

DYNASTY POLITICS IN BALI : IMPACTS ON THE 2024 LOCAL ELECTION

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ABSTRACT

Dynastic politics is a common phenomenon during general elections, both at the central and regional levels. This dynastic political pattern can be found in the selection of legislative candidates (caleg) and executive candidates (regional heads) which are colored by family relationships, such as parent-child, in-law-son-in-law, husband-wife. This study aims to capture the dynastic political pattern that occurs in Bali, including the unique ways in which it maintains its dominance, as well as the implications of dynastic politics on the quality of local democracy. The research method used is library research as the primary technique in data collection and analysis. Data sources in this study include two main categories: first, scientific journals or books, that discuss the phenomenon of dynastic politics empirically and theoretically according to different local contexts. Second, media content analysis by examining the monitoring of election results by independent institutions and socio-political narratives developing within the community. The research findings indicate that the survival of dynastic politics in Bali is determined not only by political party networks, but also by strong political networks based on customs and culture. These traditional political networks provide parties with the option to maintain or reverse dynastic politics. Negative implications include a thriving political oligarchy, hampered leadership regeneration, and decreased leadership accountability. Potential positive implications include the ability of the authorities to maintain political stability (support) and the assurance of the continuity of previous government programs.

Keywords: dynastic politics; regional head elections; local democracy; patronage politics; Bali 2024 election

POLITIK DINASTI DI BALI: DAMPAKNYA PADA PEMILU LOKAL 2024

ABSTRAK

Politik dinasti menjadi fenomena yang umum terjadi saat pemilihan umum (pemilu), baik ditingkat pusat maupun daerah. Pola politik dinasti ini dapat ditemukan pemilihan calon legislatif (caleg), calon eksekutif (kepala daerah) yang diwarnai oleh hubungan keluarga, seperti orangtua-anak, mertua-menantu, suami-istri. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memotret pola politik dinasti yang terjadi di Bali termasuk keunikan dalam mempertahankan dominasinya, serta implikasi politik dinasti terhadap kualitas demokrasi lokal. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode studi literatur (library research) sebagai teknik utama dalam pengumpulan dan analisis data. Sumber data dalam penelitian ini mencakup dua kategori utama, yaitu pertama jurnal ilmiah ataupun buku yang membahas fenomena politik dinasti secara empiris dan teoritis sesuai konteks lokal yang berbeda-beda. Kedua, analisis konten media dengan melihat pemantauan hasil pemilu dari lembaga independen maupun narasi sosial politik yang berkembang ditengah masyarakat. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keberlanjutan politik dinasti di Bali tidak hanya ditentukan oleh jaringan partai politik, namun juga jaringan politik berbasis adat dan budaya yang kuat. Jaringan politik tradisional inilah yang akan memberikan opsi kepada partai untuk mempertahankan politik dinasti atau sebaliknya. Implikasi negatif yang akan muncul adalah oligarki politik yang tumbuh subur, regenerasi kepemimpinan terhambat, dan akuntabilitas kepemimpinan menurun. Implikasi positif yang mungkin muncul adalah kemampuan penguasa menjaga stabilitas politik (dukungan) dengan baik, serta jaminan untuk menjalankan program pemerintah sebelumnya secara berkelanjutan (berkesinambungan).

Kata kunci: dinasti politik; pemilihan kepala daerah; demokrasi lokal; politik patronase; pemilu Bali 2024

INTRODUCTION

Post New Order Indonesia experienced a significant political transition, shifting from an authoritarian system of government to a democratic one. This political transition transformed Indonesia's political system from a centralized one to a decentralized one. This decentralized system provided greater space for regional governments and their communities to optimally explore regional potential and improve the welfare of their communities.

The political system adopted by Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto's leadership was characterized by democracy, with leaders being elected through an election process. However, in reality, the pattern of leadership succession tended toward dynastic politics. The political freedom afforded by democratic systems has led to a concentration of power among specific elites. In this context, dynastic politics is understood as a manifestation of political oligarchy, wherein power is concentrated and reproduced within family circles through democratic processes.

