POWER RELATIONS IN RELIGIOUS TEACHING SPACES: EXAMINATION OF THE STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM FOR RELIGIOUS PREACHERS IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

This research seeks to uncover the issues surrounding the controversy over the implementation of standardization by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia for Islamic preachers and teachers in Indonesia. This controversy has been going on for so long that before it was implemented, there were several changes in the name of the program to avoid polemics in the community. The exchange of discourses between policymakers and policy recipients is interesting to further study. To answer these questions, researchers use research methods that are almost the same as those developed by Foucault, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA. This method emphasizes correcting the discourse that develops in society, especially regarding the standardization program for religious teachers (da'i or ustad). Because religious teachers are also closely related to teaching or da'wah issues. The essence of da'wah is the teaching of the Islamic religion; therefore, this research focuses on the relationship patterns in religious teaching toward other parties related to it. Many studies have been conducted regarding power relations, especially those related to education. However, very few people have studied power relations in religious teaching spaces. This method also develops a way of researching by looking at news in the mass media, where the news produces a certain knowledge that is considered new. Therefore, the researcher collected data in three ways: media observation, interviews with actors, and documentation. According to the researcher, these three methods represent the same method used by Michel Foucault. The findings produced by researchers are three factors that influence the dynamics of power relation patterns. First, power/knowledge relations are produced by several parties. Second, the government has a strong interest in the implementation of the standardization program for religious preachers. Third, the political motive is almost clearly seen.

Keywords : power relations; religious teaching; standardization; religious preachers; CDA

RELASI KUASA DI RUANG PENGAJARAN AGAMA: TELAAH ATAS PROGRAM STANDARDISASI TERHADAP PENCERAMAH AGAMA DI INDONESIA

ABSTRAK

Penelitian yang dilakukan ini berusaha mengungkap persoalan di seputar kontroversi penerapan standardisasi oleh kementerian agama Republik Indonesia terhadap para penceramah atau pengajar agama Islam di Indonesia. Sudah lama kontroversi ini berlangsung sehingga sebelum sempat diterapkan telah terjadi beberapa kali perubahan nama program demi menghindari polemik di masyarakat. Saling tukar wacana antara pihak pembuat kebijakan dan penerima kebijakan menarik untuk diteliti lebih jauh. Guna mendapatkan jawaban atas pertanyaan tersebut peneliti menggunakan metode penelitian yang hampir sama dengan yang dikembangkan Foucault yakni Analisis Wacana Kritis atau lebih dikenal dengan CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis). Metode ini menekankan pada pengkoreksian wacana yang berkembang di masyarakat terutama soal program standardisasi terhadap para pengajar agama (da'i atau ustad). Metode ini juga mengembangkan cara meneliti dengan melihat pemberitaan di media massa, dimana pemberitaan itu menghasilkan pengetahuan-pengetahuan tertentu yang dianggap baru. Karenanya peneliti mengumpulkan data melalui tiga cara ; observasi media, wawancara dari para aktor dan dokumentasi. Ketiga cara ini menurut peneliti sudah mampu mewakili cara yang sama dilakukan Michel Foucault. Temuan yang dihasilkan oleh peneliti adalah menemukan tiga faktor yang memengaruhi terjadinya dinamika pola relasi kuasa. Yakni transparansi, komunikasi, dan politisasi.

Kata kunci : relasi kuasa ; pengajaran agama ; standardisasi ; penceramah agama ; CDA

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

This research is motivated by the debates that have occurred in several media over the last few years. Mainstream television media such as CNN (news dated 22 May 2018), Kompas TV (news dated 24 November 2019), Metro TV (aired on 19 November 2019), TV One, and I-News (aired on 25 November 2019) reported on the

problems in the standardization program for religious preachers in Indonesia. In 2017, the Minister of Religious Affairs, LukmanHakim Syarifuddin, proposed the need for standardization of Friday preachers (Arsam, 2017). According to Abdussalam, asquoted by Fahrurrozi (2018), this initiative arose against the backdrop of many sermons that did not provide coolness, especially when it was ahead of the 2019 'political celebration'. There was news about Hasto Kristiyanto's statement on Kompas.com on April 26 2018; "Politics in Religious Lectures Should Build Civility". The purpose of this standardization is to improve the quality of the preacher and sermon material. On January 26, 2017, Indonesian Ministry of Religion was developing qualifications for religious preachers. In news published on the national media Kompas.com, the Minister of Religion, Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin, said that "Now the Ministry of Religion is working hard to develop what qualifications or competencies are needed as a standard for preachers. Standardization refers to the material provided by lecturers to their listeners. In addition, the long-term goal of standardization is to improve the quality of life for Muslims Therefore, ideally, a Friday preacher should have adequate religious knowledge and national insight (Fahrurrozi, 2018). Once again, this idea that was thrown out to the public had sharp pro and con implications in the community. Almost all mass media (both print and electronic) covered it for several days. Talk shows and conversations on the timeline also enlivened the news. Several studies were also conducted by academics related to the community's response to Friday's standardization preachers (Arsam, , 2018). Because the public response tends to be negative, the official implementation of the regulation seems to have been delayed (Syarifudin & Hajariyah, 2019).

