

## MARITIME DIPLOMACY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST IUU FISHING IN THE NORTH NATUNA SEA: INDONESIA UNDER JOKO WIDODO (2014–2019)

Giffariel Novansyah<sup>1</sup> and Ilmi Dwiastuti<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Faculty of Social Science and Education, President University, Jababeka Education Park, Jl. Ki Hajar Dewantara Cikarang Utara, Bekasi Regency, West Java 17530  
E-mail: gnovansyah@gmail.com; ilmi.dwiastuti@president.ac.id

### ABSTRACT

The North Natuna Sea, officially designated by the Indonesian government in 2017, has become a hotspot for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. President Joko Widodo's "Global Maritime Fulcrum" doctrine emphasizes the use of maritime diplomacy to address various sources of conflict in Indonesia's maritime domain, with IUU fishing explicitly identified as one of these challenges. This study seeks to answer the research question: How has maritime diplomacy been implemented to address IUU fishing in the North Natuna Sea during President Joko Widodo's first term (2014–2019)? This thesis then seeks to learn the implementation of maritime diplomacy to address the issue of IUU fishing within President Joko Widodo's first term (2014–2019) while this period also remarks the high number of boat sunken under Pudjiastuti's policy. The study employs a qualitative research method, drawing on government policy documents, official statements, media reports, and secondary academic literature. Christian Le Mière's concept of Maritime Diplomacy serves as the main analytical framework. The findings suggest that Indonesia's maritime diplomacy in this period can be categorized into three main actors: the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia), constabulary forces (the Indonesian Water Police and the Ministry of Fisheries' Pengawas Perikanan), and civilians (local Indonesian fishers). Each actor contributes to different forms of maritime diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea. First, coercive maritime diplomacy—implemented by the military and constabulary forces—proved effective in deterring foreign illegal fishing vessels through arrests and the sinking of ships following legal proceedings. Second, persuasive or cooperative maritime diplomacy—conducted by all three actors through patrols, joint operations, and training—had a more limited impact, as it did not significantly reduce the recurrence of IUU fishing activities. Thus, this study highlights both the strengths and limitations of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy, showing that coercive measures are more immediately impactful, while cooperative measures face challenges in sustaining long-term effectiveness.

**Keywords:** IUU Fishing, Indonesia, Maritime Diplomacy, North Natuna Sea

### DIPLOMASI MARITIM DAN PERLAWANAN TERHADAP IUU FISHING DI LAUT NATUNA UTARA: INDONESIA PADA MASA JOKO WIDODO (2014–2019)

#### ABSTRAK

Laut Natuna Utara, yang secara resmi dinamai oleh pemerintah Indonesia pada tahun 2017, telah menjadi pusat aktivitas Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Doktrin "Poros Maritim Dunia" Presiden Joko Widodo menekankan penggunaan diplomasi maritim untuk mengatasi berbagai sumber konflik di wilayah maritim Indonesia, dengan IUU fishing secara eksplisit diidentifikasi sebagai salah satu tantangan utama. Penelitian ini berusaha menjawab pertanyaan penelitian: Bagaimana diplomasi maritim diimplementasikan untuk mengatasi IUU fishing di Laut Natuna Utara selama periode pertama pemerintahan Presiden Joko Widodo (2014–2019)? Tesis ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji implementasi diplomasi maritim dalam menangani isu IUU fishing pada masa jabatan pertama Presiden Joko Widodo (2014–2019), yang juga ditandai dengan tingginya jumlah kapal yang ditenggelamkan berdasarkan kebijakan Menteri Susi Pudjiastuti di Laut Natuna Utara. Penelitian menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan memanfaatkan dokumen kebijakan pemerintah, pernyataan resmi, laporan media, serta literatur akademik sekunder. Konsep Maritime Diplomacy dari Christian Le Mière digunakan sebagai kerangka analisis utama. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa diplomasi maritim Indonesia pada periode ini dapat dikategorikan ke dalam tiga aktor utama: militer (Tentara Nasional Indonesia), aparat penegak hukum (Water Police dan Pengawas Perikanan dari Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan), serta sipil (nelayan lokal Indonesia). Masing-masing aktor berkontribusi dalam bentuk diplomasi maritim yang berbeda di Laut Natuna Utara. Pertama, diplomasi maritim koersif—yang dijalankan oleh militer dan aparat penegak hukum—terbukti efektif dalam memberikan efek jera terhadap kapal-kapal asing pelaku illegal fishing melalui penangkapan dan penenggelaman kapal setelah proses hukum. Kedua, diplomasi maritim persuasif atau kooperatif—yang dijalankan oleh ketiga aktor melalui patroli, operasi bersama, dan pelatihan—memiliki dampak yang lebih terbatas, karena belum mampu secara signifikan mengurangi berulangnya aktivitas IUU fishing. Dengan demikian, penelitian ini menyoroti kekuatan sekaligus keterbatasan diplomasi maritim Indonesia, menunjukkan bahwa langkah koersif memberikan

dampak langsung yang lebih nyata, sedangkan langkah kooperatif menghadapi tantangan dalam menciptakan efektivitas jangka panjang

**Kata kunci:** Diplomasi Maritim, IUU Fishing, Indonesia, Laut Natuna Utara

## INTRODUCTION

IUU (Illegal, unreported, and unregulated) fishing is a rampant problem that plagues Indonesian waters. Due to IUU fishing, Indonesia suffered an annual loss of 4-7 tons, which amounts to USD 8.3 million in addition to the damage that is also reported to be inflicted towards the biodiversity of the sea itself (M. Hermawan, 2020). This poses a problem for Indonesia as one of the top 10 fish dependent nation in the world, with its fish consumption per capita reaching 46.49 kg in 2017 (WRI Indonesia, n.d.). In addition to the economic loss, IUU fishing poses a threat to the livelihood of fishers in Indonesia, especially due to the general lack of technology possessed and employed by Indonesian fishers, further making it difficult for them to compete against illegal fishing vessels from other countries that are generally better equipped, especially against the more advanced Chinese vessels.

Among the areas in Indonesia that is rife with IUU fishing instances, Natuna has especially gained both public and government attention in recent years. Its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) located in proximity with its neighbors: Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. The northern part of Indonesian EEZ overlaps with Malaysia and Vietnam, and formerly with the Philippines up until the country finished and ratified its EEZ delimitation with Indonesia recently in August 2019 (Septiari, 2019). Natuna's EEZ also overlap with the Chinese claim over South China Sea, marked by its U-shaped 9-dash line border. In addition, with its massive annual catch potential of 1,421 tons of lobsters, 2318 tons of crabs, 9,711 tons of flower crabs, and 23,499 tons of squids, Natuna became a magnet for IUU fishing cases. In 2014-2018, Indonesia arrested 556 ships for IUU fishing, with 312 originating from Vietnam, 91 from the Philippines, 87 from Malaysia, 24 from Thailand, 26 from Indonesia, 3 from China, and 5 from other countries (Idris, 2020). Due to its proximity with the vessels' country of origin, the EEZ for Natuna became a hotspot for these cases. The importance of Natuna was underlined by Former Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, who stated that Natuna existence is that of a door which must be guarded, lest thieves can come in (Connelly, 2016). And indeed, Natuna is especially vulnerable since it is spread across 262.000 km<sup>2</sup> of sea which exceeds 10 times of its land size, making it difficult for

Indonesia to patrol with its limited number of maritime assets (Supriyanto, 2015).

