

## THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE AND AGILE GOVERNANCE: HOW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Anak Agung Gde Brahmantya Murti<sup>1</sup> and Ghulam Maulana Ilman<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Warmadewa, Jl. Terompong No.24, Sumerta Kelod,  
Denpasar, Bali 80239

<sup>2</sup>Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Surabaya, Jl. Semolowaru 45, Surabaya  
E-mail: brahmantyamurti@warmadewa.ac.id; ghulamilmann@untag-sby.ac.id

**ABSTRACT.** Indonesia and other countries must deal with the COVID-19 pandemic with limited information control amid uncertainty. Handling a pandemic that has become a crisis places great demands on the government to provide agile and dynamic policies. Variations of policies that the Indonesian government has issued raise doubts in the public sphere. The government changed several policies quickly and easily, giving the impression that they did not go through a thorough formulating process. It shows that the handling of COVID-19 requires a policy system that is quite complex due to the many interactions of various sectors. By using qualitative methods, this study attempts to discuss the dynamics of changing public policies by using the concept of incremental policy amid demands for agile governance implementation by looking at the cases of policies issued by the Indonesian government in response to COVID-19. The dynamic of the policy network will be explored further to dismantle the discussion of policies for handling COVID-19 in Indonesia. Therefore, the results of this research show the challenges in implementing agile principles simply by changing and adapting policies to empirical conditions. In its application, agile governance shows several dominant actors who gather resources and support, shape policy outcomes, and advance their interests.

**Keywords:** agile governance; COVID-19; policy change; policy networks

## DINAMIKA PERUBAHAN KEBIJAKAN DAN AGILE GOVERNANCE: BAGAIMANA RESPON PEMERINTAH INDONESIA TERHADAP PANDEMI COVID-19

**ABSTRAK .** Indonesia dan negara lain harus menghadapi pandemi COVID-19 dengan penguasaan informasi yang terbatas di tengah ketidakpastian. Penanganan pandemi yang sudah menjadi krisis memberikan tuntutan besar kepada pemerintah untuk dapat memberikan kebijakan yang gesit dan dinamis. Variasi kebijakan yang dikeluarkan pemerintah Indonesia ternyata menimbulkan keraguan di ruang publik. Pemerintah mengubah beberapa kebijakan dengan cepat dan mudah sehingga terkesan tidak melalui proses perumusan yang matang. Hal tersebut menunjukkan bahwa penanganan COVID-19 memerlukan sistem kebijakan yang cukup kompleks karena banyaknya interaksi dari berbagai sektor. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, penelitian ini mencoba membahas dinamika perubahan kebijakan publik dengan menggunakan konsep kebijakan inkremental di tengah tuntutan penerapan agile governance dengan melihat kasus kebijakan yang dikeluarkan pemerintah Indonesia dalam menghadapi COVID-19. Dinamika jejaring kebijakan akan ditelaah lebih jauh guna membongkar pembahasan kebijakan penanganan COVID-19 di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan tantangan dalam menerapkan prinsip *agile* hanya dengan mengubah dan menyesuaikan kebijakan dengan kondisi empiris, selain itu dalam penerapannya, agile governance menunjukkan adanya beberapa aktor dominan dalam yang mengumpulkan sumber daya dan dukungan, membentuk hasil kebijakan, dan memajukan kepentingan mereka.

**Kata kunci:** kebijakan COVID-19; perubahan kebijakan; tata kelola yang gesit

### INTRODUCTION

Indonesia and other countries must deal with the COVID-19 pandemic with limited information control. Handling a pandemic that has become a crisis typically requires an immediate answer that must be given amid intense stress and ambiguity. (Barton, 1969; Rosenthal, Charles, & 't Hart, 1989; Ansler, Boin, & Keller, 2010). The first case of COVID-19 in Indonesia was detected on March 2, 2020, and the number of cases has steadily risen. Finally, on March 31, President Joko Widodo imposed a policy of Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB), where restrictions

are local at the suggestion of the regional government but must comply with the central government's protocol. (Aulia, 2021).

