

THE POLITICAL INTERVENTION ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' PROMOTION IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT. The promotion government officials comes into new era, the new policy reversed from a very closed selection process and heavily seniority-based to open, clear criteria, transparent procedures on the competency-based series test. In fact, policy implementation is not fully in favour of an administration driven. The study has two main research problems "How open promotion for local government officers conducted?" and "How does political intervention work in the open promotion mechanism?". This paper provides comprehensive mechanism-the hybrid administration-politics model on open promotion of local bureaucrats in Indonesia. The study used a qualitative approach and assisted by Nvivo 12 to reveal the most frequent concept on open promotion practices based on interviews. The data obtained through interviews with informants which selected purposively, selection committee members, candidates, and local government officers. This paper affirms interesting features. The competency series tested by independent assessors reflects an administration mechanism through merit concept. However, the absolute political final decision-making process at the governor or Mayor's hands reflects the individual-political interest. This system shows that the administration's process at the local level links tightly to political deliberation. The key message is that open promotion in government agencies is neither a pure merit issue nor a spoils system for competence-heavy based, on the one hand, yet is always amenable to some political intervention. The merit principles are universal; however, the practices are contextual-specific. This study has an important value in describing how The politics play significant role on local administration system.

Keywords: Political Intervention; Patrimonial; Public-personnel management; Hybrid Administration-Politics model

ABSTRAK. Sistem promosi pejabat pemerintah daerah memasuki era baru, kebijakan promosi terbuka mengubah mekanisme promosi yang didasarkan oleh senioritas menjadi proses promosi yang terbuka, persyaratan yang jelas dan serangkaian tes kompetensi. Namun pada kenyataannya, kebijakan promosi terbuka belum sepenuhnya menggambarkan nilai-nilai meritokrasi secara penuh. Kajian ini berusaha mengungkap dua permasalahan "bagaimana promosi terbuka dilaksanakan untuk pejabat lingkup pemerintah daerah? Serta "Bagaimana intervensi politik bekerja pada sistem promosi pejabat pemerintah daerah?. Kajian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan menggunakan Nvivo 12 untuk melihat frekuensi kata, konsep yang diperoleh dari wawancara. Data diperoleh dari wawancara dengan informan terpilih, observasi dan menggunakan data dukung yang berhubungan dengan promosi terbuka. Kajian memberi ketegasan bahwa serangkaian tes kompetensi dan wawancara oleh tim independen perwujudan sistem administrasi melalui konsep merit. Namun demikian, proses pengambilan keputusan akhir politik yang mutlak berada di tangan gubernur atau walikota menunjukkan kepentingan politik kepala daerah terhadap pemilihan pejabat pemerintah daerah. Sistem promosi terbuka di lingkup pemerintah daerah menunjukkan bahwa proses penyelenggaraan pemerintahan sangat erat berkaitan dengan pertimbangan politik. Kesimpulan penting dari kajian ini bahwa promosi terbuka di organisasi pemerintah daerah di satu sisi bukanlah semata-mata persoalan kompetensi atau kedekatan, penyelenggaraan pemerintah selalu bersinggungan dengan proses pertimbangan politik. Prinsip meritocracy bersifat universal; namun, pada kenyataan akan selalu bersifat kontekstual, sangat tergantung dimana prinsip ini diterapkan.

Kata kunci: Intervensi Politik; Manajemen SDM sektor publik; Model pemerintahan hibrid

INTRODUCTION

Meritocracy is a system that values the principles of competition, open selection, careful evaluation of qualities, and a set of qualification standards and established recruitment process (Robinson, 2015).

This paper reveals the dynamic process of public human resource management and open promotion system in Indonesia's decentralization era. The phenomenal, massive Jakarta's open promotion under Jokowi as Governor offered 415 middle-rank positions at the provincial office in 2013, with 1,156 candidates, confirms the new chapter of Indonesia's

bureaucratic reform agenda. The Jakarta case abolished the closed-opaque government officers' promotion system as a sub-national effort to enhance its performance through implementing meritocracy values for its corps. When Jokowi ran for and was elected as President in 2014 and Jakarta had a new governor, his legacy was maintained and widened for middle and high-rank positions. Since the Jakarta initiatives on bureaucratic reform, many local governments have imitated a public officer open promotion, meaning that competent and qualified person has filled positions.

