

RUSSIA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: AFTERMATH CONSEQUENCES OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

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ABSTRACT. This research examines the Russia-China alliance after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, which impacted the world and led to polarity in international politics. The United States and its western allies have tried to weaken Russia's dominance economically and politically. At the same time, China has supported and strengthened cooperation with Russia. This study uses a qualitative method by analyzing and critically reading the data collected through literature study. The result found that the expansion of NATO membership triggers Russia to act because of external threats. The West agreed to embargoes and sanctions against Russia, affecting 90% of Russian oil and gas markets. However, Russia showed its strength and warned of nuclear threats. This study also contends that amid the US pressure that caused Russia to lose its Western buyers, China backed Russia and became its potential oil buyer. The US pressure on Russia has brought Russia-China even closer.

Keywords: China; Crisis; Russia; Partnership; Sanction; Ukraine War

KEMITRAAN RUSIA-CINA: KONSEKUENSI SETELAH KRISIS UKRAINA

ABSTRAK. Penelitian ini mengkaji aliansi Rusia-Cina setelah Rusia menginvasi Ukraina pada Februari 2022, yang berdampak pada dunia dan menyebabkan polaritas dalam politik internasional. Amerika Serikat dan sekutu baratnya telah mencoba melemahkan dominasi Rusia secara ekonomi dan politik. Pada saat yang sama, Cina telah mendukung dan memperkuat kerja sama dengan Rusia. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan menganalisis dan membaca secara kritis data yang dikumpulkan melalui studi literatur. Hasil penelitian menemukan bahwa perluasan keanggotaan NATO memicu tindakan Rusia karena adanya ancaman eksternal. Barat setuju untuk melakukan embargo dan sanksi terhadap Rusia, yang memengaruhi 90% pasar minyak dan gas Rusia. Namun, Rusia menunjukkan kekuatannya dan memperingatkan ancaman nuklir. Studi ini juga berpendapat bahwa di tengah tekanan AS yang menyebabkan Rusia kehilangan pembeli Baratnya, Cina mendukung Rusia dan menjadi pembeli minyak potensialnya. Tekanan AS terhadap Rusia telah membawa Rusia-China semakin dekat.

Kata kunci: Cina; Kemitraan; Krisis; Rusia; Sanksi; Perang Ukraina

INTRODUCTION

The Russia-Ukrainian war had a massive and significant impact on many areas of the world's economic system. As Kagarlitsky et al. (2022, p. 491) mentioned that in 2021, although Russia's economy is the eleventh largest, the west, namely the US (US), European Union (EU), and their allies, continue to impose sanctions, they separate economic relations with Russia, which further exacerbates global trade flows. As a result of the sanctions, Russia was required to forge new partnerships to support its economy during the invasion of Ukraine. On the other hand, China, as Russia's closest ally, has the potential to become a large market for Russia's oil and gas exports. China can also assist Russia with the technology and spare parts needed.

However, due to western sanctions, Chinese companies can also be affected, so China has yet to take many actions (Dörre et al. 2019). Western sanctions did have a significant impact; many western companies eventually left Russia. With the current situation, the future fate of the Russian capitalist system becomes a big question (Kagarlitsky

et al., 2022, p. 491), Russia needs a strong ally considering the West's problematic isolation. At the same time, China desires a dependable partner with the ability to project strength regionally to increase its influence globally. Russia has taken advantage of this situation to gradually develop a new kind of systemic cooperation with China in several key areas of joint geoeconomic and geopolitical interests. Under persistent US pressure and ongoing Western sanctions, Sino-Russian ties have improved since 2014 (Tchakarova, 2022, p. 4).

Meanwhile, The US protects Ukraine as a territory, a form of hegemony, and resistance to Russia. Because it is believed that Ukraine's position determines the future of the world order. Likewise, Russia's resistance to America is also an effort to pioneer global resistance. Suppose it is true that Russia's goal is to fight global powers. In that case, it can be considered that one of the reasons for Russia's invasion of Ukraine was an act of responding to NATO's eastward expansion of power and increasing participation and Russia's awareness that America was trying to consolidate NATO as a vehicle for political and military dominance in Europe (Kusa,

2022, p. 12). The world also faced challenges from the Ukrainian war, where the diaspora of the two countries involved, namely Ukraine and Russia, spread worldwide (Bainus & Rachman, 2022, p. 263).