The crisis increased the demands on governments and showed them to be agile and adaptable (Janssen & Voort, 2020). It is used as a term to describe the necessity for organizations, particularly bureaucracies, to act in a more adaptable, quick, and flexible manner (Alsudairy & Vasista, 2014). The government immediately implements this agile concept by issuing several policies. Nevertheless, variations of policies that have been issued by the Indonesian government

to handle the COVID-19 pandemic such as the enforcement of restrictions on community activities (PSBB or PPKM), the duration of quarantine for Indonesian citizens or foreigners, and the testing and tracing requirements for users of mass transportation modes apparently raise doubts in the public sphere.

In this context, agile is here to provide a new organizational paradigm. This concept is widely developed in the private sector so that they can work smartly and quickly and is supported by the use of technology (Kumorotomo, 2020). This agile concept was not made specifically in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it will be very relevant later if the government can adopt it to improve public services by establishing several policies amid a pandemic. This reality has resulted in several countries adopting the concept of agile as navigation in the era of disruption and carrying out systemic transformations in organizations and government (Schneeweiss & Murtaugh, 2020). Thus, being agile is not a goal but a requirement to encourage the public bureaucracy to work more strategically (Purwanto, 2019).

We can learn from Taiwan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, which have applied and adopted the concept of agile in running their government amid a pandemic (Mannatan, 2020; Moon, 2020; Sabinne Lee, 2020; Janssen & Voort, 2020). Ideally, this condition will spur the government to make several policy changes related to the speed of change. If they still prioritize the characteristics of the public bureaucracy that work rigidly, routinely, and procedurally, then it is very different from the conditions that are currently being faced (Codreanu, 2016). Governments have grappled with effectively handling unpredictability across various domains, ranging from high-level strategic decision-making to day-to-day operational activities. This challenge extends to both partially public organizations and private businesses. (Janssen & Van der Voort, 2020). Therefore, Public institutions are finding new ways of adapting quickly to the changing environment, using agile methods to make necessary changes and services through public policy.

Variations of policies that the Indonesian government has issued raise doubts in the public sphere. The government changed several policies quickly and easily, giving the impression that they

did not go through a thorough, serious process. One of the most prominent is the mobility and activity restriction policy, namely PSBB and PPKM, which will be explained in detail later. The PSBB policy, which later turned into the PPKM policy, is grand in handling the pandemic as a form of the government's response. The substance of the policies stipulated is comprehensive enough to regulate community activity and mobility to suppress the spread of the virus. On the other hand, this policy was confusing to the public because the policy changed very quickly to adapt to the existing conditions. They are especially related to the social and economic conditions of the community, including the continuity of work in several sectors that are not adaptable quickly.

Rapid policy changes are also implemented in the quarantine policy for Indonesian citizens and foreign nationals who come to Indonesia from abroad. Quarantine policies are carried out in almost all countries to minimize the spread of virus mutations from other countries. Likewise, the length of the quarantine period for international travelers varies greatly depending on the country of departure, the dose of vaccine received, and the background of their status, whether it is a state assignment, vacation, or assignment as a student. There are also policies related to the requirements for conducting rapid tests and PCR, which vary depending on the mode of transportation used. However, what later happened was that this quarantine policy was changed by releasing public officials from quarantine obligations (Lova, 2021). It is noted that the government has changed the requirements for the type of examination three times, sparking a wave of protests and petitions (CNN, 2021).

We can catch this policy change that often changes suddenly (Aida, 2020) as a form of government adjustment to changing conditions. However, on the other hand, it shows the Indonesian government's unpreparedness in predicting what will happen in the future. The rapid flow of information and limited understanding as the basis for making public policies confirm that the policies made are incremental. The situation that then encourages the choice of incremental policy change is the incompleteness of knowledge and time constraints that limit attention to alternatives that are only slightly different (gradually) from the previous policy (Hayes, 2012). Hayes said this incremental policy did not change significantly

from the previous policy and better reflected the nature of the government in making policies in handling the pandemic.