Contrary to expectations, increased government performance organizations through strengthening their human resources, often out of administration

spheres. It is a highly contested and intertwined process linked to heavy personal deliberation through a final decision by a public-elected Mayor or Governor. In the context of decentralization, a Mayor or a Governor has absolute power in choosing one of the best three candidates. Poor-good willingness from those leaders is often bought at corruption through buy and sell positions, using the legal procedures that put them at the final stage of decision. Data to the Indonesia commission eradication corruption, in mid-August 2022, at least 430 sub-national leaders were corruption case suspects, and 10% of them slipped into the case of buying and selling government officer positions.

Open promotion is one left behind its agenda. The 2013 Jakarta's opened the door to reform the public human resources management in government bodies, The Jakarta province, and directly rolling to others. The experience of Jakarta's open promotion shows that the local bureaucratic reform plan depends on the governor's initiatives to exercise its authority, its goodwill, and whether the leaders align with the reform agenda. It also depends on the extent to which the national level eschews these government officers' management control over the mechanisms at the sub-national level. Executive authority at the local level is concentrated in Governor and Mayor's hands.

Historically, there is some evidence that state development is strongly related to efficient and competent public officers, such as in the Ottoman Empire, China, and Rome. In modern society, those professional and discipline corps are a key element of good governance since they are directly related to areas of governance; they provide and deliver public services, responsible for administration and fiscal, and come as a social-politics stabilizer and institutional development (Schianto-Campo & Sundaram, 2001).

Public or government officers are believed to be knowledgeable workers; their intelligence should be a credit performance mirror for public organizations. Some key elements related to and visible to public human resource management should be appropriately put in to get there. They have recruited and selected the fair mechanism to perform the assigned to it by the rule.

Following a clean recruiting system through equal access for all candidates, selected new public officers, trained and put in the specific job to come into the right person in the proper position. Those are daunting challenges for government or public organizations even under the bureaucratic reform agenda since public personnel management link tightly with the political domain. The dynamic of national politics also influences the local public personnel management policy.

Despite the large articulation on bureaucracy, there are a similar basic understanding of the implementations by which the Weber model are classified into general characteristic. Weber bureaucracy at least has several essential principles: 1) task specialization, 2) hierarchical authority, 3) formal recruitment, 4) work based on rules and regulations, 5) impersonality and career orientation (Khan & Hussain, 2020) none of them have been implemented adequately. The changes pursued in the first two decades were related to enhancing the administrative performance by creating an adequate structure of administrative posts and ensuring a fair remuneration system. The first full reform package was presented in the 1970s with steps to improve the civil service performance and nationalization of significant banks and industries. The New Public Management (NPM, and also employs personnel expertise (Gajduschek, 2003). Weber believed bureaucracy was the public organization's backbone and an efficient way to build a strong state administration. Weber's model of bureaucratic organization shows that every individual or division has a clear role. These organizations follow very systematic and procedural rules and procedures.

However, Weber's dream of making the public sector and putting government officials in state development engines is counterproductive. The bureaucracy and government officials find it hard to reach ideal expectations; this corps is even better known for poor performance (Karachiwalla & Park, 2017). Moreover, the Bureaucracy myth never really has a positive contribution to boosting economic business, as mentioned by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2017, since the corp struggled with its efficiency (Taptuk Emre Erkoc, 2017).

Shifting the Public administration paradigm and deep intervention inefficiencies issues in bureaucracy challenge both developed and developing countries. Those need to accelerate and reform their bureaucracy, focusing on prevention and solving some fundamental bureaucracy problems, including corruption, red tape, rigid procedures, bloat structure, or personnel incompetence's. The simple demand for bureaucracy is to perform professionally. Although the global public sector personnel management trend has shifted from political patronage to merit-based, Indonesia's civil service system still refers to the traditional-patrimonial model. The bureaucracy model where the experience of colonization froze in its practices. It has a long history of being formed during the Dutch colonial era, culture, and practice as a tool of rulers. Therefore, it has a place and function deeply rooted in Indonesia's government (Martini, 2010).