The standardization program for religious preachers initiated by the government through the Indonesian Ministry of Religion has attracted considerable controversy. Various views emerged, both for and against this program policy. The pro-view states that a standardization program for religious preachers needs to be implemented. The opposing view argues that the standardization program is a form of harassment against religious preachers because they are considered to doubt their religious scientific abilities. Apart from the two pro and con views above, there is also a neutral view (it is said to be neutral because this view is between two other opinions) that agrees with the standardization program by providing several conditions if the program is implemented.

On May 12, 2018, the government released a list of 200 preachers who were considered worthy and qualified in science and had good reputation and high national insight. This public release also drew criticism and controversy in the community (at least Detik news.com carried news of this controversy from May 18 to 30, 2019, Antara news.com reported from May 20 to June 4, 2018, JPNN.com at least for a week released this news). This dissatisfaction raises questions about the motives of the government (in this case represented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia) to issue a list of 200 names of preachers. Then, the government argued that the recommendations were the names requested by the public, whohad often asked for recommendations from the Ministry of Religion (Muhyiddin; 2018). On the other hand the names of preachers will cause divisions among Muslims.

Some time ago, the issue of standardization of religious preachers had subsided. In mid-2019, the new minister of religion Fachrur Rozi again initiated the need for certified preachers in Indonesia (Kompas.com edition; November 22, 2019). The certificate for preachers is planned to be given by the MUI(Indonesian Ulema Council) by testing preachers, andthen this institution will issue a certificate if they (the preachers) are considered to have the eligibility criteria as required by the government.

So far, there has been no research that has brought the issue of the standardization program for religious preachers into the realm of power relations between the parties involved(religious ministries and religious preachers). Why is it necessary to view this issue from the perspective of power relations? The problem of 'standardization' or whatever you call it (such as certification, normalization) is related to power relations and can be detected through the theories introduced by Michel Foucault. The tug of war or pros and cons over the implementation of standardization (ulama, preachers, preachers or religious teachers, especially Islam) from time to time suggests that there is something that needs explanation. Why are there always pros and cons to the plan to implement this certification (standardization) program? To the best of the researchers' knowledge, several journals have responded by examining the polemics that occurred in the government's standardization program plan, involving many groups and different methodologies. Even their studies were conducted in different cities. Such as A. Syarifuddin and Siti Hajariyah (2019) in the South Sumatra region, Arsam (2017) in Banyumas city, Fahrurrozi (2018) in Mataram city, and Saipul Annur (2018) in Palembang city. However, as far as the researcher can observe the results of the

research are not sufficient to answer the problems behind the standardization program.

So far, therehas been no research that brings the issue of the standardization program of religious preachers to the realm of power relations between the parties involved (the ministry of religion and religious preachers). Why is it necessary to examine this issue from the perspective of power relations? In the opinion of the researcher, the problem of 'standardization' or whatever it is called (such as certification, or normalization) is close to ideological issues and can be detected through theories that have been conveyed by Michel Foucault. The writing in his work 'Discipline and Punish' very sharply reviews the implementation of a standardization project that functions to discipline everything to achieve the desired power.

This study uses the analytical knife of Michel Foucault's (1976) power/knowledge, which that power is present in all areas of human life, where every relationship must have power. However, can what happened in the standardization program of religious preachers in the above case be categorized as indicated by Foucault? Therefore, careful research is required to describe the 'standardization program' in question. According to him, standardization or normalization is an important basic characteristic (Foucault, 1975).

There have been many studies on power relations, especially those related to education. However, it is very rare to discuss the study of power relations in the religious teaching space. Researchers only found several journals that talk about power relations that are slightly related to religious issues, for example, about halal certification, written by Suad Fikriawan. (2018), where he discusses the issue of "Symbolic power analysis in the contestation of the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council". Closer to the issue of non-religious education is the writing of Wouter Smets and Katrien Struyven (2018) about "Power relations in educational scientific communication critical analysis of discourse on learning styles". More recent work by Kathryn G., Herr, and Gary L. Andersen (2008),"*Teacher research and learning communities: A failure to theories power relations*," Helen Gunter (Webster & Gunter, 2018) on "How power relations affect the distribution of authority : implications for information literacy pedagogy" which examines teaching in postgraduate programs in England (UK). As recognized by the Program Director in this research, there is a dimension of repressive power that is maintained through relations of domination in the Information Literacy (IL) pedagogy program.

One interesting discussion was written by Oki Rahadianto Sutopo (2015), whoreviewed Syed Farid Alatas' book extensively, highlighting knowledge and global power relations. Case example of research conducted by Sulistyono Susilo (2016) on the common identity framework of cultural knowledge and practices of Javanese Islam". He found similarities in the identity between Islam and Javanese culture in terms of cultural genealogy, Islamic mysticism, the orientation of traditional Islamic teachings, and the concept of power in Javanese palaces.

Anothersimilar research is from Michael Rajamuda Bataona and Atwar Bajari (2017). This study reveals "Power relations and symbols of the church's political economy in the local political contestation of East Nusa Tenggara province". This study also seeks to dismantle the domination and hegemony of actors or political regimes and church authorities in the NTT who use religious symbols and build power relations with political-economic motives.

Once again, of the many studies on power relations, not a single study has been found regarding religious teaching. Research conducted by Adam Latuconsina (2016) on "Religious Learning Models in building tolerance in school public spaces" was limited to questioning religious teaching strategies so that they can be inclusive, humanistic, and tolerant to be implemented in the school environment.

Indeed, if you pay attention to research on the theme of power relations, it can touch on many things. As can be seen in collaborative research by Maria Karanikola, Karina Kaikaushi, Karolina Doulougeri, Anna Kautrouba, and EDE Papathanassoglou (2018), which examines power relations in psychiatric spaces, two similar studies from Christina Lotrea (2018) through her research in negotiation spaces and research by Camelia Beciu , Irina Diana Madroane, and Alexandru I. Carlan and Malina Ciocea (2017) .Power relations, agency and discourse in transnational social fields". There are also "Embodied experiences in international volunteering: power-body relations and performative ontologies, Social and Cultural Geography by Mark Griffith and Eleanor J. Brown (2017) discusses power relations in the international volunteer experience space.

Some studies that are also relevant, for example, are related to the authority and power relations of fatwas (Hernandez, 2013), or power relations on intellectual violence in Islam, whichexamines the events of the 'Mihnah Mu'tazilah' (Faiz, 2012). It can be used as an initial reference to test a problem in power relations. The reality is that religious issues are very close to the territory of power, which even in estimation still

needs proof. Apart from that, religion is also closely related to the problem of teaching. This means providing knowledge carried out through a certain system, whichaccording to Islamic terminology, is called da'wah. Deliverers of da'wah can be anyone, suchas scholars, kiai, dai ustad or even Quran recitation teachers in small Surau . According to Islam, teaching religion through da'wah is a general activity for any community. According to Tony Leach (2018), it is said to be an 'I-Thou relationship' in the teaching space. Da'wah can be done face to face or through other communication media, for example, television, writing in mass media, or use of other social media.

Slightly different from the research of Suci Wulandari (2018) on "Kanca Wingking ideology; study of knowledge-power relations in the interpretation of al-Huda". This research discusses the situation of women who are directed towardtraditional knowledge (Javanese ideology kanca wingking (back friend)) as justification for the interpretation of the Koran used by the new order to issue marriage law policy No.1. in 1974. Research on "Narratives of the power of women online business workers" by Sih Natalia Sukmi (2018) explores the relationship between technological and economic knowledge under the shadow of patriarchal power, which is inversely proportional to women's desire for power.

Research conducted by Ondrej Kascak and Branislav Pupala (2017) on "Topography of power relations in the Slovak preschool sector based on Bourdieu's field theory" can be seen as a comparison. Slightly different from previous research based on Michel Foucault's theory of power relations, this research uses Pierre Bourdieu as a basis for researchers to build their theories. Another studythat can be referred to is research by Juliet Christine Perumal, whichtouches on "Bodies as objects of pedagogic power relations" (Perumal, 2012) or findings from two Israeli researchers, MiriYemini and Yuval Dvir (2016) on "International baccalaureate as a litmus test revealing conflicting values and power relations in the Israeli education system". Another researcher from China, Minglin Li (2017) who researched "Power relations in the enactment of English educationpolicy for Chinese schools".