To reduce the IUU fishing cases in Natuna, Indonesia has pushed the topic of IUU fishing in international forums. Indonesia has also pushed forward the delimitations of EEZ with Malaysia and Vietnam to create a clearer border, one that is hoped to be less prone of violations such as IUU fishing. In 2015, Indonesia have also created a task force named Satgas 115 (Task Force 115) designed to enforce IUU fishing-related laws and to combat illegal fishing in Indonesia. Another mechanism to curb the number of IUU fishing is the policy from the former Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti to sink the offending ships. The mechanism being that the arrested vessels which crews have already went through the necessary proceedings, be transported back to the sea and sunk in a show of force. This is done all the while informing and inviting the representative of the vessel's country of origin to discuss her policy (Wijaya & Marta, 2019). From 2014-2019, the foreign fishing boat sunk under Pudjiastuti's policy reached 556 vessels, with most of the vessels originated from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand (Idris, 2020).

Authors has noted that Indonesia's main approach to tackling IUU fishing in its waters can be simplified into 3 main points, which are to sink illegal fishing ships, introduce moratorium towards foreign fishing ships, and banning transfer of fish at sea. (Cabral et al., 2018; Djunarsjah et al., 2021; S. P. Santoso, 2022). Within the context of international relations, the act of openly sinking illegal fishing ships has been viewed as a show of force and willingness to defend own maritime security and sovereignty (S. P. Santoso, 2022).

In the past, Indonesia have encountered multiple instances of IUU fishing by Chinese vessels. For instance, in 2010, an Indonesian vessel that was in progress of arresting a Chinese vessel suspected of IUU fishing in Indonesian EEZ decided to let the offending vessel free when a Chinese coast guard vessel threatened and pointed a machine gun at the Indonesian vessel (Parameswaran, 2016). A similar incident happened again in 2013 where Indonesian officials attempted to arrest 9 Chinese fishers suspected of IUU fishing and transport them for legal proceedings, harassment from Chinese coast guard vessels soon forced the Indonesian captain to release the crews (Parameswaran, 2016). In

2016, a Chinese coast guard vessel foiled Indonesia's attempt to arrest a Chinese fishing vessel suspected of IUU fishing by ramming the captured fishing vessel. China believed the vessels conduct was lawful and justified, as it is well within their traditional fishing zone, represented by their claim of 9-dash line (Cochrane, 2016).

Since the 2016 encounter, Chinese fishing vessels have been increasingly escorted by its coast guard vessels, making them more complicated to arrest, let alone to put them into trial and then sink them under Pudjiastuti's mechanism. Indonesia then renamed the Natuna EEZ as Northern Natuna Sea, which was introduced via the release of the new map of The Republic of Indonesia by the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in 2017 (Suryadinata, 2017). The move can be seen to convey a message to the people that Indonesia would stand firm against China, when a head-on assault is not, by any means, a realistic course of action. Multiple standoffs continue in 2019, which prompted Indonesia to deploy 4 additional warships, and 4 F-16 jet fighters to Natuna in January 2020 (Siregar, 2020).

This research will be limited to discuss Indonesia's effort to minimize IUU fishing from foreign countries with the use of maritime diplomacy in the first term of Joko Widodo's presidency, specifically on and around the highly disputed North Natuna Sea. First mentioned by Jokowi in his speech in the 9<sup>th</sup> East Asia Summit, Jokowi put forward his idea of turning Indonesia to be a "Global Maritime Fulcrum", consisting of five pillars or five main ideas. Without delving too much into the idea itself, one of the five pillars that he proposed addresses his envisioned way of tackling IUU fishing in Indonesia. maritime diplomacy is Jokowi's preferred way to address illegal fishing, among other issues that were also mentioned in the fourth pillar. Maritime diplomacy is also discussed in the Presidential Decree no. 16 of 2017 regarding *Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia* (Indonesia's Maritime Policy) in its Chapter 5.7, this time being one of the 7 pillars of Indonesia Maritime Policy (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime of The Republic of Indonesia, 2012).

Authors limits the research to events after 2014 as Indonesian approach to maritime diplomacy shifted significantly with the inauguration of Joko Widodo and the former Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti, notably due to Jokowi's vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum that brings maritime diplomacy as one of its pillars, and Pudjiastuti's approach of sinking the arrested vessels convicted of IUU fishing. Other than that, from 2014-2019, the foreign fishing boat sunk under Pudjiastuti's policy reached 556

vessels, with most of the vessels originated from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand (Idris, 2020).

This study aims to understand Indonesia's vision and practice of maritime diplomacy while analyzing how Indonesia carried out its maritime diplomacy to counter IUU fishing in the North Natuna Sea between 2014 and 2019, as well as the responses from the affected countries. The research contributes to the broader literature on Indonesia's maritime diplomacy, its response to IUU fishing, the Indonesia-China tensions in the South China Sea, and, more broadly, Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum. It also provides insights into the implementation of maritime diplomacy as an essential part of Indonesia's maritime policy, as emphasized in Jokowi's speech at the 9th East Asian Summit and codified in Presidential Decree No. 16 of 2017.

## METHOD

This research employs a qualitative case study design to examine Indonesia's implementation of maritime diplomacy in addressing IUU fishing in the North Natuna Sea during President Joko Widodo's first term (2014-2019).

Creswell's (2014) qualitative research approach contributes to this study by emphasizing depth of interpretation and the identification of patterns across complex interactions, rather than numerical measurement. The case study method, following Yin (2009), is particularly relevant, as it allows an in-depth analysis of events and processes that unfold over time, answering both "how" and "why" questions. The study draws on multiple sources of primary and secondary data. Primary data include Indonesian government reports (e.g., Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries annual reports), naval and coast guard press releases, and legal case records concerning the prosecution and sinking of vessels. Secondary sources include media reports (Kompas, The Jakarta Post, Tempo), international monitoring platforms such as Global Fishing Watch, and academic studies on Indonesian maritime security. Where possible, open-source data such as AIS satellite tracking of fishing vessels were also consulted to cross-check the presence of foreign fishing fleets in the North Natuna Sea.

The collected data were analyzed using content analysis and elements of process tracing. Content analysis was applied to identify recurring themes related to coercive and persuasive maritime diplomacy, as conceptualized by Christian Le Mière. Process tracing was used to connect specific incidents (e.g., arrests of fishing vessels, joint patrols, or military training exercises) with

broader policy goals, allowing for causal inferences about the effectiveness of maritime diplomacy.

To ensure validity, the study applied triangulation by cross-checking information from government reports, court records, and media coverage. When relying on media sources, special attention was given to corroborating reports across multiple outlets to minimize bias. While interviews with government officials and fishers could provide additional insights, the study acknowledges the limitation of relying primarily on documentary and media sources.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia's own definition of Maritime Diplomacy is briefly discussed in "Dokumen Nasional Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia", which defines maritime diplomacy as a "conduct of foreign politics with the aim to optimize maritime potential in accordance with the national and international law" (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime of The Republic of Indonesia, 2012). The limitation of what constitutes as maritime diplomacy here is notably broad, as in addition to the utilization of maritime assets to fulfill Indonesia's national interest at the sea, maritime diplomacy is also defined to include acts of foreign politics in general in bilateral, regional, and global capacity related to various maritime aspects. While the first part of the definition refers to the usage of naval forces to achieve diplomatic interest, which is more in-line to the more established literatures such as Cable's Gunboat Diplomacy, Booth's Naval Diplomacy, and Le Mière's Maritime Diplomacy, it also expanded that as long as it can be considered a diplomatic act and aims to fulfill a national interest in maritime domain, even if it does not involve the use of naval forces, Indonesia deems that it can be considered as maritime diplomacy (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime of The Republic of Indonesia, 2012).