In this paper, the authors try to explain the impact of the war and the invasion of Ukraine on the interactions of two countries, Russia and China, as the focus, so the authors review explicitly the literature that explains the impact and strategies of these countries after the war occurred. This research contributes to the field of international relations with an understanding of how the impact of the Ukrainian war affected the strengthening of cooperation between Russia and China. Some of the previous literature used by the author is related to the impact of the Ukrainian war on China and Russia but does not specifically discuss cooperation between the two which is getting stronger.

According to Kagarlitsky et al. (2022) and Moisis (2022), western interests aim to weaken Russian influence. Apart from that, the impact on western policies towards Russia is also defined by these two papers, but Moisis explains in more detail the affected sectors and sanctions targets. While Kagarlitsky et al. explained the emergence of China, which played a role in helping the affected Russian economy, Moisis explained the reasons for the invasion due to historical relations and NATO expansion. Moisis's explanation is similar to Lichterman's literature (2022), which briefly describes the influence of NATO expansion. Lichterman also presented his analysis of the viability of these western sanctions in the future and mentioned the potential for nuclear war. Like Lichterman, Bollfrass, and Herzog (2022) say about nuclear war but in detail by explaining the historical relationship of the nuclear agreement between the US, Russia, and Ukraine. Bollfrass and Herzog added that Russia's actions violated international commitments and the strategy of intimidating the West with nuclear threats.

Belov (2022) explains the relationship between Russia, the EU, and its members, especially Germany; it is said that the EU's energy transition mission has an impact on Russia, and the transition has accelerated after the invasion. This paper also mentions the termination of cooperation with Russia by partner companies and countries. Kotov's research (2022) is similar to Belov's, which explains the relationship between Russia, Germany, and the EU. Still, it focuses more on the industrial sector, saying that many German-based companies have left the Russian market, many international companies have also chosen to go, and Kotov stated that 75% more companies leave Russia. Shagina (2022) uses

an approach similar to Belov's by briefly mentioning the EU's transitional mission, which impacts Russian energy; Shagina further explains the interaction of sanctions between the EU and Russia. This research shows how the US and EU take advantage of Russia's weakness in its sanctions targets; Shagina explains Russia's economic impact with detailed percentage figures. Shagina also sees that although China is in an alliance with Russia, China still considers its decision and sees a gap in Russia, which is in a bad state.

Downs (2022), in his writing, concluded that Chinese businesses have opportunistically bought inexpensive fossil fuels from Russia in more than six months since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. Still, they have refrained from entering into new, long-term supply agreements or buying stock in Russian energy firms and projects. China is thus giving Russia a financial lifeline through its increased energy imports, which boosts Russia's energy export earnings. But because there have not been significant new energy agreements, Putin has yet to show the West that it isn't completely isolated. Downs believes China has been friendly with Russia, but in a different way than Moscow would want. Godement (2016), however, argues that the only areas of rivalry between China and Russia are those related to the economy and soft power. Their interests mostly align when it comes to security matters.

The writings of Taylor & Shullman (2021) show a strengthening situation between Russia and China regarding their similar interests. Russia lost access to several sectors after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014 regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. Russia's ambition to expand its influence in Asian markets and China's growing demand bring the two countries closer together. The same pattern and situation can be seen in the Ukraine war; the sanctions that the West immediately imposed on Russia had a significant impact on Russia's economy and influence; China, with its interests as well as Russia's alliance, is increasingly closer to Russia's position, so that Russia and China's cooperation strengthened in facing Western sanctions.

With the Ukraine and Russia cases, imposing sanctions on Russia can help the US to maintain its dominance in the EU region. Because there are sanctions that will reduce Russia's dominance in Europe, especially in energy trading, and now that position is being replaced by the US. Because Russia is subject to sanctions, the US currently controls and dictates energy policy to the EU. This study seeks to explain how the crisis and the invasion of Ukraine have a global impact with an approach that focuses on research on Russia and China. It was found that the crisis formed a rivalry between Russia and the West, strengthening the Russia-China alliance. The pressure

exerted by the West through sanctions impacts the closer relations between Russia and China. The loss of international buyers, especially the West, makes China a big potential buyer of Russian oil and gas to contribute to the Russian economy. The Russia-China economic cooperation established in 2019 has continued, as evidenced by the crude oil from Russia, more than 18% purchased by China (Sutter & Sutherland, 2022, p. 1).