Before reaching the next stage, the author must develop a series of questions that serve as guidelines for answering problems in the research field. The important question relates to how discourse (knowledge) is produced in power relations between the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia and religious preachers through the standardization program. This research intends to reveal the discourse (knowledge) produced in power relations between the government, namely the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, through the application of standardization to preachers in Indonesia.

Discourse is something that produces something else (be it speech, concept or influence). Its structure can be known from its systematicity, which is formed from various ideas, opinions, ways of thinking, and behavior in a certain context, in addition to the influence of the way of thinking and behaving itself. Simply put, how do we treat discourse as practices that form the object of speech, not as groups of signs or lines of text (Foucault, 1972).

RESEARCH METHODS

Conceptual Framework

The critical theory paradigm that guides the beginning to the end of this research is intended to expose the power relations surrounding religious teaching. The critical theory paradigm distances itself from deterministic and positivistic attitudes. Objectivity that is understood as value-free makes positivists create a grand narrative that ignoresdetails (micro-scale politics) and maintains a false human consciousness that can only be controlled by positive laws (Pertiwi, 2019, p.19).

Because of the critical theory paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 136), a qualitative approach is very likely to be used by researchers in the theme "Power Relations in Religious Teaching Spaces". In line with the critical theory paradigm, the qualitative approach rests on a post-positivist philosophy in which the reality of life is not only measured by causal or positivist relationships alone. However, there is a holistic reality that views humans as unique, free-willed, and social beings who are interconnected with other humans (Creswell, 2015).

In addition, to obtain maximum results, this research uses the critical discourse analysis method as an analytical knife to find information from the research subjects. Researcher want to understand social reality based on an idea called subjective orientation of social action, meaning that all social actions are guided by the subjective meanings given by individuals to their actions (Morissan, 2019).

Data collection method

To test the validity of a study, it depends on the type of data collection method used. Researchers use several methods

a. Observation method

Media selection is an important measure of public trust in the media they read. News coverage is taken from mainstream media,

such as; CNN news.com, JPNN.com, Antaranews.com, Metronews.com, Kompas.com, and Detik.com,between 2017 and2020. The selection of these media is based on considerations of the credibility of the news and the accuracy of their data acquisition.

b. Interview method

The researcher inventoried through online media the right people to be used as informants who can answer questions according to the theme and setting of this research. These informants include

1. Religious leaders/religious preachers/preachers or people who are involved in the world of preaching (*dakwah*). Namely: Novel Bamukmin (PA 212 spokesperson), M. Satori Ismail (chairman of IDAI (Ikatan Dai Indonesia), M. Jusuf Kalla (chairman of DMI (Dewan Masjid Indonesia), former vise president of Indonesia), Imam Aziz (chairman of culture and interfaith relations of PBNU),

2. State Institutions (DPR) and non-governmental (MUI) institutions, Islamic mass organizations (NU, Muhammadiyah, and the like), and people who are directly related to the research theme. The figures in this research that often appear in the media are MUI leaders such as KH. Ma'ruf Amin (chairman of MUI) and M. Cholil Navis (vise chairman of MUI), Muhyiddin Junaidi (vise chairman of MUI), Anwar Abbas (secretary general of MUI), members of the MPR-DPR, Desy Ratnasari (member of commission VIII DPR-RI), Ace Hasan Sadzali (member of commission VIII DPR-RI), Hidayat Nur Wahid (vise chairman of MPR), and Muhaimin Iskandar (vice chairman of DPR-RI).

3. The Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia as the originator of the standardization program policy or whatever its name is in line with the purpose of the research. Namely,Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin (minister of religion for the 2014-2019 period), Fakhrurrozi (minister of religion for the 2019-2021 period),

c. Documentation method

Retrieval of written documents in the form of letters issued by the Ministry of Religion to religious teachers, scholars, and institutions related to the certification of scholars, preachers, and ustad, including a decree from the Ministry of Religion on the list of 200 preachers recommended by the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia.

Data Analysis Method

The data obtained through the data collection strategy above is then processed and analyzed with the following steps:

a. The reading of journals and articles in the mass media became the basis for researchers to observe the results of observations in online media. Then, the results were studied together with comparing the results of interviews with informants to sharpen the results. At least from the informants, researchers know their opinions or views on the preacher standardization program. Interview results can be developed according to the research needs.

b. Organizing data reduction, which is done by making abstractions. This abstraction attempts to summarize the core, process, and statements that need to be maintained so that they remain in it.

c. Arrange the data in units where the unit here is a unit of information that functions to determine or identify by providing codes according to the source and type of data, data collection media, data viewing time, and data collection methods or techniques.

d. Categorization (preparation of categories), where the data that has been identified is grouped according to their respective categories, where similar categories are arranged and collected together.

e. Conducting data validity checks, namely, presenting data in the form of descriptive analytics in the form of descriptions with verbal words accompanied by researcher analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Dynamics of Controversy over Standardization Program Discourse in Mass Media

A glance at the time sequence of mass media coverage from 2017 to 2021 explains the pros and cons of implementing a standardization program for religious preachers in Indonesia. The problem is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with the program, but rather the background that underlies the choice of agreeing and disagreeing. If we look back at their (the preachers') attitude toward the standardization program, there are many options that could have been chosen. The options put forward will depend on the conditions that occur in each region/area.