This research analyzes the dynamics of public policy changes by utilizing the agile government concept and incremental policy approach. By examining the structure of policy networks, the relationships between different actors, and their positions within these networks, this study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the roles and influence of policy actors in a specific policy domain (Knoke, 1990; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Knoke et al., 1996; Broadbent & Vaughter, 2014) amid demands for agile governance implementation by looking at the cases of policies issued by the Indonesian government in response to COVID-19.

We proposed two research questions. How is the government's policy response to the COVID-19 case? The second is how the policy network's dynamic changes policies for handling COVID-19. Which we will analyze and explore further in the results and discussion subchapter.

## METHOD

This research uses a literature review method on policy dynamics and changes focusing on government policy responses in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. Secondary data was used in this research; the data was collected from January 2019 to February 2022. Secondary data in this research are article journals published with the indexes of SCOPUS and Sinta. Other data related to research or information on COVID-19 are sought through the government website, World Health Organization website, community websites such as LaporCOVID-19 and COVID-19.go.id and online media such as Detik.com, CNN, Kompas, Tirto.

There are two mechanisms of data collection procedures in this study. The first data collection mechanism is to determine gaps in developing theories and research on "Agile government," "Policy Change," and "COVID-19" with limitations in 2019-2021. In addition, we also collect data outside of indexed articles and have relatively past publication times, aiming to strengthen the original concept or ground theory. The second procedure was carried out to obtain data according to the needs of answering the research question.

Several criteria were determined in analyzing the results of the data. We determined the feasibility of data sources based on (1) the suitability of the data with the focus and research questions, (2) the fact that the data came from credible sources, and based on these criteria, the data collected was then reduced. We then analyzed the results of the data reduction. We use the analytical technique of Creswell (2012), where we collect and reduce data, which we then interpret and write descriptively.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Policy Response to the COVID-19: A Focus on Agile Government

On March 16, 2020, Indonesian President Joko Widodo issued a directive stating that it is now necessary for Indonesian citizens to engage in remote work, remote learning, and remote prayer. The purpose of this directive is to foster collaboration, mutual assistance, and unity among the population (Prastiwi, 2020). This form of response is seen as the emergence of a dichotomy in pandemic handling policies. The reason is that some people think that the additions and changes to these policies are to minimize transmission. Others think otherwise that the policy is increasingly detrimental to society, especially to workers (CNN, 2021). Overall, COVID-19 has brought about an almost unprecedented political shift to government intervention at a speed and scale unimaginable before 2020 (Cairney, 2021).

However, a quick response is sometimes essential; on the other hand, it can sacrifice the quality of decision-making (Janssen & Van der Voort, 2020). What is less obvious is which metrics are important to decision-making and who is providing the data. Data quality can vary greatly from country to country. Our observations in Indonesia throughout the COVID-19 crisis indicate that data regarding the situation is not solely disseminated by state institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health. Rather, privately operated websites, communities, and the media are also actively involved in real-time problem monitoring. Furthermore, the massive flow of data information from local governments to the center takes much time, so the data is not integrated. The unintegrated data in one database can potentially experience duplication and allow errors in decision-making (The Conversation, 2021).

This data helps explain the government's first approach. Along with the increase in confirmed cases, various new policies and policy changes must be adjusted due to the conditions. It implemented an exceptional quantity of measures to facilitate policy transformation. Their objective is to swiftly diminish the transmission of the virus, safeguard homeless populations and those with underlying health issues, and finally flatten the trajectory of new infections. Policy measures have been implemented at varying intervals in response to the escalating number of cases following the first report of the first COVID-19 case. President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Decree Number 9 of 2020 on March 13, establishing the Task Force for Accelerating Handling Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Arifin, 2020). In addition, the President enacted Government Regulation (PP) Number 21 of 2020 on March 31, which pertains to implementing Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) to expedite the management of COVID-19.

