan Survei Kepuasan Masyarakat Kota Padang Panjang
- LPPM universitas Andalas, 2025, Laporan Survei Kepuasan Masyarakat Kota Payakumbuh
- LPPM universitas Andalas, 2023, Laporan Survei Kepuasan Masyarakat Kota Bukittinggi
- Undang-undang Dasar 1945
- Undang-undang No 17 tahun 2014 tentang MPR, DPR dan DPRD Undang-undang Nomor 25 tahun 2009 tentang pelayanan publik Undang-undang Nomor 23 tahun 2014 tentang pemerintah daerah
- Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 86 tahun 2017 tentang Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri tentang Tata Cara Perencanaan, Pengendalian, dan Evaluasi Pembangunan Daerah, Tata Cara Evaluasi Rancangan Peraturan Daerah tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah dan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah, serta Tata Cara Perubahan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah, dan Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah.