

PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES: NEW, OLD, OR HYBRID PROFESSIONALISM?

Shinjiro Yabuki

Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy of Japan,
1-10-20, Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, Japan
Email: shinjiroyabuki@outlook.jp

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the special characteristics of the military professionalism of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI). TNI, which once held strong political power during the Suharto era, was transformed into a professional military that follows the principle of civilian supremacy and has not been involved in politics since its military reform in 1998. It seems to have changed from a military of new professionalism that dominates the politics of the nation, to a military of old professionalism that focuses purely on defence missions. However, the TNI's missions are not limited to national defence, as it also carries out non-military missions, such as territorial development (*pembinaan teritorial*, Binter). This paper uses qualitative data collected through interviews with relevant personnel of defence and security sectors. This paper analyzes the TNI's extensive non-military missions and its organized structure that are the old system of the Suharto era, sometimes criticized from the framework of conventional, western military norms. As a result, I argue that this old system is effective in conducting operations and that the TNI's professionalism is neither old, nor new, but what I call hybrid professionalism, which fits the Indonesian history and society.

Keywords: military professionalism; civil-military relations; Indonesian armed forces; military reform

ABSTRAK. Penelitian ini menganalisis karakteristik profesionalisme Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). TNI, yang pernah memiliki kekuatan politik yang kuat pada era Suharto, telah bertransformasi menjadi tentara profesional yang mengikuti prinsip supremasi sipil dan tidak terlibat dalam politik sejak masa reformasi pada tahun 1998. Tampaknya TNI telah berubah dari tentara profesionalisme baru (new professionalism) yang mendominasi politik negara, menjadi tentara profesionalisme lama (old professionalism) yang berfokus pada misi pertahanan. Namun, misi TNI tidak terbatas hanya pada pertahanan negara, karena TNI juga menjalankan misi non-militer, seperti pembinaan teritorial (Binter). Studi ini menggunakan data kualitatif yang dikumpulkan melalui wawancara dengan personil dari sektor pertahanan dan keamanan yang relevan. Penelitian ini menganalisis misi non-militer TNI yang luas dan struktur organisasinya yang merupakan sistem lama dari masa orde baru, yang kadang-kadang mendapat kritik dari kerangka norma militer negara barat yang konvensional. Hasilnya, saya berpendapat bahwa sistem lama ini efektif dalam pelaksanaan operasi dan bahwa profesionalisme TNI bukanlah profesionalisme lama, juga bukan profesionalisme baru, melainkan profesionalisme hibrida (hybrid professionalism) yang sesuai dengan latar sejarah dan masyarakat Indonesia.

Kata kunci: profesionalisme militer; hubungan sipil-militer; Tentara Nasional Indonesia; reformasi militer

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations is a broad field of research, encompassing the entire range of relations between the military and civil society at all levels, focusing on the problem of how to create a military strong enough to protect the state from external and internal threats, while at the same time preventing it from dominating the state (Feaver, 1999; Alagappa, 2001). This requires ensuring civilian control over the military while improving military effectiveness, which means enhancing military professionalism (Bruneau & Matei, 2015).

Huntington (1957) presented three classical elements of military professionalism. These are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 'Expertise' is knowledge and skill in a significant field which is acquired by prolonged education and experience. 'Responsibility' is the soldier's responsibility to the society. Their efforts should be in the service of the people and society for the promotion of social welfare. 'Corporateness' is a sense of organic unity which

is nurtured by discipline, training for professional competence and a common bond of work. He also stated that to improve professionalism, the military should be separated from society and politics and dedicated to defence missions.

Although Huntington argued that a professional military concentrates on security missions, Stepan (1988), who studied mainly South American militaries, argued that when the military's primary missions are national development or internal security, the professionalization of the military becomes more politicized. This is because, the military sees itself as the guardian of the state, and as such is involved in politics. Huntington's professionalism is called old professionalism, while Stepan's is called new professionalism.

Let us consider this old/new professionalism in the case of TNI. The definition of the TNI's professionalism is stipulated in Law No. 34 of 2004 on Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI Law). It states that "a professional military is well-trained, educated and equipped, not involved in practical

politics, guaranteed welfare, obeys to state political policies, follows the principle of democracy, civilian supremacy, fundamental human rights, the provisions of national law and ratified international law.” These professional elements can be divided into a political and an operational aspect. The political aspect relates to the norms and attitudes of TNI soldiers not to be involved in politics, not to engage in business activities, and to adhere to the principle of civilian superiority. The operational aspect relates to the effective implementation of operations, through modernization of equipment, enhancement of training and education, and a guarantee of soldier’s welfare. These values are similar to the professional norm of Western countries, but not the same.

The TNI’s peculiarity lies in its missions.

TNI conducts non-military missions, such as territorial development¹ which consists of providing social services to the local population in the fields of infrastructure, healthcare, education etc., based on its territorial command structure². Therefore, it is difficult to say that TNI has completely transformed itself into a military of old professionalism.

According to the TNI law of 2004, the TNI’s missions consist of military operations for war (*Operasi Militer untuk Perang*, OMP) and military operations other than war (*Operasi Militer Selain Perang*, OMSP). Within the article of OMSP, there are two missions. These are, (1) to strengthen the defence and support capability of the region for the total defence system, (2) supporting local government. These articles are the legal basis of territorial developments.

TNI reformed itself to enhance professionalism after the democratization. However, neither Huntington’s old professionalism nor Stepan’s new professionalism can explain the TNI’s professionalism. During the Suharto era, TNI played an important political role as the guardian of the state under the dual-function doctrine (*Dwifungsi ABR*), stipulating that TNI possesses a socio-political function (Sospol) as well as a defence and security function (Hankam). For this reason, TNI can be classified as part of a new professionalism during the Suharto era. After the democratization in 1998, TNI withdrew from the political arena. TNI seems to have transformed into a military of old professionalism, but TNI conducts extensive non-military missions.

TNI’s professionalism is to follow the principle of civilian supremacy, in the sense of not being involved in politics, but their missions are not limited to the military field. To understand the TNI’s professionalism, it is necessary to understand the concept of territorial development. According to

the army doctrine, which is primarily responsible for territorial development, the army maintains two main functions. These are war fighting function and territorial development function (Army Doctrine Kartika Eka Paksi, 2020). In other words, territorial development is not an additional mission for TNI, but equally important as the military’s main task, which is combat. Therefore. It would be difficult to elucidate the unique characteristic of the TNI’s professionalism without understanding their broad social services through the territorial development.

The purpose of this paper is to examine why TNI, which seems to have transformed into a professional military, still conducts non-military mission such as territorial development. I also explain the specific form of the TNI’s military professionalism, I call this hybrid professionalism, which follows the principle of civilian supremacy and is not involved in politics while conducting extensive non-military missions.

This paper assumes that The Suharto era’s old system of territorial command structure and activities of territorial development has been effective in conducting military operations other than war (*operasi militer selain perang*: OMSP) against non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, natural disasters, etc. The research novelty of this paper is that I reevaluate the significance of the old system of the Suharto era in contemporary society, which has been criticized as preserving corporate interests of the military and interfering in civilian activities (Bradford, 2005; Heiduk, 2011). This paper verifies that the old system transformed from a political instrument into the operational instrument which fits the democratic era.

METHOD

This paper uses a qualitative method, with primary sources in the form of interviews with relevant personnel working in the defence and security sectors, as well as documents published by TNI. The interview participants include the first head of National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), BNPB officials and a retired TNI officer. As secondary sources, this paper uses newspapers, journals and other works on civil-military relations in Indonesia. In order to analyze the TNI’ professionalism and verify the effectiveness of territorial development in conducting OMSP, I first chronologically examine the transition of the security and political environment surrounding TNI, and values and ideas of the officer corps. Second, I examine the TNI’s new role and territorial development in the democratic era. Finally, I explain the unique character of the TNI’ military professionalism.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Dual Functions Doctrine and New Professionalism

To examine the political involvement of the military, it is important to know the role it played in the history of the nation. In particular, where militaries have played a significant role during state building, they tend to be more influential in post-independence government. Indonesia is a typical example of this. An independent Indonesian state was declared in August 1945 after nearly 300 years of Dutch colonial rule, followed by three and a half years of Japanese occupation. Right after independence, Indonesia went into war with the Netherlands. In the process of the war, a common consciousness developed among the officer corps. It is the sense that TNI was created by the people, not by civilian politicians, and that TNI should continue to play an important role in the society even after the war (Jenkins, 2010). This idea stems from the history that civilian leaders surrendered to the Dutch army, while TNI continued to struggle alongside the people and eventually won the victory. During the absence of civilian leadership, TNI also played a political role. Thus, the officer corps came to believe that its views and opinions should be reflected in national and local politics after the war, blurring the boundary between the military and political/economic spheres (Said, 2006).