In this study, political dynasties are not understood as a form of leadership succession based on lineage within a monarchical system. According to Mosca in (Dona, 2022) political dynasties emerge because power tends to be passed down to succeeding generations. Besides tha the family's prominent name plays a significant role in the dynasty's continued existence (Dona, 2022). A concrete example of dynastic politics is found in the case of Bill and Hillary Clinton, where Hillary Clinton's political career and activities were significantly shaped by the prominent name of her husband, Bill Clinton. Similarly, in Bali, the prominent name of Giri Prasta, who has served as the Regent of Badung, currently holds the position of Deputy Governor of Bali, and is a cadre of the PDI-P party have paved the way for his son and daughter to enter the realm of local politics in Bali.

The phenomenon of dynastic politics has become a national issue in legislative and executive elections, both at the central and regional levels.

According to data from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), of the 37 provinces in Indonesia that held regional elections, 33 provinces had strong dynastic political patterns (Ardhya & Renaldi, 2024). In the DPR election, one family clan, husband, wife, and children, is widely represented in the 2024 election.

Some names include Ahmad Heryawan and Netty Prasetiyani from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Sugeng Suparwoto and Amelia Anggraini from the Nasdem Party, Taufiq Abdullah and Ida Fauziyah from the National Awakening Party (PKB), Uya Kuya and Astrid from the PAN Party, and several other pairs. Meanwhile, according to data from the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), of the 582 regional head candidates, 26.6%, or 155, share family affiliations, with 100 candidates for regional head and 55 for deputy regional head across all provinces in Indonesia (Kresna, 2024). The following is a display of ICW data on the distribution of dynastic politics in Indonesia.




Figure 1. Distribution of Dynastic Politics in Indonesia

Source: Secondary data from Indonesia Corruption Watch, adapted by (Kresna, 2024)

From the picture it can be explained that the dynastic political pattern built in Indonesia has a parent-child kinship pattern of 70 candidates, husband-wife 39 candidates, siblings 34 candidates, siblings (nephews, cousins, in-laws) 8 candidates, and in-laws-sons-in-law 4 candidates, where the distribution of these candidates is dominated by West Nusa Tenggara (11 candidates), Southeast Sulawesi (11 candidates), South Sulawesi (10 candidates), West Sulawesi (9 candidates), and North Sulawesi (7 candidates). The rampant practice of dynastic politics in Indonesia certainly threatens the quality of

Indonesian democracy, where the pattern of leadership succession has several negative impacts.

According to Zulkieflimansyah in (Rahma et al., 2022) the negative impacts of dynastic politics (1) political parties will only become political machines which ultimately clog the ideal function of the party, so that the target is none other than power (2) the closure of opportunities for people who have the potential for reliable and qualified cadres (3) it is difficult to realize the ideals of democracy because clean and good governance is not created).

The pattern of dynastic politics is also found in Bali Province, where this region has unique local political characteristics stemming from the power of custom, ethnicity, and family patronage. The phenomenon of the emergence of elite political families running for office in the 2024 regional elections in Bali illustrates the continued continuity of the dynastic political pattern in Bali. In the 2024 election, 69 legislative candidates for Bali Province had family ties to public officials (Prasetya et al., 2024).

Some names such as Inda Swari Dewi, the wife of Jembrana Deputy Regent I Gede Ngurah Patriana Krisna (Ipat), are running as candidates for the Bali Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Inda Swari Dewi herself is the daughter-in-law of I Gede Winasa, the former Regent of Jembrana, and Patriana Krisna (Ipat) is his son. Furthermore, Ni Made Usmantari, the wife of I Made Urip, a former five-term member of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI), is also nominated to run for the Bali DPRD. Several names such as Bima Nata, who is the son of the Deputy Governor of Bali, are also running for the Badung DPRD, and I Gusti Ngurah Gede Marhaendra Jaya, who is the younger brother of the Mayor of Denpasar, IGN Jayanegara, is also running as a legislative candidate for the Bali DPRD for the Denpasar electoral district.