In "Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century", Christian Le Mière stated that maritime diplomacy in essence boils down to the management of international relations through the use of maritime assets within a maritime domain (Le Mière, 2014). Le Mière further divides maritime diplomacy into three different types, depending on the intention that the user wants to project using a particular maritime diplomacy. Those three types are cooperative, persuasive and coercive maritime diplomacy (Le Mière, 2014).

Cooperative maritime diplomacy is the utilization of maritime assets as tool of attraction and inspiration to persuade or reassure the target

actor. For a maritime activity between two or more actors to be considered as cooperative maritime diplomacy, Le Mière stated that the parties involved must do so willingly. In cooperative maritime diplomacy, the vessels involved may or may not have a capability to engage in combat; but in the cases where it is combat-ready, such capability must remain unused during the diplomacy. Le Mière also stated referring to Nye's concept soft power, that in essence, cooperative maritime diplomacy can be called "soft maritime diplomacy", in contrast to coercive maritime diplomacy's "hard maritime diplomacy" (Le Mière, 2014).

Persuasive maritime diplomacy, meanwhile, is designated as a middle ground between cooperative maritime diplomacy and coercive maritime diplomacy. In persuasive maritime diplomacy, the actors do not need to willingly collaborate like cooperative maritime diplomacy, but it also does not aim to forcefully persuade the target actor like coercive maritime diplomacy does. Instead, persuasive maritime diplomacy aims to show or appeal to the world in general, or to a specific target actor, that one's maritime force is present, active, and ready. In other words, it does not specifically aim to influence the target actor by a sheer use showcase of power, but merely aims to build recognition from the world to one's navy (Le Mière, 2014).

Coercive maritime diplomacy, also named by Le Mière as "hard maritime diplomacy," is intended to intimidate or forcefully persuade or the target actor through the show or a limited use of force into doing what the user wants. While the use of force is permitted in coercive maritime diplomacy, Le Mière emphasized that such conduct of maritime force must be within limitation and moderation, assuming the user wants to keep it merely as an act of coercion and prevent it from turning into a full-blown war. The use of maritime force also does not have to always be present for an act to be considered a coercive maritime diplomacy, as Le Mière stated that the essence of maritime diplomacy is to signal one's intent to allies or rival, the most important thing in coercive maritime diplomacy is that one's intent to compel or deter is able to come across. Therefore, the show of sheer power by utilizing one's maritime assets with the intention of intimidating or forcefully persuading the target actor can also be considered as maritime diplomacy. The force utilized in this type of maritime diplomacy is sea-based force, in which it not only refers to naval vessels, but also aircraft, amphibious vessels, and maritime para-military vessels. Even civilian maritime vessels that possess no combat capabilities can also be utilized to achieve the goal of coercive maritime

diplomacy. In the end of the day, however, it needs to be emphasized that the end goal of coercive maritime diplomacy is to influence the target actor, be it in terms of behavior or even a change of policy (Le Mière, 2014).

Thus, Le Mière’s Maritime Diplomacy is author’s preferred definition of maritime diplomacy. The classification of maritime diplomacy is intended to further specify what kind of maritime diplomacy that Indonesia is engaged in with the offending countries of IUU fishing in Natuna. Across different events of maritime diplomacy and with different targets and different actors in Indonesia with separate implementation of maritime diplomacy, the conduct will be different, along with the reactions from the respective countries.

**Indonesia’s Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2014**

In April 2014, Indonesia held a joint naval training entitled Multilateral Naval Exercise KOMODO (MNEK) 2014. The exercise was participated by all ASEAN nations, as well as several Asia-Pacific nations such as India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, China, Australia, US, and Russia. The MNEK 2014 focused on disaster response and medical evacuation simulation, the joint training involved a large amount of naval assets from participating countries, especially Indonesia which was acting as the host country. It was reported that the training involved 24 TNI AL’s warships, and 16 other warships from the rest of the participating countries, as well as aerial capabilities such as medical helicopters that took off and land aboard the participating warships (Larno, 2014a).

**Table 1. Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the Year 2014**

Month	Cases
April	Multilateral Naval Exercise KOMODO was conducted with Natuna and Anambas, participated by all ASEAN countries, plus India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, US, China, Russia, and Australia.
November	KP Hiu 009 captured Indonesian flagged vessel with 12 Thailand crews in North Natuna Sea.

Source: Author’s own compilation based on research findings, 2024

While it was reported that there was no military training that is involved in MNEK 2014 and the event was only solely focused on disaster response simulation, it provides ample opportunities for participating countries to demonstrate their naval assets, especially Indonesian warships which made up most of the total number of naval vessels present in the joint training. This also conveys that the national fleet are operational and on standby, ready to be deployed should the need arise. This

could be categorized as cooperative maritime diplomacy, as all the parties involved are willing participants to this joint training. Joint military training in and around Natuna waters would be a trend for Indonesian army to do in the following years.

In November 2014, Ministry of Fisheries’s Kapal Pengawas Perikanan (Fishery Surveillance Vessel, hereby abbreviated as KP) Hiu 009 successfully captured KM Natuna 28, when it was indicated that the latter was illegally fishing in the EEZ of North Natuna Sea, then still known as South China Sea (Larno, 2014b). The vessel was staffed by 12 crew members, which despite fishing in an Indonesian-flagged vessel turned out to be of Thailand nationality, a tactic reported to be quite common to spoof detection from patrol ships. KM Natuna 28 was also caught using illegal fishing equipment, which along with the arrest 100kg of fishes were also confiscated by Indonesian officials. In this case, KP Hiu 009 played a role capturing to escorting the captured KM Natuna 28 back to friendly port for further legal proceeding (Larno, 2014b). The patrol ship in this case was engaged in coercive naval diplomacy, by forcibly detaining the illegal vessel and its crew with the threat of armed personnel on board KP Hiu 009.

**Indonesia’s Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2015**

In the year 2015, TNI played a big role in the utilization of maritime diplomacy to fight IUU fishing in North Natuna Sea. A couple of notable arrests in 2015 towards illegal fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea were the result of collaborations between TNI AL, KKP’s KPs, and Indonesian Water Police. KRI Kapitan Pattimura-351 and KRI Teuku Umar-385 were involved in the arrests of a total of 7 foreign fishing vessels suspected of IUU fishing (A. Santoso, 2015; Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2015). TNI AL also participated in the controlled sinking of KM Natuna 28, the illegal fishing vessel that was mentioned in the previous subchapter, being captured in 2014. The sinking was conducted and supervised by KRI Barakuda-633, KRI Hasalan 630, dan KRI Tjiptadi 381 along with KKP’s fishery surveillance ships (Sari, 2015). TNI AL also intercepted a fishing vessel of Chinese origin after it intruded on North Natuna Sea EEZ and forces it to exit Indonesian waters in November (Afni, 2015). The acts above, while on face value are merely enforcement efforts towards border and illegal fishing offenses, they are also signaling the readiness and Indonesia’s willingness to crack down on border infringement and enforce anti-IUU fishing measures, sending deterrence in the process. This is an embodiment

of coercive maritime diplomacy that were employed by Indonesia.

**Table 2. Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the Year 2015**

Month	Cases
February	Sinking of KM <i>Natuna</i> 28, an illegal fishing vessel flying Indonesian flag but was operated by Thailand crews, captured the year prior. The sinking was conducted by a combined fleet of TNI AL's warships and KKP's surveillance vessel.
April	KP Hiu Macan 001 captured 7 Vietnam-flagged ships in North <i>Natuna</i> Sea, 84 Vietnamese crew members arrested.
May	KRI Kapitan Pattimura-351 captured 5 Thailand-flagged ships in <i>Karimata</i> straits, 76 crew members of Thailand origin arrested.
July	KP Hiu Macan 001 captured 4 Vietnam-flagged vessels, 48 Vietnamese crew members arrested.
July	KRI Teuku Umar-385 arrested 2 Vietnamese flagged vessels amid security operation <i>Krewo Baruna</i> .
July	Indonesian Water Police captured 2 Indonesian flagged vessels; 26 Vietnamese crews arrested.
August	TNI AL and TNI AU joint training over <i>Natuna</i> waters.
August	TNI AL and Indonesian Water Police were ordered to sink 37 ships post-Indonesian Independence Day 18 August in multiple locations, one of them being in Ranai, <i>Natuna</i> .
November	TNI AL deployed 7 warships to guard <i>Natuna</i> waters, among the total of 40 warships utilized daily for Indonesia-wide patrol.
November	TNI AL forces a Chinese fishing vessel to exit North <i>Natuna</i> Sea EEZ.

Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings, 2024

In August, TNI AL and TNI AU conducted joint military exercises over Natuna (Saputro, 2015). This training was focused on the scenario of foreign vessels entering North Natuna Sea EEZ, and the collaboration between naval and air force to resolve such problems. The joint training is in-line with Le Mière's definition that sea-based that could be used to employ maritime diplomacy does not necessarily have to be in the form of ships and naval assets, as airplanes and amphibious capabilities also contributes to the overall sea-based power, especially when used synergistically with each other (Le Mière, 2014). TNI AL also regularly conducted patrol over Indonesian waters, where 7 warships were reported to be used daily to patrol Natuna waters (Kompas, 2015). These two instances can be viewed as a form of persuasive maritime diplomacy, notable from the lack of collaboration from other parties aside Indonesia itself, but the strategic choice of the where it was conducted is akin to what Le Mière said as "showing the flag", essentially showing the presence of one's maritime forces without directly trying to influence other actor's policy towards the subject matter.

Constabulary forces of KKP's fishery surveillance vessels and Indonesian water police also contributed towards the implementation maritime diplomacy in North Natuna Sea, notably when KP Hiu Macan 001 captured a total of 11 Vietnamese vessels in within 2 different instances, in April and July (Munthe, 2015). Indonesian

water police also captured 2 Indonesian flagged vessels, with 26 Vietnamese crew on board (Pahlevi, 2015a). KKP's fishery surveillance vessels were also involved in the sinking of illegal fishing vessels in February and August, contributing to the overall coercive maritime diplomacy employed by Indonesia throughout the year (Sari, 2015).

### Indonesia's Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2016

TNI continued to play a pivotal role in 2016 utilizing multiple types of maritime diplomacy. As with the years prior, TNI AL kept utilizing coercive maritime diplomacy when directly capturing illegal fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea. This is especially visible when KRI Imam Bonjol-383 captured the Chinese-flagged Han Tan Cou 19038 after a series of warning shot, of which China claimed to have injured one of the crew members but was declared as false by Indonesia (Fajar, 2016). When escorting Han Tan Cou back to friendly naval base in Ranai, KRI Imam Bonjol was repeatedly contacted by Chinese Coast Guard via radio communication to release Han Tan Cou by, which was ultimately ignored (Gumilang, 2016).

**Table 3. Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the year 2016**

Month	Cases
January	Reinforcement from all three branches of Indonesian militaries to <i>Natuna</i> . TNI AD to send 2000 personnel on <i>Natuna</i> on the course of 2016, TNI AL deployed 14 ships on January 2016 to <i>Natuna</i> waters, TNI AU sent undisclosed number of aircraft to <i>Natuna</i> and employing RADAR 24/7 to better secure <i>Natuna</i> airspace.
March	KP Hiu 11 intercepted Chinese fishing vessel Kway Fey 10078, attempted to arrest with warning shots fired. The vessel successfully detained but then rammed by Chinese coast guard to foil the arrest.
June	KRI Imam Bonjol-383 captured Chinese fishing vessel Han Tan <i>Cou</i> 19038 after a series of warning shots. When escorting it to Ranai naval base, Chinese coast guard contacted via radio for the ship to be released but was paid no heed. China stated one Chinese fisherman was injured in the incident, which Indonesia denied.
June	President Jokowi held a cabinet meeting on board of KRI Imam <i>Bonjol</i> that captured Chinese fishing vessel Han Tan <i>Cou</i> 19038 the week prior.
June	President Jokowi orders for local fishing vessels above 30 DWT to be permitted to fish in <i>Natuna</i> .
July	Reallocation of local fishers with large ships above 30 GT from Northern Java coasts to <i>Natuna</i> with the promise of better catch.
August	60 illegal fishing vessels sunk following Indonesian Independence Day.
October	TNI AU training in <i>Natuna</i> , 80 warplanes and 2000 personnel involved. Jokowi directly oversaw the training and was photographed on board of a Sukhoi Su-27/30.
November	KP Orca 02 and KP Hiu 12 captured a total of 5 foreign illegal fishing vessel in North <i>Natuna</i> Sea EEZ.

Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings, 2024

Meanwhile, the utilization of persuasive maritime diplomacy can be discerned from the number of troops and military assets being stationed and stationed in Natuna. In Indonesia

alone, TNI AL deployed 14 warships to patrol Natuna waters. This increase in naval strength is supported by TNI AU sending increased number of warplanes towards Natuna along with continuously employing RADAR for better surveillance on Natuna airspace, and to a lesser extent in the context of maritime diplomacy, TNI AD deploying 2000 personnel to Natuna in this year, along with Leopard 2RI tanks and other ground assets (Bhatnagar, 2016). When coupled with transport ships like Indonesian ADRI-L, the tanks, other ground assets, and personnel formed an amphibious capability, which makes up one of the component Le-Mière described as sea-based power (Le Mière, 2014; Priatmojo & Dono, 2016). President Indonesia Widodo reinforced TNI’s persuasive maritime diplomacy effort by conducting a cabinet meeting on board of KRI Imam Bonjol, of which had captured Chinese vessel Han Tan Cou just the week prior, an incident which was formally protested by China (Siahaan, 2016).

Constabulary forces kept their contribution towards coercive maritime diplomacy as KP Orca 02 and KP Hiu 12 together captured a total of 5 foreign illegal fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea EEZ (Ambari, 2016b). In March KP Hiu 11 attempted to arrest Chinese-flagged Kway Fey 10078, however the latter was rammed by Chinese Coast guard to thwart the arrest (Budilaksono, 2016). KKP also sunk 60 captured illegal fishing boats in multiple locations in Indonesia on 18th of August, a day after Indonesian Independence Day (Fajar, 2016).

Civilians increasingly became an important actor in enacting maritime diplomacy in 2016, with Indonesian government actively pushing for it. Indonesia allows local fishing ships above 30 DWT with 120 miles of range to be permitted to fish in Natuna waters (Fitra, 2016). Furthermore, KKP actively reallocated available fishing boats above 30 GT from Northern Indonesia Coasts to Natuna, which was hoped to maximize the fishing efficiency in Natuna that was only numbered to be 9.3%, projected to be 80% in 2017 (Ambari, 2016a). The presence of fishers alone and the utilization of Natuna EEZ signals to foreign parties the sovereign rights Indonesia has over the waters. This is also a tactic used by China, as by letting or even actively sending their fishers to intrude upon North Natuna Sea EEZ represent their viewpoint that they hold sovereignty over the South China Sea, inside the 9-dash line area (Dian Anggraini et al., 2018). Indonesia active utilization of the area by local fishers sends similar intent that the renamed North Natuna Sea is legally defined on UNCLOS to be within Indonesian sovereign right to harness.