Various adjustments at the community and bureaucratic levels are continuously being pursued. Not yet finished with these several adjustments, Indonesia is again faced with an increase in confirmed cases known as the "second wave", which shows the results of periodic increases with a peak on June 21, 2021. The second wave that is currently happening is quite severe and has resulted in the collapse of the public health sector (Aqil, 2021). Changes and adaptations continue to be carried out by the government until new terms appear, namely Micro PPKM, emergency PPKM, and PPKM, starting at levels 1-4 until now.

The policy is implemented through an assessment system and a leveling process. The implementation of PSBB and PPKM this time includes restrictions on community activities that are more stringent than the previous ones. We selected this policy as an example of a response to examine emerging policy change forms. In addition, the PPKM policy is quite complex because its substance also involves various aspects. This is quite different from other policies, which are more specific and sectoral. Likewise, the existing policies are not always changed; new policies have been set due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These instances demonstrate the implementation of policy solutions at the national level.

The flexibility and speed of change offered in the context of agility raises questions in the community. When linking policy changes to the agile government framework, the policy changes are incremental at the same time. According to Hayes (2012) in his book, incremental policies are based on incomplete knowledge and limited time, so the alternative policies obtained are not much different from the previous policy. This statement is very relevant when realizing the change in policy for handling the COVID-19 pandemic, whose substance changes are not too different from the previous policy. This is visible in implementing several policies such as the PSBB, Java Bali PPKM, Micro PPKM, Emergency PPKM, level 1-4 PPKM, and several other partial policies that have experienced adjustments so that it becomes common when there are criticisms that the Government's Policy on handling the pandemic is considered to be confusing for the community (Bayu, 2020).

Assuming that it effectively reduces the spread of COVID-19 cases, the government continues the policy by changing the term from PSBB to PPKM Java-Bali. In principle, this policy is implemented to ensure public safety amid the still-high increase in COVID-19 cases. The PPKM policy only focuses on Java and Bali because COVID-19 cases in those areas are high in terms of death rates, active case rates and hospital bed occupancy rates. However, after three weeks of implementation, the president deemed this policy ineffective. During the implementation of the Java-Bali PPKM, the addition of daily cases broke records several times. The changes have not been maximized by setting a Micro PPKM policy, which automatically replaces the previous PPKM policy. Furthermore, this policy also governs the establishment of village-level Command Posts responsible for coordinating with the COVID-19 Task Force at the District, Regency/City, Province, Military, and Police and reporting to the central government.

When daily cases (July 2021) reached 24,836 cases, and the death rate increased by 250% in the same period, the government responded by enacting a policy with a new term, namely Emergency PPKM. One of the changes in this policy is the use of assessment indicators to set criteria for the level of condition of an area. Not long after it was published, the government re-established the PPKM policy level 1-4 to be



followed by local governments based on the epidemiological categories in their area. To ease the burden on the community affected by the emergency PPKM, the government allocated an additional social protection budget of Rp 55.21 trillion. In addition to suppressing the negative impact on the economic sector, the government has carried out several relaxations for essential sectors that can continue to operate 100 per cent with tighter operating hours and capacity and stricter implementation of health protocols.

The government's seriousness in overseeing the implementation of the PPKM policy is reflected in the sanctions for those who violate it. These sanctions are classified into two. First, they are specifically for local governments not implementing PPKM provisions. The Emergency PPKM Coordinator conveyed the sanctions for violations of Emergency PPKM for Regional Heads. It encompasses administrative penalties, as outlined in Article 68 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law Number 23 of 2014 about the Regional Government, which consist of two consecutive written warnings followed by temporary dismissal. Second, sanctions for people who violate the law, such as causing crowds, can be punished with articles in the Criminal Code, the Health Quarantine Law, and the Law on Infectious Disease Outbreaks (Detik.com, 2021).