This study argues that dynastic politics has created a paradox in democracy. Despite the electoral mechanism, power remains concentrated in the hands of certain elites. This situation undoubtedly threatens the future of local democracy in Bali. The principles of openness, leadership regeneration, and healthy political competition will be hampered by the oligarchic practices of dynastic politics. The 2024 elections are a crucial moment to evaluate the extent to which dynastic politics affects the quality of local democracy in Bali.

Data shows that kinship relationships such as husband-wife, parent-child, sibling-sibling, and in-law-son-in-law still dominate leadership succession in the 2024 Bali regional elections, both legislative and executive. Continued dynastic politics poses a serious threat to the future of democracy. Leadership succession that is not based on a meritocratic system will hinder a nation's progress. Political dynasties are a problem, the main problem being that they are not built on competence and ability (Qondas & Sutopo, 2024).

The rampant dynastic politics in Bali also reflects weak regulations and public oversight. The Election Law does not explicitly address restrictions on dynastic politics, only establishing admin-

istrative requirements. Furthermore, weak political literacy within the community and a lack of social control have allowed dynastic politics to flourish. Furthermore, dynastic political patterns in Bali are influenced by cultural and symbolic factors of power, which are not found in dynastic political patterns in other regions or countries around the world. In the Balinese context, the power system is still influenced by social status, noble descent, and position within customary structures. This serves as a cultural legitimacy for patterns of leadership succession and the inheritance of power, which differ from the principles of modern democracy.

As an important reference for deepening the study of dynastic politics in Bali, it is certainly necessary to refer to several previous studies, which explore the same theme, namely dynastic politics. Research by Hagi Hutomo Mukti and Rodiyah entitled "Dynasty Politics In Indonesia: Tradition Or Democracy?" explains the important role of political parties and election laws in perpetuating the pattern of dynastic politics, where party elites play a role in determining candidates within their parties, and at the same time the development of political networks continues to be strengthened by the political dynasty pattern (Mukti & Rodiyah, 2020).

Furthermore, research by Zaldi Rusnaedy, Fatma, Almuhammad Haris entitled "Political Dynasty and Single Candidate in Indonesian Local Elections: Where Are The Parties?" confirms that the pattern of political dynasty that develops within political parties is indeed supported by the political party's own pragmatic policies, which aim to minimize internal party conflict (Rusnaedy et al., 2021). Research by Jon H. Fiva and Daniel M. Smith entitled "Political Dynasties and the Incumbency" explains that politicians who form political dynasties essentially benefit during their tenure within the party (party-centered), which includes the internal recruitment process and structural support from the party itself (FIVA & SMITH, 2018).

The three previous studies have a common thread, namely showing how important modern political networks, namely political parties, are in facilitating the survival of dynastic politics. Meanwhile, this study takes a different position, emphasizing the importance of traditional political networks such as genealogical relationships, cultural and customary ties, and symbolic roles in the traditional social structure of Balinese society. The focus of this study is to explain how dynastic politics manifests in Bali in the 2024 elections and what implications these dynastic political patterns have for the quality of local democracy in Bali.

METHOD

The research methodology employed in this study comprises several stages: first, the process of locating relevant sources (including books, journals, and pertinent media); second, establishing criteria for source selection, which involves assessing the credibility and relevance of the materials; third, comparing the gathered literature and synthesizing the research to identify emerging patterns; and fourth, drawing conclusions based on the synthesis of all the articles utilized.

This study is a qualitative study using library research as the primary data collection and analysis technique. This approach allows for a more in-depth exploration of other references regarding the phenomenon of dynastic politics in the context of local democracy, particularly by focusing on the relationship between local/traditional political networks and the sustainability of a political dynasty's power. The data sources in this study include two main categories: first, scientific journals or books that discuss the phenomenon of dynastic politics empirically and theoretically according to different local contexts. Second, media content analysis, examining the monitoring of election results by independent institutions and socio-political narratives developing within the community.