**Indonesia’s Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2017**

In 2017, TNI contributed to the implementation of coercive maritime diplomacy with the capture of illegal fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea, with KRI Wiratno-379 intercepted 2 Vietnam-flagged fishing boats. KRI Wiratno’s crews reported that when approached, the two vessels turned off their lights and Automatic Identificaiton System (AIS) and approached Wiratno in return. Within 30 meters distance, a Wiratno crew fired a warning shot into the air using Pindad SS1 assault rifle, resulting in the two Vietnam vessels to change direction and left North Natuna Sea EEZ. Vietnam stated that the confrontation was unwarranted as it happened in its territorial seas, 612ndi t resulted in 4 injured crews, 2 among them were in critical condition. Indonesia denied responsibility and noted the discrepancy between Wiratno crews’ accounts and Vietnam’s official statement (DW.com, 2017; Utama, 2017). TNI also maintained their persuasive maritime diplomacy via *Latihan Siaga Tempur Laut Koarmabar 2017* navy training in April, and TNI’s *Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat* (PPRC) joint military training in May; both strategically conducted on and around Natuna and its highly disputed waters. In *Latihan Siaga Tempur Laut Koarmabar 2017* where the theme focuses on the theme of safeguarding maritime security in the region, TNI AL highlighted 20 warships 4 aircrafts, and 1000 personnel (Mustaqim, 2017). TNI’s PPRC training were more comprehensive, involving the ground, air, and naval force of Indonesian military and their respective instruments and equipment. An undisclosed number of warships, aircraft, and ground vehicles were reportedly involved in the training (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2017).

**Table 4. Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the year 2017**

Month	Cases
March	KP Hiu Macan 01 captured 13 Vietnam-flagged vessels with 94 crew members onboard after a successful pursuit.
April	TNI AL’s <i>Latihan Siaga Tempur Laut Koarmabar 2017</i> military training involving 20 warships, 4 aircrafts, and 1000 personnel.
May	TNI’s <i>Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat</i> (PPRC) joint military training in Natuna, involving 5000 personnel.
May	KP Hiu Macan 01 intercepted 5 Vietnam-flagged ships in North Natuna Sea, Vietnamese coast guard intervened, resulting in collision.
July	Polair Polri’s patrol ship <i>Antasena 7006</i> detained 2 Malaysia-flagged vessels with 25 Vietnamese crews onboard.
July	KRI Wiratno-379 intercepted 2 Vietnam-flagged fishing vessels and fired warning shots. Vietnam stated that from the incident, 4 Vietnamese crew members was wounded, 2 among them were critical.
September	KP Orca 02 captured 2 Vietnam-flagged vessels, 29 Vietnamese crew members detained.
October	33 illegal fishing vessels sunk, directly supervised by Susi Pudsjiastuti from KP Orca 02.

Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings, 2024

Constabulary forces roles in coercive military diplomacy in the year 2017 entailed capturing illegal fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea and the sinking of the captured ships, mostly captured the years prior. Indonesian water police, Polair Polri's patrol ship Antasena 7006 captured 2 Malaysia-flagged vessels illegally fishing in North Natuna Sea. The 25 crew members of said vessels, which were of Vietnamese nationality did not have the required permits (Larno, 2017). KKP's Fishery Surveillance vessels KP Hiu Macan 01 and KP Orca 02 captured a total of 15 Vietnam-flagged vessels in North Natuna Sea. In May, KP Hiu Macan 01 encountered 5 Vietnam-flagged vessels and attempted to capture them but was hindered by a Vietnam Coast Guard vessel. The Vietnam Coast Guard made an unsafe maneuver in attempt to free the 4 fishing ships, but instead resulted in a collision between KP Hiu Macan 01 and one of the fishing vessels. 55 Vietnamese ship crews were thrown overboard, with 44 being rescued by their Coast Guard vessels and the rest detained by KP Hiu Macan 01 (Rahman, 2017). KKP also sunk 33 ships in Natuna this year, and the occasion was directly supervised by former minister Susi Pudjiastuti from aboard the KP Orca 02, which itself has frequently proven its service in capturing illegal fishing vessels, notably in North Natuna Sea (Kuwado, 2017).

### Indonesia's Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2018

In 2018, TNI conducted several more military exercises on Natuna and its surrounding waters. In May, KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata-331 engaged in naval training on the North Natuna Sea with USNS Rappahannock, which entails test firing of Martadinata's 76mm cannons and Replenishment at Sea (RAS) procedure (Sontani, 2018). The training was a part of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2018 joint military exercise involving 25 countries, some among them frequently became the country of origin for IUU fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Thailand (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 2018). This joint exercise, done collaboratively with other countries is part of Indonesia's cooperative maritime diplomacy.

Meanwhile, KRI Bung Tomo-357 was engaged in joint training with TNI AU's planes in a scenario where aerial threat trespass Natuna airspace. In the training, incoming aerial threats were detected using RADAR and neutralized using its 76 mm OSRG and 30 mm DS30B REMSIG cannons (Raditya, 2018). 2018 was also

the year when Satuan TNI Terintegrasi Natuna (Natuna Integrated TNI Unit) military base was inaugurated. This base was intended to incorporate all 3 branches of TNI; being the Army, Navy, and the Air Force; and featured facilities needed by its respective branches such as living space, hospital, port, and integrated hangar. Former TNI Commander, Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto stated that the base main purpose it to provide deterrence effect to threats in Indonesian border (N. Hermawan, 2018). These actions are the implementation of TNI's persuasive maritime diplomacy in 2018.

**Table 5. Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the year 2018**

Month	Cases
April	KP Paus 01 and KP Hiu Macan 01 captured 3 Vietnam-flagged ships and arrested 17 crews of Vietnamese nationality.
May	KRI Bung Tomo-357 training with TNI AU's aircrafts, displaying the ships RADAR capabilities in detecting and addressing aerial threats.
May	KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata-331 joint training with US's Navy's USNS Rappahannock as a part of RIMPAC 2018.
May	KP Hiu 04 captured 2 Vietnam-flagged ship, 16 Vietnamese ship crews arrested.
June	KP Hiu Macan 01, KP Paus 01, KP Orca 01 captured 10 Vietnam-flagged ships with 74 crews on board.
December	<i>Satuan TNI Terintegrasi Natuna</i> military base in Natuna was inaugurated.

Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings, 2024

Indonesian constabulary forces implementation of coercive maritime diplomacy on North Natuna Sea mostly took form in the capture of IUU fishing vessels. With the efforts of Fishery Surveillance vessels KP Paus 01, KP Hiu Macan 01, KP Hiu 04, and KP Orca 01; KKP successfully captured 15 IUU fishing vessels in North Natuna Sea and arrested 167 crew members from said ships. All ships and its crews were of Vietnam origin (Ambari, 2018)

### Indonesia's Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea 2019

The year 2019 were marked by the high involvement of Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance (VFRS) ships that escorted their fishing boats to prevent capture in North Natuna Sea. From the TNI side, KRI Bung Tomo-357 were in the process of escorting 4 Vietnam-flagged fishing vessels to Tanjung Pinang port in Riau, when 2 VFRS ships attempted a dangerous maneuver that almost resulted in collision. KRI Bung Tomo reportedly managed to repel the two VFRS ships and continued escorting the 4 Vietnam fishing boats to friendly port (Panama, 2019). Similarly, 2 months later, KRI Tjiptadi-381 were in the process of capturing a Vietnam-flagged fishing boat BD 979 when dangerous maneuver by 2 VFRS ships resulted in collision towards both

KRI Tjiptadi-381 and BD 979, the latter ultimately sunk 614uet o the damage suffered. The 12 Vietnamese crew from BD 979 were successfully arrested by KRI Tjiptadi and escorted back to TNI AL base in Ranai (Maulana & Ika, 2019). Coercive maritime diplomacy was notably employed from both Indonesia and Vietnam in this case.