From previous literature, no research examines the strengthening of cooperation between Russia and China after the policy of imposing sanctions by Western countries on Russia as a result of aggression toward Ukraine. Existing research is limited to specific discussions on Russia's situation in facing Western sanctions in maintaining Russia's domestic economic stability. There is literature that underlines the cooperative relations between Russia and China in general, which is not directly related to the situation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The most relevant previous research is that a similar phenomenon occurred with the strengthening of relations between Russia and China due to Western sanctions caused by Russia's annexation policy in Crimea, not related to the crisis in Ukraine. So, from the literature review of previous research, this research seeks to present a new discussion that examines cooperation between Russia and China, which was strengthened by the impact of Western sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.

METHOD

To limit the scope of the research, the author focuses on strengthening cooperative relations between Russia and China amidst the Ukraine crisis, which caused Western countries to impose sanctions on Russia. Both nations were impacted and had different patterns in interactions after the Ukraine War. The authors concentrate on Russia and China but are not limited to some countries, especially US. Russia and China relations underwent alterations with the outbreak of the Ukraine War. To better comprehend the upheaval of the Ukraine War, one of the conflicts that occurred in 2022 and shook the international community, other sources in the form of articles, and news. The authors conducted a literature review by reading the timeline of the beginning of the political unrest, the relationships between the two countries, and ongoing developments of issues related to this issue because it attempts to understand the partnership relations between Russia and China after the Ukraine War.

This study uses qualitative methods to explain the complexity of the research substance and content that the authors have collected through library

research methods. The qualitative research carried out is descriptive by analyzing data inductively; the data that has been collected is re-analyzed and developed (Mohajan, 2018, p. 9) to be processed and presented in explaining the phenomena that occur. Authors collect data mainly more than 20 articles in Scopus-indexed journals, and the remaining data vary in the form of scientific articles, reports, news, and books that describe the situation of the two countries, Russia and China, in their relations and interactions after the Ukraine crisis. Still, it's not limited to the two countries. Afterwards, the Authors processed and analyzed the data collected in the library research to develop an explanation for strengthening relations between Russia and China after the Ukraine crisis, which led to sanctions from the US and its western allies.

Theoretical Framework

To explain the cooperation between Russia and China, which strengthened after the Ukrainian War and resulted in the imposition of sanctions by Western countries against Russia, the author examines it by applying social identity theory, which is based on the situation of Russia and China being marginalized from the west leading to the identity of the two countries being built to carry out further collaboration. Like the impact of Russia's annexation of Ukraine, sanctions imposed by the West forced Russia to get closer to China (Larson, 2020, p. 3). The same thing was repeated after Russia's aggression towards Ukraine. However, it tended to be for maintaining stability and, based on national interests, also as an effort to prevent the US from getting involved (Nadkarni, 2010). On the other hand, since 2018, in defense department documents, the US has seen Russia and China as great power rivals. So Larson (2020) believes that relations between Russia and China have restored the status of great powers and impacted the sentiments of Western countries. The strengthening of relations between the two provides a firm stance that Russia and China oppose the West. This phenomenon is in accordance with social identity theory, which creates positive identities.

The terms of social identity in social identity theory are that there are similar ties between the two, including a dark past such as the end of the 16th century for Russia and the mid-19th to 20th centuries for China; the issues that occurred during both times were not closely related to the economic downturn, famine, and invasion (Wang, 2012; Larson, 2020). Historically, both of them continue to be cornered in unpleasant situations, such as China being helpless against economic pressure from the US, as well as the expansion of NATO, which continues to harm Russia (Larson, 2020); even this is what triggers Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022.

However, the balance of power theory is also an important basis for seeing the phenomenon of cooperation between Russia and China, which continues to strengthen and can explain efforts to fight countries that threaten the international system through balancing (Walt, 1990), such as that done by Russia and China in facing the prolonged US unipolar dominance at the system level as well as encouraging which reciprocally helps change in the region (Korolev, 2016; Haynes, 2020). So, the author applies social identity theory and power of balance theory in explaining Western sanctions against Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine, which strengthened relations between Russia and China.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Status Quo

West Sanctions on Russia Conditions

In the polarized geopolitical situation, the West is trying to stem the domination and influence of Russia in politics and the economy to put Russia at a disadvantage in all sectors. Moisiu (2022, p. 2) states that the West's stance impacts all business transactions, banking, and the freezing of foreign exchange sources. Many factories were closed, and massive withdrawals of equipment for oil and gas and natural affairs slowed the technical process. The author added that this invasion has historical links; Putin followed the ambitions of former Russian political leaders for the Slavs to unite and control their territory (Chotiner 2022). Rationally, Moisiu argued that the Russian invasion was an attempt to protect its interests from outsiders; the Kremlin became vulnerable because of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) expansion which resulted in Russia attacking Ukraine, so NATO and the US could be blamed (Moisiu, 2022, p. 2), Ukraine has always been Russia's foreign interest priority, the NATO expansion has made Russia worried that Ukraine and Eastern European countries had made the West an orientation (Ma'arif & Maksum, 2022, p. 273; Widiasa, 2018, p. 68).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused imposed sanctions on an economic embargo in the form of a ban on Russia in terms of crude oil exports and to consolidate with the EU to stop oil imports from Russia in the European region. Stopping oil import activity made Russia lose its oil market in the European region. However, there was a discourse that Russia would soon shift its oil market to Asia. This makes Europe lose its oil supply. So that the embargo remains firm and the EU does not waver. But the US is willing to provide oil supplies, replacing oil supplies from Russia (Lenaerts & Tagliapietra, 2022, p. 247). Willing to become an oil supplier to replace

Russia means the US agrees to keep this embargo to keep the EU region steadfastly imposing these sanctions on Russia. This shows that the US is serious about dealing with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and wants to make Russia a deterrent. Apart from sanctions, The Biden administration plans to curtail trade in Russian oil and gas in the long term to destroy one of Russia's leading roles in global energy trade. The Biden administration plans to curtail trade in Russian oil and gas long-term to eliminate one of Russia's leading roles in global energy trade (Cafruny et al., 2022, p. 9).

War and sanctions cause energy prices to soar; this provides the highest income and profits but is believed to be only in the short term. With the accelerated EU transition mission, western sanctions, and the limited transition of the Russian market to Asia, Shagina (2022, p. 105) emphasizes that Russia is considered impossible long enough under these conditions. In February 2022, the impact of sanctions led to the mass write-off of Russian assets by Western primary energy and oilfield companies. In May, the EU agreed to a gradual embargo on Russian oil, forecasting Russia to lose up to \$22 billion in revenue annually as 90% of its imports are affected (Valero, Seputyte, & Nardelli, 2022). The West has to look for alternatives after sanctions against Russia; the EU has started eliminating dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Due to the absence of international buyers, the author mentions that gas is predicted to fall by 5.6% while oil production is expected to fall by 17% in 2022; previously, oil production had shown a 10% decline in April. The US and EU exploit Russia's high dependence on foreign technology, and export bans are imposed to complicate Russian oil and gas operations, such as in the refining and petrochemical sectors, as foreign companies still control 50-60% of the Russian market for advanced energy technologies (Shagina, 2022, pp. 106-107).

Many foreign companies in Russia are under pressure and must decide immediately whether to withdraw. Most chose to leave the Russian market, even supporting sanctions against Russia. About 600 major international companies have left Russia, with only 130 remaining by April 2022 (Sonnenfeld et al., 2022). Despite cooperating with Russia in the energy sector, Germany formulated five EU sanctions against Russia. The sanctions were also aggressive and did not emphasize the diplomatic approach as in 2014, which was more lenient. Kotov (2022, p. 341) explains that the sanctions imposed are symbols that show the position of Germany and the EU towards Russia's actions. Lichterman (2022, p. 185) believes that what the US and its allies have done will continue, this campaign they do by responding through an arms race that will not only confront Russia but China

will also be nudged. But the risk of war between nuclear-armed states also increases. In the end, the expansion of NATO became the leading cause of the invasion because the US and its European allies were deemed not to keep their commitments by failing to provide a safe space for Russia in the post-cold war (Lichterman, 2022, p. 187).

If Russia intends to focus on the Asian market, Russia will need high investment costs and a long time for infrastructure. But Shagina (2022, p. 108) explained that China could be a hope because, by 2021, Russia had accounted for 18.4% of China's crude oil imports. China remains cautious about Russian energy to avoid being too dependent because 15% is the limit regulation to prevent dependence. Besides China, Russia is India's largest oil supplier, accounting for 25% of India's oil imports, whereas previously, it was only 1.3%. The sanctions had a significant effect; the loss of Europe as a buyer affected the structure of the Russian state budget on oil and gas sales because the amount was huge, namely 42%. According to the author, Russia now has little to offer. China is Russia's best chance to achieve its goals, but Beijing is expected to take advantage by dictating energy deals, such as after the 2014 Crimea illegal annexation sanctions. As an energy superpower, Russia is slowly fading away (Shagina, 2022, p. 109).