During the authoritarian regime, the Indonesian bureaucracy grew into one of the largest bureaucracies in the world (Turner et al., 2019). The bureaucracy in Indonesia has an essential role in becoming a catalyst for development and a tool to achieve national interests and improve people's welfare (Priyono Tjiptoherijanto, 2019; Akny, 2014).

However, the Indonesian bureaucracy performs poorly despite its potential, strength, and authority (Tjiptoherijanto, 2012). Civil servants in Indonesia report low work motivation (Syamsir, 2014). Civil servants are closely related to corruption, the practices embedded in Indonesian civil servants' structure and daily activities (P et al., 2016; Budiman et al., 2013). Extortion is one of the negative features of Indonesian bureaucracy (Fathya, 2018). Bureaucracy is a tool to maintain and expand monolithic power (Soebhan, 2000). The basic challenge Indonesia faces, regardless of the extent of bureaucracy problems in other countries, is formulated on one famous call, the CCN, an abbreviation of collusion-corruption and nepotism (Ginting, Rosalina & Haryati, 2011; Pratiwi, 2015) bribery, corruption, poor ethics in national labor force and inadequate infrastructure [1]; central government emphasizes to reform bureaucracy in both central government and local government. Reform policies were executed by Ministry of Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform (MAEBR; M. Harun Alrasyid, 2007) leave early and complicate matters as well identical to the adage "why should be made easier if they can be complicated". This general picture has become so attached in the minds of the public in Indonesia, so many people who assume that the difference between the thugs with the bureaucracy lies only in the clothing department alone. To be able to realign the bureaucracy at the position and the actual mission or its role as a public service (public servant ; Kasim, 2013; Budiman et al., 2013). The practice of illegal levies is one of the bad characteristics of the Indonesian Bureaucracy (Fathya, 2018). The main goal in strengthen bureaucratic capacity and eliminate red tape, corruption, and favouritism (Harsasto Priyatno, 2018).

The poor quality of Indonesian bureaucracy affects the country's global competitiveness index. The positioning of Indonesian bureaucracy is far behind that of developed countries, even compared to other Asian countries. World Governing Index data, measured the governance quality of 200 countries with six indicators; (1) *Voice and accountability*, (2) *Political stability and absence of violence*, (3) *Government effectiveness*, (4) *Regulatory quality*, (5) *The rule of law*, dan (6) *Control of corruption*. The study revealed that Indonesia still performed poorly

(WB,2010)¹.

Indonesia's position in the bureaucracy efficiency index also showed disappointing data. Indonesia scored 8.7, where -1- is classified as satisfactory strong while -10- is weak. Indonesia lagged behind other ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, not to mention developed countries like Japan². The bureaucratic reform in Indonesia was considered slow compared with the neighbouring countries. Based on the global competitiveness Index indicators in 2014-2015, Indonesia's bureaucracy efficiency rank was far behind Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand³. Therefore, Indonesia must conduct numerous fundamental changes in its government administration.

Bureaucratic reform in Indonesia covers a broad scope of administration. It involves institutional, procedural, cultural, and bureaucratic ethical reforms (Mariana, 2006). The reform holistically touches all government areas, including political, economic, and administrative reforms. Bureaucratic reform with a legal basis and a clear road map to eliminating corruption, cronyism, and nepotism practices. The agenda for bureaucratic reform by applying the concept of merit is also carried out at the regional level, focusing on regulating government officials, which includes three dimensions: organization, human resources, and management (Wakhid, 2011).

The progress of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia is considered slow, unlike the movements made by neighbouring countries. Bureaucratic reform in an efficient bureaucracy has not shown significant results (Haning, 2018; Tjiptoherijanto, 2012; Ginting, Rosalina & Haryati, 2011). Bureaucratic reform policies are only weak in regulations and implementation (Yusriadi, 2018). The bureaucratic road map stages I, II, and III have not been significantly affected (Hapsari et al., 2018). Bureaucratic reform is constrained by weak accountability factors, political regime hegemony, high and legitimate power distance, and bureaucratic dysfunction (Amarullah & Maulana, 2017).