On one occasion, the Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin initiated a standardization program for preachers. In an interview, he said "Now the ministry of religion is working hard to develop what qualifications or competencies are needed as a standard for preachers. Standardization refers to the material

given by the preachers to their listeners." The word "working hard" indicates the seriousness with which the government, through the Ministry of Religion, will implement a certain standard aimed at religious preachers. There is a slight emphasis on the standards that will be applied, namely on the material. The minister did not mention anything other than material, such as targeting a particular person or institution.

However, in the same interview, he said, "It can be MUI, it can be a joint organization of religious mass organizations, or others. precisely here we are hearing opinions." The mention of the name of the institution or organization appears to contrast with the earlier statement about the material. Although he added 'hearing opinions'. It is important to underline that the mention of names will have implications for those mentioned in the interview. For MUI or those who feel they are religious organizations, they will prepare and wait for the next step from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, represented by Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin.

On January 27, 2017, Antaranews.com reported that the minister of religion proved his statement by summoning the MUI, NU, Muhammadiyah, the dean of the faculty of Da'wah, al-Wasliyah, the special staff of the minister of communication, IKDI, the directorate general of religious education, and others who were not mentioned. On that occasion, the minister of religion announced a program called "khatib certification". There was a change in the term from what was conveyed to journalists earlier 'standardization of preachers' to 'certification of preachers'. In terms of language, there is a narrowing of meaning from 'standardization' to 'certification', from 'preacher' to 'khatib'. The meaning of 'standardization' in the language is the provision of benchmarks or standard measures, which means that there will be a formulation of detailed and complete guidelines on something. In contrast, 'certification' means the provision of a certificate without any formulation of guidelines to follow.

The degradation of meaning appears to be read by other parties. Statement of MUI deputy chairman KH. Cholil Navis can serve as a reference. He said that MUI is interested in the implementation of preacher certification. The implied meaning is that there is also an interest of the MUI in the certification of preachers intended by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The similarity of this desire needs to be examined. It turns out that the MUI has prepared in advance by giving TOT (training of trainee) for its members to implement the certification intended by the Ministry of Religion. The name given by MUI is dai standardization, which includes the ethics,

materials, and methods of da'wah. It is one step ahead of what the Ministry of Religion will implement.

A different response was delivered by the chairman of IDAI (Indonesian Dai Association), M. Satori, who was worried that the preacher certification program would cause problems. He said, "I think this program will be effective if it starts from mosques in government institutions. So we start this program gradually so that it does not cause problems in the field." His concern is not to reject the ministry of religion's desire, but to provide a solution for its implementation. The phasing of implementation that he refers to is interesting to learn as a way of exploring the will of the ministry of religion. Because he started from mosques in government institutions. The ball seems to have swung to the ministry of religion to determine the reaction of the community. He seems to have guessed that the government might use a way to minimize the risk of resistance from certain parties. This can also be seen from the change in the use of the word 'standardization' to 'certification'.

The two opinions above can at least be used as an initial step to build a relationship between the government represented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the preachers represented by MUI and IDAI. A Ministry of Religion that cooperates with potential parties to become counter-apart is a good strategy to incorporate the desired ideas.

After two days, there seems to be a rather intense dynamic in terms of program implementation. The statement of the minister of religion is interesting to listen to, "who will issue the standard? It is not our domain, but the domain of mass organizations. Certification is not my idea; they are the ones who ask for structuring and guidance." Regarding the issue of who has the right to standardize, the Ministry of Religion seems to be hands-off and then leaves it to the mass organizations. Even the matter of certification is said to be 'not the pure idea' of the ministry and again throws it to other parties. There are additional words requesting 'structuring and guidance' from other parties. The meaning of these two words seems ambiguous or deliberately disguised so that the words 'standardization' and 'certification' can be explained in another context. Therefore, it may be correct to say that by Martina L. Mabille (2019) stated that the view of normalization (read; standardization) in which there is categorization, identification, and classification carries implications for differences.