China and Russia have attempted to present their growing economic connections as a crucial tenet of their partnership. Russia and China according to Xi during a visit to Moscow in June 2019, a foundational element of bilateral ties, economic cooperation, and trade are essential to the growth and rejuvenation of both China and Russia. Putin stated a few months later that the connection is an ally in the truest sense of a complex strategic alliance. The two nations have agreed to agreements for cross-border infrastructure and have established and eventually achieved targets to increase bilateral commerce. Chinese visitors to Russia increased to almost two million in 2019 from 158,000 a decade earlier, spending over \$1 billion (Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2021, p. 18).

Russia's Nuclear Threat Strategy

From the outset, Bollfrass & Herzog (2022, p. 7) argued that the core of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was nuclear weapons. Russia has fired nuclear-capable missiles at Ukraine and exercises with nuclear-armed submarines. Because of its nuclear arsenal, Russia has prevented the West from helping Ukraine with military intervention. According to the authors, even before the invasion, global nuclear tensions had occurred because of Russia's regime change mission. By invading, Russia has reneged on its commitments and challenged

the global nuclear order even though it has been subjected to international sanctions and exile. Russia is a member of the five nuclear holders in Nuclear Weapons States (Bollfrass & Herzog, 2022, p. 10).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union left nukes in the Ukrainian area, which were eventually handed over to Russia with guarantees by Russia and the US for Ukraine's security in the Budapest Memorandum Agreement. But Russia violated it by annexing Crimea in 2014, supporting the Donbas separatist movement, and in 2022, an invasion of Ukraine. Bollfrass and Herzog (2022, p. 15) see that concerns over Russia, resulting from a failed invasion of Ukraine, could be a reason to trigger nuclear use. Russia uses this attitude as a bluff and an excuse to pressure Europe to make concessions to Ukraine and to balance it with the US. Russia can claim to be a great power with the nuclear threat. Bollfrass and Herzog believe that the NATO-Russia nuclear relationship influences the commitment of the US alliance. Russia has also threatened NATO that if they intervened, Putin said there would be a nuclear risk (Bollfrass & Herzog, 2022, p. 21).

Weaken Russia Influence & Dominance

Welt (2019, p. 27) mentioned the statement from former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's interests in building a solid Ukrainian state is carried out by the US to prevent the emergence of new powers from Russia because if Russia succeeds in controlling Ukraine will expand Russia's dominance in the region, moreover, the US has emphasized their global threats anticipation through the new US Defense Strategy since 2001, the threats referred to are countries such as Russia and China regarding their hegemonic power regionally and their economic influence (Slayton 2018, p. 131). So the alignment and support from the US in the form of economic and military assistance to Ukraine is carried out to prevent Russia's domination in the Eurasian continent, which aims to suppress competition from the US in the global region. Besides control, military aid also strengthens the alliance, and Welt added the opinion that foreign military aid can also be a way to realize the national interest of a country. So the alignment and support from the US in the form of economic and military assistance to Ukraine is carried out to prevent Russia's domination in the Eurasian continent, which aims to suppress competition from the US in the global region (Welt, 2019, p. 29).

After knowing about the statement from former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the purpose of the military assistance that the US provides to Ukraine becomes clear. In addition to strengthening the alliance, it also prevents the Russian

invasion of Ukraine. In the war between Russia and Ukraine, the resistance led by the US in the face of Vladimir Putin's aggression was considered essential to safeguard the main interests of helping Ukraine's defence and protecting Europe. Apart from that, to maintain its hegemonic role, America must stay in it because this creates opportunities for the US' rival (in this case, Russia) to expand and exploit. So the US must invest, one of which is providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine to secure and maintain its hegemony. The US sees Russia as a rival, so in any case, the hegemony of the US has the thought that it must be superior to Russia. This does not intend to impose its control over the sovereignty of other countries but what the US stands to maintain the international order (Tellis & Note, 2022, p. 2).

Holsti (1987, pp. 348-349) mentions several forms of foreign aid, one of which is military aid, such as those done by the US for Ukraine. Holsti argues that military assistance is a traditional technique to sustain alliances and strengthen allies with another goal to control. So that the military strength of the recipient country will depend on the donor country, and they cannot operate it without approval from the donor country. So this kind of control provides a partial guarantee that the recipient country will use armed forces as desired or in the interests of the donor country.