TNI conducted a guerrilla warfare during the war. The total people's war doctrine was a military strategy created by General Nasution based on his own experience during the war. The concept of the doctrine was utilizing all available resources in the battle area and operating troops in a mobile and flexible way in Indonesia's rugged terrain. The troops should be led with strong leadership not only in the defence field but also political, economic, social and ideological fields from the local to the national level (Nasution, 1965). Therefore, the philosophy of Indonesian national defence is total defence which comprises not only the military sphere but also the civilian sphere. This concept is related to the TNI's territorial command structure and territorial development.

The political situation after the war also influenced the ideas of the officer corps. The political system of post-independence Indonesia is a parliamentary democracy. Among the various political parties, no dominant party emerged, resulting in successive short-lived coalition governments. Initially TNI followed the principle of civilian supremacy, but it saw seemingly unstable governments and raised doubts about democracy. As a result, it developed a sense that TNI should participate in politics. This idea led to the concept of the 'middle way' (*jalan tengah*) proclaimed by

General Nasution. The 'middle way' stipulated that the position of TNI was neither just a civilian instrument, like in Western countries, nor a military regime that dominates state power, but one of many forces in society, working together with the people (Wiranatakusumah, 2000).

Political instability led to corruption, administrative inefficiency and economic stagnation, that disappointed those who had high expectations for independence and democracy. The first president Sukarno was also dissatisfied with the parliamentary democracy, arguing for a concept of what he called 'guided democracy' (*demokrasi terpimpin*), in which the president exercises strong leadership. In 1959, Sukarno revived the 1945 Constitution, dissolved parliament, made all parliament members appointed by the president, and restricted the right of political parties. In his defence, Sukarno claimed this was not a dictatorship, but rather a system guided by the wisdom of the president, suitable to the Indonesian society. In order to bolster his regime, he began to rely on TNI, sending many military officers into the legislative, as well as into the administrative and economic spheres. These policies coincided with the interests of TNI. In the era of 'guided democracy', the role and importance of TNI in non-military sphere had increased. This trend developed into the dual-function doctrine stipulated that TNI possesses socio-political functions as well as defence and security functions, and was formally adopted at the army seminar in 1966 (Crouch, 1978).

General Suharto seized power through a series of moves of the G30S in 1965, an incident that six generals was murdered by a group of the military personnel influenced by communist ideology. He institutionalized Sukarno's system which had relied heavily on his personal charisma. The character of Suharto regime was that he sought to conceal his one-man rule, through a cover of faux elections and parliamentary democracy while building a system that was favorable to himself. Suharto also declared economic development, which Sukarno had failed to achieve, as a national goal, claiming that political and social stability was needed to achieve this (Sato, 2002).

Suharto built a system of centralized power throughout the country with an administrative hierarchy from province, regency/city, subdistrict to village level, which paralleled the TNI's territorial command structure. The dual function doctrine was stipulated in the 1982 Defence Law, which legitimized the TNI's socio-political function. TNI played an important role in maintaining Suharto's regime, through closely associating with Golkar, functional groups that served as a ruling party (Robinson, 2001). As described above, TNI was a typical example of

the new professionalism described by Stepan during the Suharto era. However, the norm and attitude of socio-political role of TNI dramatically changed after democratization and its military reform.

TNI's new paradigm and the reform to the old professionalism

In May 1998, 32-year long Suharto regime came to an end as a result of the strong democratic movement triggered by the Asian financial crisis. Societal pressure for democratic reforms extended to the TNI reform. TNI held a seminar in September 1998 and formulated a policy entitled 'The New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru)'. This new policy was the TNI's paradigm shift from the traditional conception of the Suharto era to the democratic era. The TNI's socio-political functions were reviewed as follows, a shift from a controlling military to an influential military, providing constructive advice to the civilian authorities without direct involvement in politics, and TNI will not be at the forefront in all areas, but will promote a division of roles with other civilian institutions. Next, the new paradigm stipulates that the TNI's role in democratic era should concentrate on the defence and security field in order to be an effective professional military. The Ministry of Defence, a civilian institution, is responsible for formulating defence policy and allocating the defence budget, and TNI carries out its operations (Paradigma Baru, 1998).