The intensity of the use of the word intensified when the minister of religion said, "The government does not say that those who are not certified or standardized should not preach.

The government does not have the domain to prohibit this. That is the right of the community itself and the mosque takers." The contradiction in the statement is made more obvious by the appearance of several 'no' words. This can be compared to the minister's initial statement about the importance of setting standards for preachers. The consistency of the attitude of an institution that fights for a program that will be directed toward the birth of a policy is starting to slacken. Most likely, the meeting between the Ministry of Religion and several parties (MUI, religious organizations, and others) experienced sharp dynamics.

This statement is also interesting, "The ministry of religion and the government reminded us that sermons should not be delivered confrontationally." It is interesting because from previously exploring the problem of the preacher, it has now shifted toward the material, namely the sermon. From personal issues to material issues. Sociologically, it is recognized that pointing to the personal will have more complicated implications than the material.

The minister of religion's frequent use of the word negation indicates a firm position on policy. The ministry of religion, which is an extension of the government, attempts to create a line of demarcation between parties. From this statement, it is expected that there will be polarization between which parties support and which reject the proposal.

The implication of the minister's statement appeared immediately on the same day, when two members of the House of Representatives (Desy Ratnasari and Ali Taher) commented "The treatment must be for all religions. Don't let it not be useful," as if to remind us that the government has been unfair in its policies. Desy capitalized on the government's weakness in targeting only one group or institution. A one-direction policy in the eyes of the DPR, which represents the people, would be very dangerous. The government will easily take repressive actions against a targeted group.

Rejection is also seen in the statement of Vice President Yusuf Kalla, who is also the chairman of the Indonesian mosque council (DMI). He said, "Mosques in Indonesia are built and organized by the community. Da'wah in Indonesia is a community da'wah, so it is not easy to organize it." Almost frankly, Yusuf Kalla rejected the preacher certification program by comparing the number of mosques in Indonesia. A logical comparison that must be considered by the government because it is impossible to certify so many preachers (mosques).

Now it's MUI's turn to talk about preacher certification. MUI vise chairman M. Zainut Tauhid argued that "MUI can understand the idea of the minister of religion as long as the program is voluntary, not mandatory". The impression obtained from that statement was that MUI avoided confronting the situation openly. However, it gives an option to the Ministry of Religion so that the program is only voluntary, not mandatory. Because it is voluntary, there will be no sanction for those who do not follow the program. The degree of voluntary nature is mathematically easier than obligation. The psychological burden is also reduced.

News about preacher certification after that stopped. Until a few months later, kompas.com reported on the signing of cooperation between the DKI Jakarta provincial government and PBNU in training preachers. On that occasion, PBNU Chairman Said Aqil Siraj revealed the purpose of the training, "So that preachers and preachers understand the mission of Islam which is ramadan oil alamin, Islam which is moderate, tolerant, constructive, not destructive, not reviling, not fighting, not slander."

This statement implies that there are problems in the delivery of lectures by preachers. If simplified, the problems include; Islam that is not moderate, intolerant, not constructive, destructive, abusive, divisive, and slanderous. Identification of the attitudes and traits mentioned can be a standard that should be allowed and not allowed by a preacher or khatib according to the perspective of NU (represented by its general chairman) and the DKI provincial government (represented by the governor of DKI Jakarta).

The Governor of DKI said, "We deliberately cooperate with PBNU to be able to educate our preachers, our Ustaz, so that they make places of worship, preaching the right thing, which is following Islam which is ramadan oil alamin, which brings mercy, tolerant Islam." From this statement, there is a deliberate intention by the Governor of the DKI. This means that the governor has the initiative to invite the PBNU, not the other way around. The goal is clearly to educate the preachers and stad to follow the desired direction. In this regard, the PBNU is used as a shield for the DKI provincial government to anticipate possible resistance from other parties. This form of cooperation is also a preventive measure against past experiences.

Through the slogan 'Islam ramadan oil alamin', a symbol of togetherness between the two parties (DKI Provincial Government and PBNU) was built. This slogan is considered very appropriate because of its universality. These words contain the meaning of Indonesia's diversity, which is blessed by the almighty God.

An explanation is also needed from the governor's statement that alluded to a place of

worship that seemed forbid to be used as a means outside worship. The governor had said "da'wah is right", so the simple logic is as if all this time the da'wah delivered was not correct. The meaning of 'the right one' here raises many interpretations.