Energy Needs and Dependence

Oil and gas comprise Russia's and China's shared economic interests. China's rising energy demand made Russia more desirable as a critical supplier, particularly given Beijing's desire to diversify its energy sources. Western sanctions prevented Russia from accessing capital for more extensive investments in the energy industry. The structural growth in their combined oil and gas exports is due to China's increasing demand, new pipeline, and liquefaction facilities, as well as Russia's desire to expand its Asian trade at a time when European consumers were increasingly worried about over-dependence on Russian supplies. With considerable difficulty, the two nations have reached agreements on the infrastructure needed to expand their commerce in fossil fuels. After protracted discussions marked by mistrust on both sides and Russia's worries about being too dependent on the Chinese market, they finally reached an agreement to construct the East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline in 2009 (Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2021, p. 19).

Despite arduous discussions and a pricing disagreement initially, ESPO eventually benefitted China and Russia. They moved on with a Power of Siberia gas pipeline deal in 2014. The gas pipeline project was more economically tricky. However, it

was ultimately successful, thanks mainly to intense political interest, particularly in Moscow, where leaders felt compelled to demonstrate that Western sanctions following the illegitimate annexation of Crimea could not isolate Russia (Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2021, p. 19) with Russia's strategic denial attitude, which justifies its actions as legally valid and legitimized (Widiasa, 2018, pp. 66-67). The Power of Siberia tale illustrates the inherent difficulties of reaching such agreements and the significance of political will in materializing them. With the world's most remarkable natural gas reserves, Russia's Gazprom is already announcing the construction of a second and third major gas pipeline to China, positioning the Chinese market as a potential replacement for its substantial gas exports to Europe (Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2021, p. 19).

Taylor and Shullman (2021, p. 19) in their report mentioned that Chinese loans and investments made through the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other businesses were essential to the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project's success in the Russian Arctic, a region that Putin gave high priority due to its significance for the Russian economy and defence. By using the Northern Sea Route, China received its first shipment from Yamal LNG in 2018, shortening transit times and reiterating the connection between resource extraction in the Russian Arctic and shipping along the route, which underpins Moscow's and Beijing's shared commitment to creating a "Polar Silk Road."

China gains a lot from its energy cooperation with Russia. One significant prospect is the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, which transports gas from Russia's East Siberian gas reserves to China's northeastern regions (Godement, 2016, p. 8). China's imports of Russian crude rose by 10.2% to 1.7 million barrels per day (BPD) and LNG by 40.4% to 2.1 million tons between March and July 2022. Gazprom, an integrated global oil and gas company, boosted gas supplies to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline by 60.9% in the first seven months of 2022. In July, supplies frequently exceeded the daily contract amount, reaching three-times-new record highs for daily export quantities (Downs, 2022). Cooperation in the energy sector raises Russia's reputation in Asian markets. It enables it to diversify its energy supply away from Europe (Tchakarova, 2022, p. 6).

Meanwhile, Russia's relations with the EU are strained; the green transition of the EU and member countries with the Fit-for-55 program uses the European Green Exchange Rate parameter. In this EU Vision, Germany is one of the countries that play an essential role. As a result, imports from Russia are no longer valid for transition due to the abandonment

of primary energy sources, and German-Russian cooperation is also structured. Brussels and Berlin imposed restrictions on imports of Russian coal and oil as sanctions for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and German business partners also froze projects in Russia. The German government firmly attempted to abandon the Russian gas pipeline and succeeded in releasing the certification at the end of February while also depriving the Russian Federation of ownership of the Gazprom and Rosneft companies. The two countries also stopped interaction between the energy sector departments. Of all these consequences, Belov (2022, p. 512) argues that even after 50 years of cooperation, this attitude shows the government's short-term readiness to replace energy cooperation towards independence from Russia's fossil resources.

Putin, President of Russia, activated the new payment scheme on March 23, 2022, and it takes effect from April 1 for Russian gas, specifically for buyers such as Germany as a country labeled as "unfriendly" (Belov 2022, p. 517); the label also applies to many other EU countries. Putting Russia in the most unfavorable situation possible was a priority for Germany and the West as a primary political goal. As with the "cancel culture" that is echoed against Russia, it also damages the socio-economic conditions so that domestic turmoil occurs and eliminates the foreign exchange income Russia generates from selling oil, gas, and coal. But Ukraine's invasion also disadvantages Germany and the EU, slowing down their climate targets (Belov, 2022, p. 519).