The data analysis technique was conducted thematically and interpretively by analyzing the patterns of the secondary data used. Thematic analysis is done by grouping the main issues regarding dynastic politics, such as the relationship between political elites, political parties, and the social structure of Balinese society. And the interpretive approach is to understand the meaning of all dynastic political practices, and how political parties and local networks affect the quality of local democracy in Bali.

Through these two approaches, this study attempts to theoretically and critically construct the future of dynastic politics in Bali, as well as offer new knowledge about the characteristics of dynastic politics that can not only be explained through formal institutions/organizations alone

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Concept of Dynastic Politics

The concept of dynastic politics refers to a situation where power is dominated by a handful of individuals with family ties. According to Aspinall & As'ad as cited in (Akbar et al., 2024), the dynasty system is a political phenomenon in which the can-

didates who take part in political contests come from the family that is currently in power in the government. Dynastic politics is also defined as a situation where family ties or blood ties to previous officials provide an advantage to those seeking political office (Ishibashi & Reed, 1992, p. 369).

As is the case in Japan, leadership succession through dynastic politics is also evident in parliamentary elections (the Diet). According to Michihiro Ishibashi and Steven R. Reed, second-generation parliamentary candidates inherit their father's ties and have an advantage in being nominated by party members. Their father's friends, who occupy hierarchical positions, tend to favor second-generation sons because they inherit their father's wealth (Ishibashi & Reed, 1992, p. 369). In some cases, dynastic politics is built on modern power networks such as political parties, as well as power networks based on social and cultural ties.

Even in several countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore, public officials, both current and retired, are part of dynastic politics. Family networks are also said to play a significant role in the power systems of these countries (Purdey, 2016). The implications of dynastic politics are complex, as they ensure continuity of government, and candidates tend to be easily recognized due to their affiliation with previous officials. However, dynastic politics also risks undermining the meritocratic system, perpetuating political oligarchies and reducing the quality of democracy. This will undoubtedly impact the consolidation of local democracy, where political competition is not open to fair competition.

Local Democracy

The concept of local democracy is actually similar to democracy in general, in that democratic life requires that the succession of public office leadership must be through general elections (elections), and that power itself must be able to provide competent candidates with the opportunity to compete honestly and transparently (Sisk et al., 2002). In a democratic system, there are so-called opposition and minority groups. Opposition groups themselves can be political parties or community groups that function to monitor, criticize, and participate in overseeing government policies (Nasution, 2013). Minority groups must also be guaranteed representation of their aspirations in government decision-making. Minority groups have the right to participate and be represented in the political process, and this right is protected under international law (Sisk et al., 2002).

According to (Sisk et al., 2002), there are several core concepts of local democracy, namely:

- a. Citizenship and Society. Community participation is the main foundation of the concept of citizenship, where community institutions and their decision-making processes enable the practice of direct democracy (Sisk et al., 2002).
- b. Deliberation. This concept of deliberation emphasizes that democracy is not only understood as an election process, but also involves discussion, dialogue, and debate, aimed at finding solutions to problems within society (Sisk et al., 2002).
- c. Political education. Public participation is necessary to provide information on all issues within society, which creates a space for the public to understand the real issues, not just government officials. This will narrow the gap between political elites and the public (Sisk et al., 2002).
- d. Good governance and social welfare. This concept stems from the thinking of John Stuart Mill, who stated that participatory democracy, reflecting the wisdom and intelligence of the people, will create good governance and social welfare (Sisk et al., 2002).

Dynastic politics is also defined as politics that is controlled by a regime that is carried out in rotation from family members and lasts for several generations (Permana, 2023). Leadership succession in a dynasty system is achieved through family affiliation, such as a politician's child, wife, daughter-in-law, sibling, and other forms of family ties. This dynasty system also serves as a safeguard against politicians' loyalists who want to avoid losing their votes in their area. Therefore, to secure votes, family members are involved in politics. However, the success and stability of a dynasty system is greatly influenced by the family's ability to systematically manage the power of loyalists (Rusdin et al., 2025). The survival of dynastic politics is also influenced by ownership of capital, economics, politics, culture, social and symbolic power, where candidates who do not come from the dynastic system are unable to compete (Rusnaedy et al., 2021).