Statements with multiple interpretations often lead to polemics because the public is forced to predict the implied intent. Public predictions can be said to be not far from the knowledge that has been obtained. Meanwhile, knowledge itself is rooted in its history and cannot be changed. Foucault uses the term historical discontinuity, where there is a disconnection between histories.

B. Program Discourse that Continues to Be Polemical

Horrendous news occurred on May 18, 2018, when the minister of religion Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin released a list of 200 moderate preachers. Various media reported the same thing. The public response was also extraordinary to this ministry of religion policy. The mass media took turns reporting on the list of 200 names of preachers. It seems that the discussion about preachers in the previous SOE received a response from the government.

What is interesting is the use of the word 'moderate' after the word 'preacher'. This means that the ministry has set the adjective moderate as a benchmark for determining a preacher. There is no exact reason as to why the word 'moderate' was used. What is certain is that the minister of religion, as reported in various mass media, explained three indicators of a preacher being labeled 'moderate'. If summarized, the three indicators includepreachers who have high competence in the field of Islam, preachers who must have sufficient preaching experience, and preachers who have a high national commitment.

The first indicator of high competenceis never explained further. In terms of competence, researchers think that all preachers must have it because there is no way that without competence they can convey their knowledge to the audience. High competence needs to be proven by clear data and not just subjective assessment.

The second indicator of 'sufficient preaching experience' is also similar to the first. The meaning of 'sufficient' is not unequivocal. Especially concerning one's own experience. How exactly can one be said to have sufficient experience? This measure of adequacy may never be the same from one person to another.

The third one about 'high national commitment' is an indicator that is not closely related to the professionalism of a preacher. Because this indicator is closer to political nuances than professional. Therefore, the question of high and low commitment must also be measured. Does it need to be tested in the form of a commitment evaluation?

The minister of religion also added, "Being a preacher is not only a mastery of content but also skill in delivering the content of the message to the community." Skills can be interpreted as the ability to use tools with a specific purpose or goal. The minister of religion emphasized skills, not content.

Therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that the three indicators plus content delivery skills are abilities that a preacher must have. The Ministry of Religious Affairs may have used this standard to select 200 moderate preachers.

Although the minister of religion has explained the three indicators of the names. However, many in the public are skeptical about the determination of the preachers' names. Saleh Daulay, the deputy general secretary of PAN, said, "Who tested them? Is there a selection?" Or the cons such as PA 212 spokesperson Novel Bakunin, "I see that those who are included in the 200, among them are scholars who are indicated by ulama suu' (evil scholars) who often make uproar with their inconsequential statements," or sarcastic ones such as ustad Abdus Somad, who happened not to be included in the list, "Because the Ministry of Religion does not want to disappoint the public, I am full until 2020." Ustad Yusuf Mansur, who was included in the list, "I am happier and more serene not being on the list of names. Not because I don't like it or because I am ungrateful. But more because I am still a santri, still learning, and there are so many mistakes and incompetence."

The various comments in the media indicate that serious problems are being faced by the Ministry of Religious Affairs' decision to issue a list of 200 names of preachers. Even NU and Muhammadiyah, who, according to the minister of religion, were asked to provide input, also commented. Through its vise chairman, Marsyudi Syuhud, NU believes that the ministry should be more transparent. Muhammadiyah, through its chairman Yunahar Ilyas, sees the potential for divisions between communities.

The problem of transparency in determining the names of preachers released by the Ministry of Religious Affairs seems crucial in questioning various parties. Still, in the same day's news, the deputy chairman of Commission II of the House of Representatives from the PKS faction had the same opinion as NU and Muhammadiyah, even more critical. He said, "Monggo, 200 monggo, but don't limit others. This is a step that divides us. This is the land that causes terrorism to flourish." In line with others, the lack of transparency creates suspicion and different perceptions in the community. Mardani

therefore proposed mentioning the names of the banned preachers. However, it seems that the Ministry of Religious Affairs has avoided mentioning the names of the banned preachers in order to reduce the tension of resistance.

Two days after the release of the 200 names of preachers by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the news in the media is not getting dimmer but the opposite. Many parties are now more actively involved in commenting on the release of the 200 names. An interesting statement came from the head of the Nahdatul Ulama Da'wah Institute (LDNU), Maman Imanulhaq. He believes that the state intervenes too far in the religious life of its citizens. "The state does not need to intervene too much in the religious life of its citizens. The ones who should be on the list of preachers should be Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad Islamiyah, Persis, and others." This statement indicates the state's power relations with its citizens. Through the establishment of certain standards (criteria) that must be obeyed by its citizens, it is hoped that compliance will be obtained. Second, the statement also implies a struggle for authority between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Islamic organizations. Islamic organizations are aware of the state's intense involvement in regulating parties considered potential opponents. Meanwhile, mass organizations that feel that they oversee their preachers have to protect them from intervention.