This new norm is also reflected in the 2004 TNI Law. Although a paradigm shift has occurred, there are several values and ideas that have remained. These are to uphold 'Pancasila', as the Indonesian national philosophy, the 1945 Constitution, patriotism, and devotion to the nation and the people. The code of conduct as soldiers, such as the Seven Oaths (Sapta Marga) and the Soldier's Oath (Sumpah Prajurit)³, did not change. Therefore, only the idea and interpretation relating to political involvement have changed.

Amid strong public pressure, TNI accepted democratic reforms by civilian politicians, as well as reforming itself. Major security sector reforms in Indonesia took place between 1998 and 2004. Significant structural changes include: elimination of the post of Chief of Social Politics Staff TNI and the dual function doctrine, separation of TNI and national police (POLRI), abolition of the military seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), enactment of the 2004 TNI Law which stipulates professional military norms (Defence White Paper, 2003). There were a lot of discussion about the reasons that contributed to the peaceful and successful military reform. For example, TNI played a key role in the democratization process and TNI was able to preserve its political influence

within the new government, and civilian leaders did not demand more ambitious reform agenda and left it to the TNI's plan (Laksmiana, 2019; Croissant, 2018; Djuyandi, 2015), the strong public pressure for reform, and stable relationships between political parties after democratization (Mietzner, 2008; Robinson, 2001).

The TNI's new role and territorial development in the democratic era

The major threats to Indonesia before democratization were external threats during the war of independence (i.e. Royal Netherlands Army) and internal threats such as communism and separatist movement. In order to cope with those strong internal and external threats, TNI developed the 'Total People's Defence and Security System' (*Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta: Sishankamrata*) in the Suharto era. The root of the doctrine is Nasution's total people's war, and Sishankamrata has later become 'Total Defence System' (*Sistem Pertahanan Semesta*) in the democratic era. The name of the defence strategy has been changed but the fundamental character has not changed. The Indonesian national defence is a total defence that integrates military defence and non-military defence, involving all citizens, regions, resources and national infrastructure.

The threat perception of the MoD and TNI mainly concerns non-traditional threats such as terrorism, natural disasters, drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms smuggling and piracy. They also concern China's military modernization, considering economic growth and growing influence in the South China sea (Defence White Paper, 2015). In sum, the TNI's perceived threats in the democratic era are non-traditional threats and external threat (i.e. rising China). Traditionally, Indonesia confronted with strong internal threats but the importance of external threats has increased. This has led to an increase in the defence budget and improved the TNI's military effectiveness.

During the Suharto era, internal threats such as communism were strong, therefore political and ideological stability was needed, thus TNI played a political role. The end of the Cold War brought structural changes. In order to deal with contemporary threats, TNI needs to focus on defence missions and to improve its military effectiveness. The shift of security environment has changed TNI from playing a political role to an operational role. However, TNI still conducts non-military missions, such as the territorial development. TNI's growing involvement in civil affair have been criticized as a step backwards in military reform⁴.

The concept of territorial development involves a continuous and direct interaction between TNI and the people in order to achieve their unity for the protection of the sovereignty and territory of the nation (Ltkol Suteja, 2020). Village Guidance NCOs (*Bintara Pembina Desa*: Babinsa) carry out activities of territorial development in direct contact with local people at the village level. Babinsa are supposed to listen to the demands and problems of the local people in order to solve them through communication. Examples include constructing and repairing roads and bridges, providing medical support, education to the local people for cultivating patriotism and awareness of national defence, etc. These activities have increased the reputation of the military among society (Esty, 2019).