Government regulatory policy changes were implemented while considering the community's deteriorating economic conditions due to the COVID-19 epidemic. On 25 February 2020, the government prepared incentives by providing an additional allocation of Rp 298.5 billion for the tourism sector (Riana, 2021). The stimulus is intended for airlines and agents to provide special discounts to travelers, which is expected to attract tourists and restore the community's economic condition. The policy is not explicitly supported because the government limits access to community mobility among domestic tourists through the PPKM policy and stipulates quarantine requirements for foreign tourists. Most people are confused; on the other hand, the government opens the way for the community's economy through tourist attractions and vice versa, and people are also limited in their mobility.

Apart from the comprehensive PPKM policy in handling the pandemic, several similar things have also undergone changes, one of which is the

quarantine policy as the duration and provisions of the quarantine protocol, which have changed because they have to adapt to the development of the virus, and also confusing technical rules such as exceptions from departure countries, location disparities. Quarantine, student/office assignment/worker status, and quarantine period indicators. Indeed, this classification was prepared in the hope that it would suit the interests and background of each individual entering Indonesia. However, there was a change in quarantine policy, which previously implemented universal mandatory quarantine. Now, there must be a separation between government officials and the public. Changes in the rules regarding the length of quarantine days, which are not short, and the high costs that must be incurred also give rise to new problems, namely the quarantine mafia. They can free people from the obligation to quarantine before entering Indonesia.

Indeed, trying to accommodate all the interests of society is not as easy as it seems. In addition, the initial process of drafting an ideal policy tends to take a relatively long time, starting from looking at the problem situation and academic studies until the policy is enacted. If a policy collided with reality at that time, where COVID-19 was a precedent in all countries, it would seem impossible to implement a policy cycle. So, the government's efforts to adopt the agile concept are appropriate in responding to the pandemic because the virus's behavior is also changing very quickly. Agile governance aims to sense events and respond quickly (Janssen & Van der Voort, 2020), particularly bureaucracies, to enhance their flexibility, adaptability, and speed in their actions (Alsudairy & Vasista, 2014).

Criticism of the government's instability in Setting policies also comes from members of Commission IX of the House of Representatives of the Indonesia Republic. What is worrying is that changing policies will make people feel indecisive and prefer not to be aware of restrictive policies, and will impact large-scale crowds (Tempo. co, 2021). Ultimately, the government had to adjust to swiftly confront the imminent danger posed by COVID-19. There was a significant and tangible danger that the virus would rapidly and extensively propagate if not promptly and effectively addressed. In this context, "government" is broadly employed to encompass the entire framework of public and

semi-public entities collaborating to advance collective welfare. Due to COVID-19, these players needed to act quickly. However, there was much uncertainty surrounding the situation, the effectiveness of the suggested steps to halt transmission, and the extent to which the population would actively monitor future policy.

Indeed, the government is focusing on rapid response; there is a tendency for some policy changes to be more incremental. This is because the preparation time is shorter when implementing agile governance. Agile actions frequently necessitate a flexible organizational structure, heightened engagement of stakeholders and resources, and streamlined decision-making processes to achieve prompt and transparent outcomes (Deloitte, 2017; DeSeve, 2020; Moon, 2020). It affects government policies, which are often fickle in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic, and it is justified by a lack of coordination and communication among the governmental actors themselves (Intan, 2021). Public policy does not exist in a pseudo-space because the environment in the policy formulation process often becomes a battle arena for actors, interests, and structures, which then try to put the issues into the policy-setting agenda. In such a policy environment, politics and power become important aspects determining the dynamics of formulating and making policy decisions.