Russia-China Supportive and Interdependence Economy

China exports its numerous produced items to Russia since it has traditionally viewed Russia as an energy provider and cutting-edge technology. The dissatisfaction of the Russians with this disparity has never been a structural barrier to improved ties but rather an amusing worry for Beijing to manage. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and takeover of Crimea, China welcomed the Western sanctions against Russia as a chance to acquire. Russia needs a market for its resources and a means of generating economic activity to make up for it. China gladly offered such a channel but, of course, asked for friendship fees. China is making fresh investments in the Russian railway and telecom industries due to Russia's relaxation of restrictions on foreign investors. Financial cooperation increased as Russian banks partnered with Chinese organizations for safety (Chase et al., 2017, p. 9). The thawing of economic tensions and reciprocal promises on border issues have strengthened relations between Russia and China and allowed both parties to concentrate on other geopolitical objectives.

China and Russia have signed agreements since 2014 in energy, commerce, technology, aerospace, and finance while also stepping up their diplomatic and military cooperation. Since 2014, bilateral trade has increased, although the flows are unbalanced. In 2021, China represented a percentage of Russia's trade of 18%, while Russia made up 2% of China's commerce. From 11% in 2013, China's trade share with Russia has gradually increased, primarily at the EU cost. Strategic exports from Russia to China include fertilizer, metals (nickel, gold, platinum, and titanium), and oil. China has been turning more and more to Russia for crude oil, natural gas, and coal (Sutter & Sutherland, 2022, p. 1).

As China experiences shortages, Russia may also become a more significant supplier of fertilizer and wheat. China removed import restrictions on Russian wheat following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Electronics and machinery account for 28.8 billion dollars worth of China's exports to Russia, followed by essential metals (\$5.7 billion), clothing and textiles (\$5.4 billion), and airplanes, ships, and cars (\$5.0 billion). If China turns to Russia to help solve the world's shortages and Russia's access to international markets diminishes, the conflict may strengthen bilateral ties. The unrest in Ukraine impacts China's access to agricultural products such as sunflower oil and corn. To diversify away from American exports, China resorted to Ukraine; today, it is looking for new sources. China may displace nations looking to import limited food and energy due to its disproportionate position as a consumer (Sutter & Sutherland, 2022, p. 1).

Following the introduction of Western sanctions, China has stepped in to boost Russia's economy in various ways, motivated by shared geopolitical and commodities trading interests. Russia's economy depends on China in the face of a potential default scenario. China is thinking about purchasing stock in Russian energy and resource firms. Additionally, following the collapse of the Russian currency (ruble), China agreed to quadruple the trading margin with the Ruble (Tchakarova 2022, p. 8). Some of their activities in response to the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia suggest that they had thoughtfully prepared for them.

Indirect Russia-China Importance and Influence in Central Asia

While the Kremlin's drive to establish new markets and finance sources is at the heart of Russia's economic pivot to China, politics also play a significant role. Beijing and Moscow supported authoritarian governments worldwide, opposed US involvement in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), staged cooperative

military drills, and attempted to develop a united plan to thwart 'color revolutions' even before the Ukrainian crisis (Chen et al., 2022, p. 6). The scenario right now will serve to amplify this feeling. According to Chinese officials, Russia is more receptive to sure of Beijing's views on regional and global governance. The war in Ukraine is not the main reason that brings the nations closer but also because the Kremlin got more emotionally anti-Western. A formal military partnership between Moscow and Beijing will likely be avoided. Russia has no desire to become involved in territorial disputes between China and its neighbours in the East or the South China Sea (Gabuev, 2016, p. 27).

The Kremlin, in contrast, is seen by the Chinese as easily aroused into a pointless confrontation in which Beijing does not wish to participate. This statement explains China's position on Ukraine: it did not overtly condemn Russia for annexing Crimea and destabilizing Donbas, but it did not also embrace Moscow's position either. However, a 'soft alliance' between China and Russia may develop (Gabuev, 2015, p. 1). The areas may expand the political partnership, including collaboration in Central Asia and increasing cooperation on internal political concerns.

Moscow had mixed feelings about Beijing's growth in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) before the Ukraine crisis (Bolt, 2014, p. 59). The Kremlin welcomed Beijing's search for inexpensive gas as long as it helped Gazprom maintain its market share in Europe. Following the start of the Afghan conflict, Moscow and Beijing also banded together to oppose US military presence and assisted in removing US bases from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Moscow resisted Chinese efforts to economically integrate the site because it feared that former Soviet republics would become more reliant on Beijing than on Moscow. For instance, it opposed plans to connect Western China to Europe via Central Asia and the Chinese notion of establishing a joint development bank for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with a Beijing headquarters and funding from China (Miller, 2022, p. 7).