Research on the practice of post-direct election open promotion at the regional level reveals that the spoils system is influencing in managing personnel resources. The selection of a person to occupy structural positions by the regional heads is a symptom of the appearance of a mutualistic relationship between officials and the bureaucracy, which is intended to strengthen, benefit, protect,

¹<https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-governance-indicators>

²<https://www.merdeka.com/uang/wamenpan-rb-reformasi-birokrasi-indonesia-paling-lambat-di-asia.html>

³World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015>

and secure each other's pragmatic interests. The domination of political forces and support teams behind the scenes triggers anxiety, jealousy, and frustration, lowering the bureaucrats' work ethic (Hayat & Ngusmanto, 2020) political forces and successful team in determining promotion. As a consequence, a lot of mindsets, attitudes, and acts of political officials who are directly contrary to the pattern of merit system (skills).

Open promotion is one left bureaucrat reform agenda. The new policy reversed from a very closed selection process and heavily seniority-based to open, clear criteria, transparent public procedures on the competency-based series test. In fact, policy implementation is not fully in favour of a philosophically merit driven. The study has two main research problems "How open promotion for local government officers conducted?" and "How does the merit and spoils system work in the open promotion mechanism?".

METHOD

The study is based on Creswell's qualitative research concept, which tries to reveal human problems through distinct way/scientific methods (Creswell, 2012). Data collections are primary and secondary from various sources. in-depth interview obtained in this study to purposive informants who directly engage with the research focus.

Semi-structured interviews provide a series of questions; the first section is about informants' identities, and the second section provides basic questions related to the topics. The questions are 1) The perception of the merit system in the process of open promotion mechanism and 2) The perception of the spoils system in the open promotion mechanism. Additional questions will be delivered based on the informants' answers to explore more informant perception of study topics.

Informants are three academic professors as the selection committee member, three senior local government officials as the candidates, and ten local government officials as the OC, and those come from different municipalities.

The theoretical framework is used as a basis for the researcher's understanding of merit-spoils system, in line with Grant (2014), which refers to it as an anchor to understand the research focus fully. The main goal of these efforts was to capture the essential concepts of open promotion and to structure the connectivity among those to come into refining research methods (Kumar, 2011). In in-depth face-to-face interviews with semi-structured list questions, the answers are recorded and transcription as primary data input for further analysis. Data analysis uses

QSR Nvivo 12, a qualitative software that helps the researcher manage coding procedures that were processed manually (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). NVivo increases validity and reliability (Neill, 2013).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION



Figure 1. The most frequent word on Local Officials' Promotion

The conclusion section consists of only one paragraph. It describes the answer to the hypothesis research objectives or scientific findings obtained. Do not write a repetition of the results and discussion, but rather a summary of the findings as expected by the research objectives. If necessary, at the end of the conclusion the writer can also write down the things that will be done about further ideas from the research.

Word frequency result shows that the most appears are: *kompetensi*/Competence, *intervensi*/intervention, *politik*/politics, *bupati*/regent, *adil*/fair, *jelas*/transparent, *terbuka*/open, *fitproper*, *seleksi*/selection and *panitia seleksi*/selection committee. Those are classified into three dominant factors on open promotion for local government officials in Indonesia: 1) Competence based selection, 2) Equality and 3) Political intervention

Competency-Based Selection

Bureaucratic reform has allowed civil servants to be chosen based on competence, knowledge, and skills through fair selection (Adi, 2018). Besides recruitment, open promotion is one of the most critical parts of the reform agenda in managing public officers in Indonesia. The government is conscious that promotion is one of the aspects that can increase the officers' motivation which has been neglected so far. Indonesia's new public services management heavily focused on qualification, competence, and work performance, all carried out under justice and non-discriminative conditions. The most important merit system is a qualification, which includes the selection, recruitment, placement, and promotion of all government officers in the proper position (Chairiyah et al., 2020).