### **COVID-19 Policy Network in Indonesia**

The dynamics of policy changes are very complex, especially regarding policies for handling COVID-19. The policy restricting social activities in Indonesia is our entry point in seeing the interaction of various elements in policy changes. Social settlement policies are emerging as a new policy domain due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When a new policy domain emerges, interactions between various actors and interests pool resources and support, shape policy outcomes, and advance their interests (Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Brockhaus & Carmenta, 2014).

To explore the dynamics of changes in social restriction policies for COVID-19 in Indonesia, we first examine the structure that policy networks adopt. Several changes have occurred to adjust to the need for social restrictions in response to the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. Before the large-scale social restriction policy, the central government, through Presidential Decree 7/20, formed a

special unit tasked with handling COVID-19. The unit, referred to as Unit I, comprises the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, the Minister of Health, and the Minister of Finance, who occupies a director-level position. The executive level is led by the Head of the National Disaster Mitigation Agency, with the Assistant for Operations to the Commander of the TNI and the Assistant for Operations to the Chief of the National Police serving as vice chairmen. The executive level consists of representatives of 12 elements from several ministries.

Unit I was established to enhance the coordination of operational policies, bolster operational resilience in the healthcare sector, strengthen national resilience in managing COVID-19, expedite the response to COVID-19 through collaboration among ministries/agencies and local governments, enhance preparedness for the escalation of COVID-19 transmission, and enhance the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to COVID-19. The implementation level must establish and carry out operational plans, coordinate and control, supervise implementation, mobilize resources and report on their implementation to the President and the Steering Committee regarding COVID-19.

The first change that occurred in unit I was the addition of the number of actors involved in handling COVID-19. At the advisory level, all ministers, heads of intelligence agencies, military, police and governors of each region are also involved. All representatives from each ministry and agency (which previously had 12 members, now 33) were involved at the executive level. The changes also increase the budget resources the Task Force can use. Suppose previously, the emphasis was on sources of the state budget. In that case, this change states that it can use regional government budgets and budgets from ministries or state agencies by reallocating them—unit I was then replaced with Unit II, which added another function: restoring the national economy.

In the second transition, from Unit I to Unit II, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy was designated as the Chair of the Policy Committee and assisted by six Deputy Chairmen, which included the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal

and Security Affairs, the Coordinating Minister for PMK, the Minister for Finance, Health, and Home Affairs. Additionally, the Minister of BUMN is designated as the Chief Executive to facilitate the integration and coordination of policy implementation established by the Policy Committee (Susiwijono, 2020).

Unit II has created two specialized units at the operational and technical levels to address specific areas. One unit is focused on managing the health element, specifically dealing with COVID-19, and is directed by the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency. The other unit, National Economic Recovery, is dedicated to the economic side and managed by the Deputy Minister of BUMN I. The composition of this special committee includes representatives from the Government and other essential stakeholders such as associations, business actors, business entities, experts, academics, and other members of society. The Chair of the Policy Committee (Coordinating Minister for the Economy) determines this committee's membership and organizational structure.

Unit II possesses the power to issue decisions that carry legal force and must be adhered to by ministries/agencies, regional administrations, and other entities. The Regional Head establishes a Regional COVID-19 Handling Task Force, following the considerations and suggestions provided by the Head of the Task Force at the Center. The Task Force for Handling COVID-19 retains similar responsibilities as the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19 in addressing the coronavirus. All units created at the national and regional levels are controlled by Unit II (Souisa, 2020), particularly within the dedicated COVID-19 response unit and the specialized unit for national economic revitalization (Bayu, 2020).

The COVID-19 handling unit's structural alterations demonstrate how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected various areas, including social, economic, and community welfare. Suppose you look at the inherent functions of each unit change. In that case, the focus has shifted from prioritizing a health approach (epidemiological considerations) to an approach emphasizing national economic recovery.

Looking at how changes have occurred in the structure formed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, it can be seen that the task force is

a network structure in which some actors have various interests and have the power to issue policies and mobilize budgets. The central government is the main actor in social restriction policies (Azmi et al., 2021). Crises legitimize central authority because, for fast decision-making, the level of decision-making needs to be limited (Hamblin, 1958).