While Babinsa conduct these activities, they observe the situation in the villages, as well as potential threats to the regions. As a result, Babinsa can identify suspicious persons or activities in the area. It contributes to the effective implementation of counter-terrorism operations by TNI. Regarding disaster relief operations, according to the National Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*: BNPB), TNI has information on the geography, economy, society and the situation of the people and always communicates with them⁵. TNI's territorial commands (*Satuan Komando Wilayah*: Satkowil) cooperate with the local governments at province, regency, city, subdistrict and village levels, thus they are capable of effective coordination when disasters occurred⁶. TNI was also active in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The army chief of staff, General Andika Perkasa, was appointed as the national COVID-19 committee's vice chairman in 2020. TNI, mainly through its territorial command, conducted the territorial operations of vaccination across the country. The TNI's these activities won the public's trust and improved its popularity.

Territorial development is also important in the area where separatist movements are active. The TNI commander, General Andika Perkasa, presented his policy of focusing on territorial development in Papua. He directly instructed commanders in the 18th Military Regional Command (Kodam) and 181st Military Regency Command (Korem) to strengthen the activities of territorial development in 2022⁷. His successor, Admiral Yudo Margono, right after his inauguration as the TNI commander, also reported to President Jokowi that TNI intended to focus on territorial operations rather than military operations in Papua⁸. This shows that TNI considers territorial development is effective against separatist movements.

Having examined the TNI's territorial development as described above, there is one thing

that has become clear. It is the similarity with the US military doctrine of counter-insurgency (COIN). The key concept here is how to win the hearts and minds of the people. Although the US military won a quick and decisive victory with overwhelming firepower in the Iraq war, stability operations did not proceed smoothly after the military victory. The US military began to recognize the importance of COIN operation and established the principles of it. These principles include understanding the society, culture and interest of the local people, and utilizing political, security, legal, economic, developmental activities in corporation with the locals and relevant institutions, to gain popular support through continuous communication. These are same as the concept of TNI's territorial development. Of course, there is a fundamental difference between them, because the US military's COIN operation is conducted outside the home country, while TNI's territorial operation is usually conducted inside the country. However, TNI recognizes the importance of the winning hearts and minds of the local residents, through its experience of the independence war and the effort dealing with various internal threats. TNI has been practicing these principles for the unity of TNI and people, long before the US military creates the COIN doctrine.

Hybrid Professionalism of TNI

The TNI's professionalism appears to have changed from new-professionalism to old-professionalism after democratization. The current TNI's professionalism is unique, in that it doesn't involve in politics and abides by the principle of civilian superiority, as well as conducting extensive non-military activities. The important clues are the TNI's territorial command structure and territorial development. The idea behind territorial development is to find out the problems that local people have and solve them, and achieve unity between TNI and the people, through which TNI develops the potential of the territory and improves the resilience of the nation. However, there is also criticism about it. TNI's direct political involvement at national level has been abolished, but the involvement at local levels still exists through the territorial command structure (Bradford, 2004). This paper clarified the effectiveness of the territorial command structure and territorial development when TNI conducts military operation other than war (OMSP) against non-traditional threats which are considered to be the major threats of TNI and the nation in the democratic era, such as disaster relief, terrorism and separatist movements.

According to TNI, the purpose of territorial development is national defence, and it is not

carried out by TNI alone, but in cooperation with other national institutions⁹. Another TNI officer explains that TNI historically perceived a high external threat from the Netherlands as well as domestic threats, which required maintaining the unity of TNI and the people, in order to integrate the national resources and efforts to secure peace and order of the country. He also explained that the TNI's professionalism differs from that of other countries because of differences in historical background (Ltkol Suteja, 2020). Another officer said that a professional military is one that protects people and conducts missions to do so. A professional military has to fulfill social responsibility. Military operations other than war, such as disaster relief, and territorial development are missions of TNI stipulated in the 2004 TNI law. For this reason, this is the professional military that accomplishes these missions and that the TNI's professionalism is different from the professionalism of Western states.

The TNI's professionalism differs from the old professionalism of Huntington, in which a military should concentrate on defence missions without political involvement. Some argue that the TNI's professionalism resembles a new professionalism of Stepan, because of the TNI's extensive non-military activities through territorial development (Esty, 2019). TNI could be characterized by new professionalism during the Suharto era, however TNI in the democratic era conducts extensive non-military missions but makes no efforts to politically control the nation. In sum, TNI contains elements of both old and new military professionalism, but falls into neither category.