Competency is the first factor to be targeted in the bureaucratic reform for government personnel. The open promotion gives a wide space for all candidates to fill the position whenever suitable

for their abilities. Strategic bureaucrat positions are reserved for those who possess adequate skills instead of seniority. Competency tests conducted in the open promotion system include technical, managerial, and socio-cultural competencies by the law's mandate. These competencies are tested through various examinations that every participant must take. The forms of selection include a written test, interview, presentation, and psychological test. Technical competence is carried out by making papers by candidates with topics according to the field of the position being applied. The paper can show the candidate's level of knowledge and skills for the job to be filled. The second stage is the interview, and the third stage is managerial skills conducted at the assessment center owned by a local university or other organization. For local governments that do not have an assessment center, managerial competence tests are replaced by psychometric or similar tests by the selection committee to determine the candidate's ability to manage the organization. Competency assessment also examines the candidate's track record by conducting an open-public opinion. The committee allows the public to send their opinion on a particular candidate. In addition, the public is welcome to report the candidate's behaviour.

The specific skills needed for government employees in Indonesia are socio-cultural abilities. Socio-cultural competence aims to determine public officials' behaviour, adaptability, and empathy for the plurality of society. This ability is crucial for public officials, considering Indonesia is a multi-ethnic country with different religions, cultures, and social strata. The competency test result is on the candidates' list with their scores and announces publicly. In this case, the public will notice the best and worst candidates. Since open promotion for middle-high positions is based on competence and a transparent mechanism, it produces competent government officers (Nurwana, 2016; Yusdar & Irwansyah, 2018). Regarding the new open promotion model, the reform abolished the close-conventional system heavily influenced by the military promotion model.

Equality

The implementation of the merit concept in Indonesian civil servant resource management is regulated in Law No. 5 of 2014 on State Civil Administration which states that government institutions must implement a merit system in civil servant management. An open promotion system provides equal opportunity for qualified civil servants to get the desired position. The open promotion system carried out by the central and local governments has different characteristics from the promotion system before the bureaucratic reform. Job vacancies are

publicly announced offline in local media and on the organization's website. All requirements, selection steps, and schedule information are informed clearly. The open announcement is the first distinguishing characteristic of the new model, which was run in silent mode at the hand of each local government human resource agency. The public promotion announcement shows every qualified civil servant has the right to get an intended promotion as their wishes and will. The open promotion gives equal opportunity to every civil servant that meets the requirement to pursue a career in accordance with their skills and competence. The mechanism also brings out the second positive characteristic of open promotion: the candidate's active participation. The open promotion system allows candidates actively pursue their career path, to have initiatives to participate in the promotion and follow all the steps in the selection process and compete fairly under public scrutiny.

This mechanism was not found when the local human resources body conducted conventional promotion. The career and promotion of local officers' are handled by a specific team force called the position and rank assessment body. It works as a talent pool, identifying vacant positions, searching for qualified government officials, investigating their track records, and proposing candidates to fill those positions (Sulistiawaty, 2016). It was the only one that fully controlled government officials' careers. The mechanism made the employee passive towards his career, otherwise using this body as a career pulley instrument. However, open promotion has changed those practices. Civil servants interested in higher positions must actively register as candidates and take the fit-and-proper test, competing with the other qualified candidates (BPKP, 2014). The candidates' active role in getting the promotion will significantly affect their attitude and work performance. Motivation and positive attitudes will arise from candidates actively pursuing the desired position (Swales & Blackburn, 2016). Furthermore, A fair ambience in public organizations directly impacts employee motivation (Jankelová et al., 2022).

The open promotion has changed the paradigm that strategic positions provide for senior civil servants; civil servants only need to be patient and work for years to achieve an important position in a government organization. That system is effortless and taken for granted. However, the criteria to post at middle and high positions are determined by the rank order list and other requirements defined by the promotion task force body. The unclear requirements lead to many ways to get the jobs since several candidates will have equal opportunities.