**Table 6.** Maritime Diplomacy in North Natuna Sea in the year 2019

Month	Cases
February	KP Hiu Macan 01 attempted to capture 4 Vietnam-flagged vessels, but when escorting, Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance (VFRS) ship KN-241 demanded the captured fishing vessels to be released. KP Hiu Macan 01 complied.
February	KRI Bung Tomo-357 captured 4 Vietnam-flagged fishing boats. 2 VFRS ships demanded the release of the fishing boats and performed dangerous maneuver. KRI Bung Tomo, however, successfully escorted the 4 fishing boats to a friendly port.
April	KRI Tjiptadi-381 attempted to capture a Vietnam-flagged vessel BD 979, when 2 VFRS ships rammed both BD 979 and KRI Tjiptadi-381 to prevent the captured vessel being escorted back.
October	<i>Sentra Kelautan, Dan Perikanan, Terpadu</i> (SKPT) Natuna officially opened, giving better facilities for local fishers (cold storage, stockpile, export), allowing them to operate more efficiently in the region.
October	Susi oversees the sinking IUU fishing boats aboard a Fishery Surveillance vessel. 40 were sunk over the course of 2 days, 7 of them in Natuna.


Source: Author’s own compilation based on research findings, 2024

From the side of constabulary agency, KP Hiu Macan 01 encountered similar resistance with TNI side. A few days before KRI Bung-Tomo-357 incident, KP Hiu Macan is escorting the captured 4 Vietnam-flagged fishing vessels, when a VFRS ship KN-241 demanded the release of the 4 fishing vessels while sailing dangerously around KP Hiu Macan 01. KP Hiu Macan 01 and KN-241 both claimed that they are within their national waters. Due to the concern of escalating the conditions further, KP Hiu Macan 01 complied and released the 4 captured vessels (Manalu, 2019). In October, 40 ships were sunk under the supervision of KKP, 7 of them were sunk in Natuna. Former Minister Pudjiastuti herself observed the sinking from aboard a Fishery Surveillance vessel (Assifa & Ika, 2019).

From the side of civilian as an actor in persuasive maritime diplomacy, *Sentra Kelautan Dan Perikanan Terpadu* (SKPT) in Natuna officially opened. The centralized facility for fishery-related commerce allows access to better facilities for local fishers, among them are cold storage, warehouse, and export provision (Ambari, 2019b). While the opening of the structure itself is not necessarily a form of maritime diplomacy, the facility is intended to bolster local fishers access to better technologies, facilities, and services, with the intention of enabling them to operate more efficiently in the

region. Hikmahanto Juwana, international relations expert from Universitas Indonesia stated that local fishers play a major role in occupying North Natuna Sea, and any bilateral negotiations to appeal for sovereign rights over North Natuna EEZ will go to waste if Indonesian fishers scarcely utilize the area (Asmara, 2019). This concept is in line with the utilization of local fishers as an actor of persuasive maritime diplomacy.

**Figure 1.** Number of IUU fishing vessels captured by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) in 2015 – 2019



Source: Processed from GoodStats (Shafina, 2023)

All in all, referring to UNCLOS 1982, a country holds sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation of natural resources within the area of 200 nautical miles adjacent to its territorial waters, which defines a country’s EEZ. In Indonesia’s case, a part of its EEZ that is outstretched northward and around the territorial waters of Natuna overlaps with China’s claim over South China Sea (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982). Consequently, between the years of 2010-2016, many instances of Chinese fishing vessels were discovered and detained in the Natuna EEZ but were protested and demanded to be released by the government of China. While Indonesia referred to UNCLOS’ EEZ and define the act of Chinese ships fishing in said zone to be illegal, China did not acknowledge the claim and instead push the idea that the waters in question are still a part of South China Sea, and therefore it is legitimate and very well be within their rights to for a Chinese fishing vessel to be in that area (The South China Sea Arbitration, 2016). China regularly sends its coast guard ships along with its fishing vessels as a deterrent towards detainment.

In March 2016, after an incident which Chinese coast guard would ram a captured Chinese fishing vessel that was escorted by

Indonesian patrol ship. Later that year in June, KRI Imam Bonjol would try to arrest 12 Chinese fishing vessels and in the process released warning shots that wounded Chinese crews inside of one of the pursued ships. President Joko Widodo would organize a cabinet meeting aboard the same KRI Imam Bonjol, which can be interpreted to be a signal of readiness from Indonesia to maintain its sovereign rights in North Natuna waters (Sengketa Di Kawasan Laut Natuna Utara, 2020). In the following year, Indonesia released its revised national map with emphases on its maritime border with other countries. Within it, Indonesian EEZ north of Natuna Island along with the overlapping the part of the South China Sea was renamed to North Natuna Sea, which is a position taken by Indonesia to signal that it is resolute with its claims over the disputed area (Allard & Munthe, 2017). China protested the action citing that South China Sea is a name that has already been globally recognized, and renaming the waters would just exacerbate an already complex problem (Muhaimin, 2018).

## CONCLUSION

North Natuna Sea, as it was named by Indonesian government in 2017, always has been a hotbed for IUU fishing, notably from foreign vessels. Bordering with the territory of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia on the west and east respectively, Singapore also on the east, Vietnam and Cambodia on the north, and a part of it overlaps directly with China's unilateral claim of South China Sea on the northeast, the Natuna EEZ is among the farthest regions of Indonesia. Coupled with a great fishery potential and the nature of the region being a disputed territory, notably against Vietnam and China, numerous cases of IUU fishing plagued the regions over the years. The highly disputed area of North Natuna Sea, the array of IUU-fishing related problems that Indonesia faced in the region, and most importantly, the way that Indonesia address said problems by utilizing maritime diplomacy under the first term Joko Widodo (2014-2019).

Among maritime diplomacy types, coercive diplomacy proved to be the most dominant. The Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), and the Indonesian Water Police consistently enforced maritime law by seizing and, in some cases, sinking vessels found guilty of illegal fishing.

In parallel, persuasive diplomacy played a complementary role through sustained naval presence, joint military exercises, and civilian engagement that strengthened Indonesia's sovereignty claims and deterrence posture in the

North Natuna Sea. Cooperative diplomacy was also visible through Indonesia's participation in multinational maritime exercises such as MNEK 2014 and RIMPAC 2018, which enhanced regional collaboration and showcased Indonesia's maritime capabilities.

These findings contribute to the theoretical development of maritime diplomacy, particularly in illustrating how a middle power such as Indonesia integrates coercive and persuasive strategies to safeguard sovereignty while promoting regional stability. Indonesia's multidimensional approach demonstrates that maritime diplomacy can function both as a deterrence mechanism and as a cooperative instrument, especially in contested maritime zones.

From a Southeast Asian security perspective, Indonesia's experience in the North Natuna Sea highlights the complex interdependence between national maritime enforcement and regional peace. The persistence of overlapping maritime claims and the involvement of external powers, notably China, emphasize the importance of ASEAN members pursuing balanced approaches that combine national assertiveness with collective cooperation to maintain regional stability.