Power relations are also tried to be shown by Islamic organizations by providing alternative criteria. Islamic organizations, especially large ones such as NU and Muhammadiyah, are interested in knowing the intricacies of determining the 200 names issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Therefore, although the Minister of Religious Affairs admitted that the two organizations were invited in the process of determining the 200 names of preachers, there were doubts and hesitations when the Ministry of Religious Affairs released the names to the public.

The hesitancy and doubt shown by these two large mass organizations have led to great public suspicion of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. these two organizations have a tremendous mass in Indonesia. Therefore, these two organizations have the 'trump card' of public trust, which has implications for the ability to control opinions.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs is in a false position. If they are not invited to participate in the process of determining the name, the two organizations will surely react strongly. Even when invited, they still reacted negatively, seemingly cornering the Ministry of Religious

Affairs. The tug-of-war of interests was muted by the ministry by not standardizing only 200 names.

When communication becomes negative or at least there are many opinions of experts, figures, or competent parties on certain issues, the public's request (if true) about the preacher may be twisted into a political issue. It is no wonder that observer Syarwi Pangi Chaniago deplored this, saying, "Do not let the ulama and mubalig be used as political commodities to gain electoral votes for the sake of the presidential election."

It is alleged that the issue of preachers, or more precisely, the standardization program initiated earlier, has entered the area of politicization. This can be seen from the statements of politicians in the DPR RI, which are indicated to be divided. Some supports, some half-supports, and some reject the program. If described, it would be as follows:

Table 1 : Program Supporter (produced by researcher)

Program	Support	Neutral	Reject
Certification of preachers	PDI-P	MUI	PAN, PKS, and Ormas (NU-Muhammadiyah)
Standardizati-on of preachers	PDI-P	MUI	PKS, Ormas Muhammadiyah
List of 200 names of preachers	PDI-P	Partai Golkar, MUI	PPP, LDNU, PA 212, NU, Muhammadiyah, MUI, and Gerindra

It is interesting to note the opinion of observer Hendri Satrio who said "But with this list, it is like clearly separating preachers, preachers who are approved by the state and those who are not. This is not a blunder. The Ministry of Religion has messed up Jokowi's image,". He seemed to indicate that the government was planing to separate preachers who were under its 'control', and those who were 'against' it.

There are at least three problems arising from the release of the 200 names of preachers: transparency, communication, and politicization. The communication factor is also important if the Ministry of Religious Affairs will release a list of names. Because it appears that in the polemic over the list of 200 names of preachers, many parties feel that they have not been invited to communicate by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is not clear what form of communication is desired by those who reject the list. Should there be bargaining between the interested parties? This communication is

vulnerable to abuse by those who want certain names to be included in the recommendation.

The politicization factor is a logical consequence of communication. Politicians will use their communication to determine the intent and purpose of determining the list of 200 names of preachers. Political parties that have constituencies in the regions have a strong interest in determining the names of certain people. Apart from serving as an 'extension of the tongue' for the party, preachers can also help gain more mass votes if successfully recruited. Although this signal of politicization was denied by the minister of religion, Lukman Hakim Syarifuddin, he said, ... "if we are in practical politics, of course we only input those with large followers, if you feel there is something uncomfortable the minister of religion apologizes." This statement shows the political attitude of the minister of religion by signaling that followers are needed to win votes. The apology also indicates that there is something wrong with the policy.

CONCLUSION

After reading and analyzing the results of the discussion, the researcher draws several important conclusions. First, power/knowledge relations are produced by several parties, includingthe Ministry of Religion (government representative), MUI, and religious preachers. What is interesting is that the standardization program for religious preachers in this research differs in terms of the application of power and knowledge. If power relations have led to inequality between one party and another, then the power relations in this religious preacher standardization program appear to be power competition between several parties.

The standardization program, although using different terms such as certification, standardization, and several related terms, is the way the government implements the standardization policy toward religious preachers. Second, the government has a strong interest in implementing the standardization program for religious preachers. Therefore, the government should lock down its power by monitoring all lecture activities in mosques or taklim assemblies. Third, what can be seen almost clearly is the political motive. As revealed by Michel Foucault, bio-political elements are inevitable in power relations. Likewise, this study found political elements in the implementation of the standardization program for religious preachers. This can be seen from the statements of figures who suspect and deny the inclusion of political elements in the programs to be implemented.

Moreover, these years (2017-2020) are years of high political tension.

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