Second, when examining the relationships between various actors, we can detect a shift from Unit I to Unit II, demonstrating the inclusion of numerous additional actors. Almost all state actors were involved: all the ministers, TNI, Polri—governors throughout Indonesia and other parties. The government's action can be attributed to its response to the mounting apprehension caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. The network interaction is the gaming environment for applying the Covid-19 policy and significantly impacts its effectiveness.

With the formation of Unit II, the government issued its first policy. It showed how the position of the task force and the minister of health is very central in considering each other in determining the implementation of large-scale social restriction policies. The task force and intergovernmental network are terms used to indicate the connection between government entities. They also collaborate and exert influence on one another during policy creation and implementation, resulting in an intricate network structure and interactive relationship.

At the operational and technical level in the field, 2 Task Forces have been assigned to represent the health aspect (COVID-19 handling) and the economic aspect (national economic recovery). The two Task Forces consist of representatives from the Government and other necessary elements (Associations/Business Actors, Business Entities, Experts, Academics, and other elements of society), whose membership structure and organizational structure are determined by the Chair of the Policy Committee (Coordinating Minister for the Economy).

The task force can issue legally enforceable decisions upon ministries/institutions, local governments, and other entities. This existing network describes intergovernmental relations which also involve other interest groups. The interplay between the subjects included in the policy network and the form of the policy

network itself significantly impacts the decision-making process, implementation, and outcomes of Indonesia's COVID-19 policy.

From the formation of the unit that handles COVID-19, we can see the dynamics of the government's response to the COVID-19 situation, including the policy of limiting social activities. Unit I was formed with a relatively simple structure to illustrate the government's understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic phenomenon. This framework enhances the professionalism, democratization, and transparency of the COVID-19 policy process and improves the scientific rigor of policy substance and the effectiveness of policy implementation.

One of the phenomena that can be observed in the formation and management of various COVID-19 handling units is that the role of the Coordinating Minister for PMK is considered central because his role and authority are considered too broad. Epidemiologists questioned this because it should have been submitted to the minister in charge of health (Sari, 2020). This suggests that the appointment of the Coordinating Minister for PMK reflects what Marsh and Smith think of policy networks that reflect the distribution of power and past conflicts, shape current political outcomes and reveal the institutionalization of power relations (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p. 6).

Whereas in several cases before COVID-19, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment often held several government positions outside the maritime and investment sector (Adryanto (ed), 2021). Furthermore, Marsh and Smith (2000) how the operationalization of power as a way for actors to use their reputation and position power to exert influence is shown by the words of an expert staff of the presidential staff office said the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment was appointed to handle the COVID-19 pandemic, because during considered capable of carrying out these tasks and given by the president properly.

## CONCLUSION

Handling a pandemic that has become a crisis places great demands on the government to provide agile and incremental change. Indonesia has attempted to be prompted by almost-unprecedented policy change towards state intervention.

Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that it is still challenging to implement agile principles only by changing and adjusting policies to empirical conditions. Furthermore, it is difficult to implement amid the dynamics of such a complex policy process. Agile will be able to occur when there are actors who have great power to determine, direct, and formulate policies. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic has positioned the government as the central actor in crisis management. However, within the government itself, a network of actors has particular interests regarding the tug-of-war of health and economic interests. However, some actors dominate in pooling resources and support, shaping policy outcomes, and advancing their interests.

The constraint we face in producing this paper is our awareness that we have been unable to offer an all-encompassing analysis of every aspect of the modified policy. We have only managed to put overly broad policies that have sparked controversy in the community. Furthermore, our ability to gather primary data from the players or agency is restricted, which diminishes the author's ability to accurately delineate the actors, structures, and interests involved in the dynamic process and the final policy changes. Future research prospects can still be pursued, particularly from the standpoint of government politics.

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