China is rising as one of Central Asia's most potent players as Russia declines. China's expansion in Central Asia is owing to its vision for regional connectivity, desire for Central Asian energy resources, and substantial funds, which it distributes through commercial investments, loans, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other organizations. China does not pressure Central Asian regimes to reform, unlike the West. Beijing does not utilize political pressure like Russia to shape the area. China's absence of an overt political agenda other than regional stability makes it attractive to

local administrations. China's geopolitical and geoeconomic impact is evident in Central Asia, where it has learned to handle Russian fears over its rising regional dominance. Maintaining favorable relations with Moscow in Central Asia will be one of the most critical tests of Chinese political and economic diplomacy (Stronski & Ng, 2018, p. 9).

Ng and Stronski (2018, p. 9) also argue that Beijing looks equal to the challenge. China manages Russia well because it focuses on economic concerns in Central Asia and avoids political and military difficulties. Beijing's soft power is developing in Central Asia, but it cannot compete with Russia's media presence or the popularity of Russian colleges, especially in Siberia. However, the number of Central Asian students studying in Chinese universities, often with government stipends, is rising. Kazakhs studying in China climbed from 781 to 13,198 between 2005 and 2015, and the Chinese government currently gives 23 academic scholarships to Kyrgyz people.

Beijing has managed Russia's anxieties about its status in Central Asia since Russia can do nothing about China's influence. Moscow's actions in Ukraine have alienated Central Asian elites. Many of China's regional goals, economic development, political stability, and keeping the West at bay coincide with Russia's plan or do not conflict with Russia's short-term objectives. China prioritizes political and social stability in Central Asia through development. Given the volatility in the Middle East since 2011 and in Ukraine since 2014, China and Russia fear political instability and popular revolt in the area; both wish to preserve the political status quo (Rivellino, Whaibe, & Luetz 2022). Both nations worry about radicalism flowing from Afghanistan or the Middle East to Central Asia, which borders China and Russia. Despite having similar aims in preventing militant extremism, their tactics for ensuring regional stability diverge. Russia focuses on physical power in Central Asia military outposts, arms transfers, and counterterrorism through Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Stronski & Ng, 2018, p. 10).

Moscow does gain from China's territorial growth, which spans the Eurasian (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) landmass and links Asia and Europe. From China's least developed regions to Europe, the Chinese Silk Road represents a horizontal geopolitical expansion that draws focus away from Russia's Far East. The necessity for Russia to play a part in bridging geopolitical gaps at those locations of the junction is being highlighted by the Belt and Road Initiative. China gains from Russia's expansion of its influence in Eurasia by obtaining advantageous access to raw materials. Moscow is becoming a

significant player in international security that might represent China's geoeconomic interests in Eurasia. China is the financial and economic contributor, while Russia provides security (Tchakarova, 2022, p. 10). Both countries have found a viable task-sharing formula.

CONCLUSION

This study analyzes and explains how the Ukrainian crisis caused by the invasion by Russia affects the global system and has global consequences, with explanations that focus on the relations and partnership between Russia and China. The political and economic global impact creates polarity and rivalry for alliance groups that require each to achieve its interests through implemented strategies and policies. This research shows the presence of two rival camps from global political polarity; The two sides give each other their influence and strength and try to put their rivals in the most disadvantageous position possible. Western sanctions have had a massive impact on Russia's domestic economy; China is Russia's hope for recovery with the policies reached between Russia and China in economic cooperation on infrastructure development, further strengthening the alliance between the two. Having lost Western oil buyers, China has become a potential primary energy market for Russian oil and gas. Due to the West's harshest isolation, China will be crucial to Russia's political, economic, and financial survival. Putin did take the severe penalties into account before beginning the full-scale invasion of Ukraine again. Because of the division of the global economy and the strengthening of connections with China, Russia's economy and politics are seen to be dependent on situations, especially on further Russia-China relations. Relations between Russia and China continue to strengthen, as pressure from the West has negatively impacted the Russian situation. Besides the infrastructure agreement, the cooperation in the energy sector agreed, and China raised the import to 40% in July 2022, giving Russia a reputation for supplying Asian markets. Russia-China had economic influence in Central Asia; it could be an economic recovery opportunity if Russia decides to focus on the Asian market, but the challenge will be the high-cost investment and long-term project. Future research can focus on studying the impact of the Ukrainian war on other regions such as African and Middle Eastern countries that have relations related to Russian oil.

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