The stages and mechanisms of open promotion of each organization can be different. However, in principle, all of them have something in common, the fact that the promotion is announced publicly, the steps are clear, it involves competency and psychological tests, and it invites external assessors. In general, the steps are conducted as follows: 1) Public announcement in mass media, 2) The committee announces the selection stages, 3) The selection stages include administrative selection, managerial competency, and field of competency assessment, 4) The assessment involves written exam, psychometry, interview, and presentation, 5) the selection committee will publicly announce the result of each stage, 6) the committee will announce three best candidates who will then be assessed by the head of regional government, 7) The final result will be written down on an official decree. This system provides equal opportunities for any candidate to participate in the selection and get the same treatment as long as they meet the qualifications as regulated by law (Zainal Abidin, 2020).

Political Intervention

Open promotion conducted by local governments is an implementation of the law's mandate to improve government organizations' performance. Appointing competent employees is an effort to apply the general postulate in human resource management to hire the best people for the job, the right man in the right place at the right time. The open promotion mechanism has established the regulations for competency-based selection when choosing the three best candidates with the highest scores from the whole selection process. Through different types of competence tests, the model of the middle-high rank government officials is symmetrical with that of merit principles. This model avoids conflicts among candidates, and only the best three will come to the final stage. It is by law. Indeed, the elected-local leader, the CEO, has the authority to appoint, transfer, and dismiss a civil servant by Law No. 5 of 2014, article 1 (14), and Article 53 (State Civil Service Agency, 2015). Therefore, the involvement of regional leaders in appointing regional-level officials is legal under the law. This policy is implemented by placing the selection by the regional head at the end of the whole selection process. This process is no longer inside the scope of the selection committee's work, which ends after the three best candidates are chosen.

The decision by the regional heads no longer uses a numerical approach or ranks. The decision regarding which candidate will be chosen is entirely in the hands of the regional chiefs. The reasons and

considerations of who will be selected all depend on the mayor/regent/governor. Some informants stated that the final decision was entirely based on non-technical reasons from the regional heads who desired to choose an official who could cooperate with them. By some informants, the non-competence-based decision-making process is called "creating a good chemistry" between the boss and the employee. This legal model makes the officers more vulnerable to the Mayor or The Governor's maneuver, and the senior officer's destiny dependent on their hands. The intervention of political leaders by the Mayor or The Governor is allowed by laws, which is symmetrical with merit values. This model is believed to enhance collaboration between senior officers and the Mayor or The Governor. However, this system is particularly disadvantageous in the spirit of modernization Indonesia of government organization management.

The intense exercise of control from elected-popular leaders to administration personnel management partly answers the heavy intertwined between politics and administration at the local level. This model puts senior government officers as the Mayor or The Governor's assets. Such a system is reversed with the government officer's task and the oath, which worked based on regulations and state representatives. The Mayor or The governor will come and go, but the government officers will remain and work steadily to deliver state or local responsibility to the people. On the other hand, involving political actors through the involvement of regional heads is also considered a political intervention in the bureaucracy at the regional level. Regional leaders are deemed to have political interests and specific calculations that will affect the bureaucratic system, which is supposed to be neutral and work for the public interests. The high level of bureaucratic political intervention, in this case, the placement of civil servants, affects the neutrality of civil servants in the elections. The selections for high-ranking Indonesian bureaucrats are according to the merit system, which involves the candidates' qualifications, competence, and work performance. The section also conducts transparency and gives equal opportunity for qualified candidates without discriminating against political backgrounds, race, skin colour, religion, ethnicity, gender, marital status, age, or disabilities. However, this open recruitment system has yet to break the chain of political intervention toward the bureaucracy. The final decision of the open promotion is given to the popular elected official with unlimited power over local personnel management. Therefore, managing personnel resources at the regional level faces difficulties in distinguishing the political and administrative dichotomy (Zainal Abidin, 2020).

Hybrid Model

The open promotion mechanism shows that the merit and spoils concept is used in one package. Moreover, the open promotion model conducted under the bureaucratic reform umbrella not only utilizes competence-based techniques but also accommodates the authority of regional heads as political actors to execute their rights and obligations as the head of the human resources department at the regional level.