The emergence of political dynasties in Indonesia's political system poses challenges to the ongoing democratic process. The democratic process, which demands transparency, fairness, and equal opportunity for all competent candidates, is hampered by the practice of family political dominance. Family dominance in Indonesia's political system

hinders opportunities for candidates and cadres seeking political office.

The process of selecting candidates for elections is ultimately a mere formality, with the reality determined by family affiliation. In some cases, at both the central and regional levels, leadership changes through dynastic systems are intended to maintain power and votes in regions where a politician routinely wins. Efforts to maintain the legitimacy of votes in a region provide a strong foundation for politicians seeking other public office. Maintaining this dominance also requires sound management skills, particularly in managing public aspirations. Elected politicians will prioritize assistance to regions that have significantly contributed to their electoral success.

Portrait of Dynasty Politics in Bali in the 2024 Election

The phenomenon of dynasty politics in the 2024 election in Bali Province can be found in several executive and legislative candidacies. Several candidates running have blood/family ties to former public officials, whether through parent-child, sibling-sibling, or in-law-in-law. Examples include legislative candidate Inda Swari Dewi, wife of I Gede Ngurah Patriana Krisna, the Deputy Regent of Jembrana for the 2021-2024 period, and daughter-in-law of former Jembrana Regent I Gede Winasa from 2000-2005, who is running on the Golkar Party's ticket.

Furthermore, Anak Agung Istri Paramita Dewi, running for the Bali Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) from the Denpasar City electoral district, is the daughter of I Gusti Agung Rai Wirajaya, a member of Commission XI of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Then, the legislative candidate for the Bali DPRD from the Tabanan Regency electoral district, Ni Made Usmantari, is the wife of I Made Urip, a member of Commission IV of the Indonesian House of Representatives.

In addition, there is also the name I Gusti Ngurah Marhaendra who is running as a legislative candidate for the Bali Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) from the Denpasar City electoral district, who is the younger brother of Denpasar Mayor IGN Jaya Negara. The Denpasar Mayor is the younger brother of the Minister of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Bintang Puspayoga, who is also the brother-in-law of the former Minister of Cooperatives and MSMEs, former Deputy Governor of Bali, and former

Mayor of Denpasar, Anak Agung Ngurah Puspayoga. Several other names with the same family affiliation are still widely found in the 2024 election stage in Bali Province.

The following image shows several political parties that are supporting family in the 2024 election.




Figure 2. Political Parties Nominating Families for the 2024 Election in Buleleng Regency
Source: Secondary data from RadarBuleleng.id adapted by (Prasetya et al., 2024)

Based on the image above, it can be seen that there are 7 political parties that nominate family members in legislative candidacies. Dynastic politics in legislative institutions is often a way for political parties to gain support. This is because previous officials, whether fathers, brothers, or husbands of prospective candidates who are running, already have previous political capital, such as strong political networks (masses), and during the election moment, these political capital can be used again to gain votes.

In detail, the image shows that the PDI-P Perjuangan Party nominated 28 people, the Golkar Party 16 people, the Democratic Party 7 people, the Gerindra Party 6 people, the Nasdem Party 3 people, the Hanura Party 3 people, and the PKB 3 people, where all the candidates nominated by these parties have family ties (Prasetya et al., 2024). In addition to legislative nominations, dynastic politics can also be found in executive elections (regional heads), for example, the Regent of Tabanan for the 2010-2015 and 2016-2021 periods, Ni Putu Eka Wiryastuti, is the biological daughter of I Nyoman Adi Wiryatama, the Chairman of the Bali Regional People's Representative Council.

There are several reasons that cause political parties to maintain dynastic politics in leadership

succession, both legislative and regional elections, namely (1) political parties still want to maintain patron-client relationships from loyalists of previous regents/mayors (2) political parties try to fulfill the quota of women's representation of 30% as mandated by Election Law No. 7 of 2017 (3) political parties state that the children/wives/relatives of the regents/mayors who are running as legislative candidates are indeed driven by their conscience to serve the community (Wijaya, 2024). These various reasons for political parties are the main basis for understanding how the culture of dynastic politics in successful leadership in the election arena continues to persist.