Within the studied IUU-related problems in North Natuna Sea, there are similarities. First, the flag of the ship does not reliably reveal the true origin of the crew members nor the operation, as cases where foreign crew members utilize ships from different countries to spoof detection from authorities. A more thorough search through the suspects ships and its crew members documentation and permits are usually the common method of detection leading to the arrest of illegal fishers, especially since Pudjiastuti's moratorium towards foreign fishing vessels was introduced in 2014, and IUU fishing-related regulations were made noticeably stricter as a result. Within these cases, the trend of illegal fishing vessels utilizing unsustainable fishing methods and instruments is also worryingly common, with ships using pair trawls being in most of the cases which has concerning lack of selective capabilities when catching fish and their damaging aspects towards coral reef. The importance of Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) capabilities are also highlighted in these cases, where many arrests are made possible due to the offending ships being detected utilizing RADAR, sonar, or other surveillance supports such as aerial reconnaissance. Supplying better information towards Indonesian patrol ships enables them to conduct operations more effectively. Foreign coast guard intervention is also a common theme

among these cases, in which Chinese coast guards and Vietnamese coast guards routinely escorts their fishing vessels, making it more difficult for Indonesian ships to make arrests. Incidents and collisions involving the coast guard ships, both intentional and otherwise, happen multiple times and usually results in bilateral tension between the two countries afterwards.

To strengthen the effectiveness of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy, several policy measures are recommended. First, enhance bilateral mechanisms with Vietnam and China to manage recurring fishing incidents and prevent escalation into diplomatic or security crises. Second, reinforce Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) systems through greater integration of technology—such as satellite-based vessel tracking, aerial surveillance, and inter-agency data sharing—to ensure timely detection and response. Third, deepen engagement within ASEAN and related regional frameworks to institutionalize cooperative maritime governance, promoting a rules-based order in the South China Sea and beyond. Strengthening these dimensions of diplomacy would reinforce Indonesia's maritime sovereignty while contributing to a more stable and cooperative maritime environment in Southeast Asia.

## REFERENCES

### Books

- Coordinating Ministry for Maritime of The Republic of Indonesia. (2012). *Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia 2012. Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia 2012*.
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. SAGE Publications.
- Le Mière, C. (2014). *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. In *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203555590>
- Santoso, S. P. (2022). *INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT STRATEGY IN REALIZING MARITIME SECURITY THROUGH POLICIES OPEN SHIP SINKING (2014-2017)*. PUSTAKA AKSARA.
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. SAGE Publications.

### Journal Articles

- Cabral, R. B., Mayorga, J., Clemence, M., Lynham, J., Koeshendrajana, S., Muawanah, U., Nugroho, D., Anna, Z., Mira, Ghofar, A., Zulfainarni, N.,

Gaines, S. D., & Costello, C. (2018). Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing. *Nature Ecology & Evolution*, 2(4), 650–658. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-018-0499-1>

- Connelly, A. L. (2016). *Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone* (p. 20). Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Dian Anggraini, S., Kusumawardhana, I., & Ramadhan, I. (2018). The Implication of Indonesia's IUU Fishing Policy in Natuna Territorial Waters toward South China Sea Geopolitics. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 7(2). <https://doi.org/10.18196/hi.72130>
- Djunarsjah, E., Kusumadewi, D., & Chairuniza, G. (2021). The effectiveness of Indonesia's fisheries policy to reduce illegal fishing. *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science*, 805(1), 012018. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/805/1/012018>
- Supriyanto, R. A. (2015). *Indonesia's Natuna Islands: Next Flashpoint in the South China Sea?* In *RSIS Commentary* (p. 3). Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
- Suryadinata, L. (2017). *What Does Indonesia's Renaming of Part of the South China Sea Signify?* Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, 64, 1–6.
- ### News articles
- Afni. (2015, November 23). *Armada Laut RI Berhasil Usir Kapal Tiongkok Dari Laut Natuna*. JawaPos. <https://www.jawapos.com/hankam/01202955/armada-laut-ri-berhasil-usir-kapal-tiongkok-dari-laut-natuna>
- Ambari, M. (2016a, June 15). *Natuna Disiapkan Jadi Pusat Pasar Ikan Terbesar di Indonesia*. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2016/07/15/natuna-disiapkan-jadi-pusat-pasar-ikan-terbesar-di-indonesia/>
- Ambari, M. (2016b, November 15). *Kapal kapal Asing Ini Kembali Ditangkap di Perairan Natuna*. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2016/11/15/kapal-kapal-asing-ini-kembali-ditangkap-di-perairan-natuna/>
- Ambari, M. (2018, May 18). *Laut Natuna Masih Disukai Kapal Asing Penangkap Ikan Ilegal. Kenapa?* Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2018/05/18/laut-natuna-masih-disukai-kapal-asing-penangkap-ikan-ilegal-kenapa/>

- Ambari, M. (2019a, March 14). Wilayah Perairan Natuna Tetap Jadi Buruan Pencurian Ikan. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2019/03/14/wilayah-perairan-natuna-tetap-jadi-buruan-pencurian-ikan/>
- Ambari, M. (2019b, October 10). SKPT Natuna, Pusat Ekonomi Baru di Ujung Utara Indonesia. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2019/10/10/skpt-natuna-pusat-ekonomi-baru-di-ujung-utara-indonesia/>
- Asmara, T. (2019, December 30). Indonesia Protes China Terkait Pelanggaran ZEE di Natuna. Benar News. <https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/indonesia-china-natuna-zee-12302019161448.html>
- Assifa, F., & Ika, A. (2019, October 7). Selama 2 Hari, Menteri Susi Tenggelamkan 40 Kapal Pencuri Ikan di Pontianak dan Natuna. Kompas. <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/10/07/17203981/selama-2-hari-menteri-susi-tenggelamkan-40-kapal-pencuri-ikan-di-pontianak>
- Bhatnagar, T. (2016, January 1). Mengapa Indonesia menambah kekuatan militer di Natuna? BBC News Indonesia. [https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2015/12/151230\\_dunia\\_indonesia\\_natuna](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2015/12/151230_dunia_indonesia_natuna)
- Budilaksono, I. (2016, March 24). Pangkalan militer di Natuna sangat penting. Antara. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/551729/pangkalan-militer-di-natuna-sangat-penting>
- Cochrane, J. (2016). China's Coast Guard Rams Fishing Boat to Free It from Indonesian Authorities. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/asia/indonesia-south-china-sea-fishing-boat.html>
- Cochrane, J. (2017, September 10). Indonesia, Long on Sidelines, Starts to Confront China's Territorial Claims. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/world/asia/indonesia-south-china-sea-military-buildup.html>
- DW.com. (2017, July 25). TNI Bantah Lukai Nelayan Vietnam. DW.Com. <https://www.dw.com/id/tni-bantah-lukai-nelayan-vietnam/a-39822034>
- Fajar, J. (2014, November 22). Pemerintah Mulai Tegas Tangkap Kapal Ilegal Fishing. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2014/11/22/pemerintah-mulai-tegas-tangkap-kapal-ilegal-fishing/>
- Fajar, J. (2016, August 20). Peringati Kemerdekaan, Indonesia Tenggelamkan 60 Kapal Pencuri Ikan. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2016/08/20/peringati-kemerdekaan-indonesia-tenggelamkan-60-kapal-pencuri-ikan/>
- Fitra, S. (2016, June 29). Jokowi: Potensi Perikanan di Natuna Hanya Mampu Tergarap 8,9 Persen. Katadata. <https://katadata.co.id/berita/industri/5e9a56ca393da/jokowi-potensi-perikanan-di-natuna-hanya-mampu-tergarap-89-persen>
- Gumilang, P. (2016, June 21). Kapal Pengawas China Sempat Bayangi KRI Imam Bonjol di Natuna. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160621133353-20-139775/kapal-pengawas-china-sempat-bayangi-kri-imam-bonjol-di-natuna>
- Hermawan, M. (2020). Perkuat Pemberantasan IUU Fishing Dan Kejahatan Transnasional Terorganisir, KKP Tawarkan 3 Langkah Solusi. Kementerian Kelautan Dan Perikanan Republik Indonesia. <https://kkp.go.id/artikel/17443-perkuat-pemberantasan-iuu-fishing-dan-kejahatan-transnasional-terorganisir-kkp-tawarkan-3-langkah-solusi>
- Hermawan, N. (2018, December 19). Panglima TNI Resmikan Satuan TNI Terintegrasi Natuna. TNI Angkatan Darat. <https://tniad.mil.id/panglima-tni-resmikan-satuan-tni-terintegrasi-natuna/>
- Idris, M. (2020). Selama Jadi Menteri, Berapa Kapal China Ditenggelamkan Susi? Kompas. <https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/01/06/160600226/selama-jadi-menteri-berapa-kapal-china-ditenggelamkan-susi?page=all>
- Kuwado, F. J. (2017, October 29). Susi Pudjiastuti Tenggelamkan 33 Kapal Asing di Natuna. Kompas. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/29/17545801/susi-pudjiastuti-tenggelamkan-33-kapal-asing-di-natuna?page=all>
- Larno. (2014a, March 29). Latihan Bersama Komodo 2014 resmi dibuka. Antara. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/426696/latihan-bersama-komodo-2014-resmi-dibuka>
- Larno. (2014b, November 3). Bakorkamla amankan kapal pencuri ikan Laut Natuna. Antara. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/462>