During the Suharto era, TNI exercised the dual-function doctrine comprising both defence and security functions as well as socio-political functions, and wielded strong political influence. After democratization, national police were separated from TNI, military seats in the diet were abolished and the assignment of military personnel to civilian posts was prohibited. TNI's dual-function was abolished and institutionally withdrawn from the formal political process. Therefore, it can be said that TNI's political and security functions were separated from civilian politician and police, and now possess defence and social functions. This is the unique character of TNI. The TNI's professionalism is the mixture of old and new professionalism, that it has developed. I call this 'hybrid military professionalism'. It is not a military that returns to the barracks and devotes itself solely to defence missions as Huntington describes. Nor is it a military engaged in internal security and national development missions, which dominates the state as Stepan describes. In other words, it is a

military that is dedicated to its duties in accordance with the principle of civilian supremacy, without political involvement, while engaging in a wide range of social services.

Let me now consider the question I posed at the beginning of this paper. Why TNI, which seems to have transformed into a professional military, conducts extensive non-military missions such as territorial development. The fundamental concept of TNI's way of battle is total defence against an overwhelming invading enemy by utilizing all the resources, infrastructure and personnel in the territory. To this end, TNI believes it is important to develop the defence potential of the territory in peacetime. Therefore, it doesn't contradict the TNI's professionalism in the sense that the military repairs roads and bridges, builds schools, provides drug prevention education in schools and medical supports in local societies. These non-military activities are the preparation for their effective operations, fulfilling their social responsibility, and these activities are stipulated by the law. The territorial command structure and territorial development are inseparable elements of the TNI's professionalism. TNI originated from the people, out of the national revolution. The military's character, missions and activities are influenced by the history, culture and politics of each country. The relationship between the military and society in Indonesia differs from that of many Western countries. This paper has identified the TNI's specific professionalism. This hybrid professionalism is created by Indonesia's particular history, security environment and political situation and it is adapted to the society in the democratic era.

CONCLUSION

This paper verified that the TNI's territorial command structure and territorial development, which have been criticized as a hotbed of corporate interests, contribute to the effective implementation of military operations other than war. TNI has successfully transformed these old systems of the Suharto era from a political instrument to an operational instrument. I also verified that the unique form of the TNI's professionalism. It is a hybrid professionalism to fulfil social responsibility and develops the defence potential of the nation. Although this paper discussed the TNI's military professionalism descriptively, future work is needed to empirically examine the TNI's military effectiveness in terms of military modernization, training and education and soldier's income, etc. based on data analysis.

Note

- 1 Territorial development (*pembinaan teritorial*) is a TNI's non-military mission consist of regional resilience development (*pembinaan ketahanan wilayah*, Bintawil), TNI service (*Bakti TNI*) and social communication (*komunikasi sosial*, Komsos). Examples of activities for territorial development, TNI repairs roads and bridges, provides medical service and education in schools for drug prevention and the cultivation of patriotism, through which TNI intends to achieve the unity of TNI and local people.
- 2 Territorial Command Structure is the structure of Indonesian Army, which paralleled the civilian administration from province level to the village level, (Crouch, 1978).
- 3 These codes of conduct of TNI state the loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, being a guardian of the state and the people, soldier's value of justice, patriotism, honesty, dedication, courage and discipline.
- 4 "On 76th anniversary, watchdog highlights TNI's growing involvement in civil affairs," *CNN Indonesia*, 6 October 2021, <https://www.indoleft.org/news/2021-10-06/on-76th-anniversary-watchdog-highlights-tnis-growing-involvement-in-civil-affairs.html>.
- 5 Interview with staff members of BNPB, 6 December 2022.
- 6 Interview with Maj Gen. (ret.) Syamsul Ma'arif, the first head of BNPB, 6 December 2022.
- 7 "General Andika: Community Territorial Development TNI Focus in Papua," *West Papua Daily News*, 9 February 2022, <https://westpapuadaily.com/general-andika-community-territorial-development-tni-focus-in-papua.html>.
- 8 "TNI's humane approach welcomed yet stay firm in Papua: Jokowi," *ANTARANEWS.com*, 19 December 2022, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/266294/tnis-humane-approach-welcomed-yet-stay-firm-in-papua-jokowi>.
- 9 "Binter dan Koter," Website TNI, <https://tni.mil.id/view-1710-binter-dan-koter.html>.
- 10 Interview with TNI Maj Gen (ret.), 6 December 2022.

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