Dynastic politics is also practiced as a way to mask leadership weaknesses (Dedi, 2022). Leadership succession is carried out through family affiliations to prevent the leader's shortcomings during his or her tenure from being exposed to the public (Dedi, 2022). This is often organized by certain groups through a process of consensus in appointing a successor (Dedi, 2022). This practice often occurs to protect the image of politicians and political parties. Not everyone is fully aware of their leaders' track records while holding public office. This is precisely what politicians attempt to conceal

and avoid by recruiting family members to secure victory in the next election.

The persistence of dynastic politics in Bali is strongly influenced by the patronage networks established by previous regional leaders. Patronage networks based on customs and culture often play a key role, in addition to relying on modern political networks through party machinery. For example, Giri Prasta strengthened his connections with traditional leaders, stating that he would increase their allowances in Badung Regency (Askara, 2024). He also strengthened his political networks with local Balinese organizations such as the Bali Angungah Shanti Alliance, Tanem Tuwuh Bali, and Pasikian Yowana Bali (Putra, 2025). The example of Giri Prasta illustrates the significant role played by customary and cultural networks. The political capital Giri Prasta derived from his prominent reputation and political network was further bolstered by this customary and cultural support, with traditional leaders playing a part in sustaining the dynastic system.

These established political networks based on customs and culture ultimately created a sustainable pattern of patronage that could be used to garner political support for his family. Patronage politics, which involves the use of power or position to influence political support, and political practices involving money that benefit particular interest groups, significantly impact the democratic process (Saragih et al., 2024). This strengthening of traditional political networks based on customs and culture is a unique feature of Bali's electoral contests, not found in other regions. It is even noted that local politics in Bali is closely linked to traditional values, which serve as a determining factor in winning over voters (Prayogo et al., 2024).

The stability of dynastic politics is also supported by the strong influence of political parties. Political party oligarchies make the nomination process and the political status of these candidates less than ideal (Arifin, 2025, p. 32). Political parties tend to take shortcuts by nominating candidates with family affiliations with the incumbent government, with the goal of securing votes through undemocratic leadership regeneration.

Furthermore, capital factors also influence the durability of these dynasties. In some cases, dynastic candidates are astutely nominated and capable of carrying out the party's mandate. However, sometimes, figures are nominated solely to secure their own votes in the region, and these candidates ultimately lack the capabilities or even full autonomy to represent the people in the region. This ultimately

makes the quality of democracy in the regions illusory.

The regional autonomy implemented in Indonesia since the reform era has also triggered the emergence of political dynasties. Regional autonomy has led to the emergence of petty kings in the regions who, using whatever means they have, control and dominate the local political landscape.

This clearly contradicts the principles of fair democracy. The negative implications of the regional autonomy system associated with dynastic politics include stagnant leadership, corruption, and clientelistic capitalism (Dona, 2022, p. 125). This will re-emerge the phenomenon of patronage-clientism, where party elites, acting as patrons, seek to maintain loyalty with the community, acting as clients, through various forms of material assistance, which leads to the community's continued hope and dependence on such assistance.

Dynastic Politics and the Challenges of Local Democracy

The practice of dynastic politics that is still rampant at the regional level, both for legislative and executive elections, certainly has implications for the quality of democracy. Some negative implications arising from this dynastic political practice are (1) the flourishing of political oligarchy at the regional level. A system of power that is only monopolized by certain groups will lead to the practice of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). According to (Rohmah et al., 2024) the practice of oligarchy and dynastic politics will lead to corrupt practices. Some say that corrupt practices can occur due to uncontrolled power.

Corrupt practices certainly contradict the principles of local democracy, namely good governance and social welfare. Regional development programs are highly determined by the quality of leaders. If the leader is corrupt, of course development and the standard of living of the community are difficult to improve. So the democracy that tends to occur is only a pseudo democracy, and is only procedural and not substantial.