A selection with a competence-based mechanism, administrative, and psychological assessment to evaluate the candidates based on their ranks, ability, skills, emotional intelligence, and maturity is carried out by utilizing a variety of tests and stages and involving experts from outside of the organization. This mechanism proves that the government of Indonesia has implemented the merit system comprehensively. The next stage is a political process that allows the regional leaders to perform a selection and make the final decision. The involvement of political interest in modern bureaucracy management is not a new thing. However, when states perform bureaucratic reforms by earnestly implementing the merit system, politicians still maintain their authority to regulate the staff working under them (Colonnelli et al., 2020).

Political intervention in government personnel management possesses some advantages. First, it is able to improve employees' motivation since the official with the highest rank directly chooses them. The second advantage is increasing cohesion between regional leaders and civil servants due to the presence of ideological understanding. However, promotion based on political calculation also has some disadvantages. To start with, it can result in patronage phenomena. The chosen official may experience political confusion. As a public servant, one must be neutral and work for the public interest, not be influenced by partisan or constituent factors. Furthermore, one is concerned that one is chosen as a reward for the elected official (Ngusmanto, 2016) winning team, and voters. One of winning team element which have little attention from scholars is bureaucrat. Although, normatively, bureaucrats are required to neutral in all type of general election, but in fact bureaucrats is very involved deeply in general elections. Based on empirical research in Sintang District and Ketapang District, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, we found that bureaucrats have a significant role as a winning team in pilkada (direct election for local leader. The selection system with political background is feared to obscure the candidate's competence *"....it can also be used to engage in patronage practices: public sector jobs could be used to reward political supporters of the*

party in power. Patronage represents apparent friction in the selection of a high-quality public workforce since political support can act as a substitute for individual competence ...» (Colonnelli et al., 2020).

The hybrid between Merit and Spoils in personnel resource management of civil servants at the regional level shows that the spoils system has not entirely disappeared from public administration and modern government. As stated by Wilson, the presence of political forces in the government also depicts that the administration-politics dichotomy is not feasible. The management of government organizations cannot be carried out without the presence of political forces.

CONCLUSION

The hybrid model reflects a local administration system in Indonesia's modern governance. However, government officers are a bureaucratic machine that will stay despite the comes-and-goes model of the Mayors or the Governors. The personnel management should be free of political intervention and run on a competence basis; two bodies will be more effective in a functionally fragmented situation. However, a transparency selection in the first stage is clouded by political forces since, in the end, the regional heads will utilize non-technical indicators to choose the senior officers when deciding. This model reveals that government organizations in Indonesia are not fully independent bureaucratic institutions based on merit but work under the shadows of political forces.

The implementation of open promotion for structural officials at the regional level in the corridor of bureaucratic reform is conducted with a very different mechanism than the personnel promotion-task force mechanism. The new selection process provide transparency and credible selection system are ensured, the model of the local seniors officers selection offer advantages because of the mechanisms are based on the competence to assess technical abilities; one's rank is considered one of the administrative requirements, and the candidates' maturity is evaluated using a psychometry test. The selection steps have been specifically designed to consider and measure the candidates' abilities, a competency test conducted by an independent assessment team which illustrates that open promotion under public administration mechanism. On the other hand, the appointment of the winner of the selection process by regional heads as the popular elected political leader reflects of political power. The characteristic of the Merit-Spoils hybrid model is shown in the selection of the three best candidates

and allowing the regional heads to make the final decision. Combining the administrative-politics model in the open promotion for the structural position is a unique choice for Indonesia government official' management in Indonesia.

The intervention of politics on public administration actually does not need to be debated whether it exists or not because the facts show that favouritism-based practices still exist in this modern administration era. Stančetić (2020) writing very clearly shows how the spoils system still survives in the Balkan countries and is common in developed countries. This paper reveals how the hybrid model is run in parallel as a bridge to accommodate the modern administrative process and to provide a mechanism for the popular elected Mayor/Governor to channel their political passion as policymakers. Despite the fact of Indonesia's bureaucratic reform, which is believed to be influenced by a global wave of neoliberalism through new public management concepts, however, the long and strong patrimonial legacy makes it shift to a local contextual ambience (Gaus et al., 2016).

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