- 237/bakorkamla-amankan-kapal-pencuri-ikan-laut-natuna
- Larno. (2017, July 5). Polair Polri Tangkap Dua Kapal Berbendera Malaysia di Perairan Natuna. Antara Babel. <https://babel.antaranews.com/berita/60804/polair-polri-tangkap-dua-kapal-berbendera-malaysia-di-perairan-natuna>
- Manalu, J. E. R. (2019, February 21). Kejar Kapal Asing, Hiu Macan 01 Diintimidasi Kapal Pengawas Vietnam. Bisnis.Com. <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20190221/99/891837/kejar-kapal-asing-hiu-macan-01-diintimidasi-kapal-pengawas-vietnam>
- Maulana, H., & Ika, A. (2019, April 29). 2 Kapal Pemerintah Vietnam Tabrak KRI Tjiptadi-381 yang Sedang Patroli. Kompas. <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/29/08345151/2-kapal-pemerintah-vietnam-tabrak-kri-tjiptadi-381-yang-sedang-patroli>
- Munthe, J. (2015, July 31). Curi Ikan, Empat Kapal Nelayan Vietnam Ditangkap. Sindonews. <https://daerah.sindonews.com/berita/1028105/174/curi-ikan-empat-kapal-nelayan-vietnam-ditangkap>
- Mustaqim, A. (2017, April 25). TNI AL Gelar Latihan Siaga Tempur di Laut Natuna. detikNews. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3483019/tni-al-gelar-latihan-siaga-tempur-di-laut-natuna>
- Pahlevi, A. (2015a, July 3). Ditangkap! Dua Kapal Vietnam Berbendera Indonesia yang Asik Mencuri Ikan di Perairan Natuna. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2015/07/03/ditangkap-dua-kapal-vietnam-berbendera-indonesia-yang-asik-mencuri-ikan-di-perairan-natuna/>
- Pahlevi, A. (2015b, October 20). Penenggelaman Kapal Asing, Bukti Indonesia Serius Perangi Illegal Fishing. Mongabay. <https://www.mongabay.co.id/2015/10/20/penenggelaman-kapal-asing-bukti-indonesia-serius-perangi-illegal-fishing/>
- Panama, N. (2019, February 25). KRI Bung Tomo-357 tangkap empat kapal Vietnam. Antara. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/802507/kri-bung-tomo-357-tangkap-empat-kapal-vietnam>
- Parameswaran, P. (2016). China's Maritime Confrontation With Indonesia Is Not New. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-maritime-confrontation-with-indonesia-is-nothing-new/>
- Priatmojo, D., & Dono, D. (2016, October 21). Belasan Tank Leopard Dikirim ke Natuna. VIVA.Co.Id. <https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/837610-belasan-tank-leopard-dikirim-ke-natuna>
- Raditya, R. (2018, May 7). KRI TOM – Pesawat Tempur TNI AU Latihan di Natuna. KRI TOM – Pesawat Tempur TNI AU Latihan Di Natuna. <https://militer.or.id/10034/kri-tom-pesawat-tempur-tni-au-latihan-di-natuna/>
- Rahman, M. R. (2017, May 23). Indonesia Vietnam selesaikan insiden Natuna secara diplomatik. Antara. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/630925/indonesia-vietnam-selesaikan-insiden-natuna-secara-diplomatik>
- Santoso, A. (2015, July 13). TNI AL Tangkap Kapal Vietnam di Laut Natuna Kepri. Liputan 6. <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2272269/tni-al-tangkap-kapal-vietnam-di-laut-natuna-kepri?page=4>
- Saputro, A. (2015, August 25). Cegah Gangguan di Perairan, TNI AL dan AU Latihan Perang di Natuna. detikNews. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3000981/cegah-gangguan-di-perairan-tni-al-dan-au-latihan-perang-di-natuna>
- Sari, E. V. (2015, February 9). Menteri Susi Tugasi 7 Armada Laut Tenggelamkan 1 Kapal Asing. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20150209124256-92-30642/menteri-susi-tugasi-7-armada-laut-tenggelamkan-1-kapal-asing>
- Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. (2017, May 19). Saksikan Latgab PPRC, Presiden Jokowi: TNI Sangat Siap Mempertahankan NKRI. Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. <https://setkab.go.id/saksikan-latgab-pprc-presiden-jokowi-tni-sangat-siap-mempertahankan-nkri/>
- Septiari, D. (2019). Indonesia, Vietnam speed up EEZ delimitation. The Jakarta Post. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2019/06/24/indonesia-vietnam-speed-up-eez-delimitation.html>
- Siahaan, M. T. A. (2016, June 23). Tiba di Natuna, Jokowi gelar rapat di KRI yang tembak kapal Cina. BBC News Indonesia. [https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita\\_i](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_i)

- ndonesia/2016/06/160623\_indonesia\_jo  
kowi\_natuna
- Siregar, K. (2020). Indonesia deploys 4 additional warships to Natuna amid standoff with Chinese vessels. Channel News Asia. <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-china-natuna-islands-dispute-south-china-sea-12237456>
- Sontani, R. (2018, May 23). KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata Lakukan Latihan Tempur dengan Kapal AS di Laut Natuna Utara. Airspace Review: Aviation and Defense. <https://www.airspace-review.com/2018/05/23/kri-raden-eddy-martadinata-lakukan-latihan-tempur-dengan-kapal-as-di-laut-natuna-utara/>
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. (2018, August 3). Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2018 Concludes. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. [https://www-pacom-mil.translate.google/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1593407/exercise-rim-of-the-pacific-2018-concludes/?\\_x\\_tr\\_sl=en&\\_x\\_tr\\_tl=id&\\_x\\_tr\\_hl=id&\\_x\\_tr\\_pto=tc](https://www-pacom-mil.translate.google/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1593407/exercise-rim-of-the-pacific-2018-concludes/?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=id&_x_tr_hl=id&_x_tr_pto=tc)
- Utama, A. (2017, July 25). Indonesia bantah tembak kapal Vietnam di Laut Cina Selatan. BBC News Indonesia. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40714995>
- Wijaya, C., & Marta, D. (2019). Menteri Susi kembali tenggelamkan kapal: “Ini way out yang sangat cantik untuk bangsa kita, menakutkan untuk bangsa lainnya.” BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48131222>