Another negative implication is that (2) the regeneration of quality leadership will be hampered. Dynastic politics will certainly close opportunities for cadres with quality resources. Quality cadres are certainly essential in the political process, because they are the ones who will lead, plan regional development programs, and implement policies that can ensure that all community groups receive fair treatment. Dynastic politics is also seen as having a negative impact on the democratic system and the wel-

fare of a society, which as a result reduces the quality of democracy, increases social inequality, and hinders leadership regeneration (Qondas & Sutopo, 2024, p. 30) Meritocratic-based leadership succession is difficult to develop amidst such a strong dynastic political pattern.

And another negative implication is (3) accountability will decline because the rulers see themselves as difficult to replace. The principle of accountability is an important thing that must be maintained in governance. The principle of accountability is also referred to as one of the main elements in realizing good governance which is currently being pursued by Indonesia (Sadjiarto, 2000). Good governance certainly requires transparency in the working mechanisms of its leaders, including the succession of a country's leadership.

In addition, dynastic politics will give rise to the phenomenon of opportunities in politics becoming exclusive, a strong oligarchy of power, so that opportunities for competent candidates who do not come from dynasties will be ignored (Arifin, 2025, p. 639). A strong political dynasty system will create unhealthy competition within politics itself. Candidates who actually possess the competence and opportunity to run in elections will face obstacles due to strong family dominance. If a candidate from a dynasty possesses strong political skills, he or she will certainly be able to accommodate the people's voice.

However, if a candidate from a dynasty is unprepared and unable to carry out their political mandate, dissatisfaction will arise, and regional development programs may be hindered. Therefore, a balance is needed: strong symbolic capital and high-quality human resources. Without these two balances, the quality of democracy at the local level will be merely ceremonial. The phenomenon of political dynasties is also considered to tarnish the image of Indonesian democracy due to the weakness and loss of the checks and balances system (Re-manu et al., 2025, p. 3).

If the leadership succession system is closed, does not open competition with other competent candidates/cadres, it means that the country has not adopted the principles of openness, justice that synergize with the spirit of democracy. This is what makes it difficult for a country or region to accept change, due to a comfort zone that does not necessarily have a positive impact on regional development. In some literature it is also mentioned that the negative consequences that arise from the practice of dynastic politics are the emergence of practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism, of which

20% of these dynastic political practices can hinder the progress of a region (Muksin et al., 2025).

While positive implications of dynastic politics can exist, they are rare. A potential positive implication of dynastic politics is the emergence of political stability, as the incumbent leader is able to effectively maintain broad support. This ability to maintain political stability is significantly influenced by the leader's performance during office. If their performance is good, the public will automatically trust them and continue to elect them. Another potential positive implication is that dynastic politics can ensure the continuity of previous development programs, meaning that previous government programs are continued even if the leader changes over time. These two positive possibilities could be logical reasons why dynastic politics is not problematic, provided that community aspirations and existing programs are continued, or even enhanced, for the benefit of the community.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical implications of this study suggest that the discussion of political dynasties should not focus solely on the weaknesses of democracy and political parties. Rather, it highlights a mechanism through which formal institutions (political parties) and informal institutions (customary and cultural networks) converge to ensure the perpetuation of dynastic power.

The rampant dynastic politics in Bali certainly presents its own challenges to the process of living a democratic life. The persistence of dynastic politics in Bali is not solely supported by modern political networks emanating from political parties. Political parties still play a crucial role as political machines and as a medium for negotiation between candidates and party leaders. However, in Bali, dynastic politics is also sustained by the skill of ruling officials in building traditional political networks based on custom and culture. These customary and cultural political networks are the primary means by which ruling officials can leverage their families to run in elections. This political modality ultimately serves as an important reminder for political parties to continue providing opportunities for dynastic politics.

There are several potential negative and positive implications of a power system based on dynastic politics. The negative implications certainly foster political oligarchy in the regions, hinder leadership regeneration, and diminish the accountability of rulers to a sense of irreplaceability. Meanwhile, a potential positive implication is political

stability, driven by the rulers' ability to maintain broad support and a commitment to continuing previous development programs, even across different periods.

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